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Zusammenfassung
Die in dieser Arbeit dargestellten Studien beru¨hren eine große Bandbreite von The-
men in der Arbeitso¨konomik, Bildungso¨konomik und Entwicklungso¨konomik, wobei ein
gemeinsamer Nenner der Schwerpunkt auf die Lo¨sung von Problemen statistischer En-
dogenita¨t im Rahmen der jeweiligen empirischen Forschungsfrage darstellt. Kapitel 2
verwendet ein Regression Discontinuity Design, um den Effekt einer Rentenku¨rzung auf
das Arbeitsangebot anhand von Rentendaten niedrigqualifizierter Deutscher zu bestim-
men. Kapitel 3 bis 5 wenden sich Fragen in Bezug auf Bildung und Arbeitsangebot in
Entwicklungsla¨ndern zu.
Um den Effekt starker Rentenku¨rzungen auf das Arbeitsangebot zu scha¨tzen, nutzt
die Analyse in Kapitel 2 drei Natu¨rliche Experimente aus, bei denen solche Rentenku¨rzun-
gen eine Gruppe u¨berwiegend geringqualifizierter deutscher Spa¨taussiedler betraf. In
zwei dieser Natu¨rlichen Expermiente wurde die Rente um 8 bis 16 Prozent geku¨rzt,
jedoch zeigen die Regression Discontinuity-Scha¨tzungen keine statistisch signifikante
Verzo¨gerung des Renteneintritts. Dieses Ergebnis kann nicht dadurch erkla¨rt werden,
dass die Rentenku¨rzung eine selektive Erho¨hung Mortalita¨t verursacht ha¨tte. In einem
dritten Natu¨rlichen Experiment hatten Arbeitnehmer starke Anreize, einer Rentenku¨rzung
durch vorgezogenen Renteneintritt auszuweichen. Die Analyse zeigt jedoch, dass es
auch hier keinen signifikanten Effekt auf den Renteneintrittszeitpunkt gab. In der
Gesamtbetrachtung sind diese Ergebnisse konsistent mit der Interpretation, dass es fu¨r
niedrigqualifizierte a¨ltere Deutsche angesichts eines im Verha¨ltnis zum Rentenniveau
relativ geringen Marktlohnes optimal ist, so fru¨h, wie es institutionelle Rahmenbedin-
gungen erlauben, in Rente zu gehen.
Kapitel 3 wendet sich der Analyse von Daten aus einem Entwicklungsland zu. Es
beschreibt eine Haushaltsbefragung, in die die gesamte Bevo¨lkerung einer togoischen
Gemeinde in den Jahren 2008 und 2011 einbezogen wurde, wobei individuelle Beobach-
tungen zwischen den beiden Befragungswellen verknu¨pft wurden. Die hauptsa¨chliche
Motivation fu¨r die Erhebung dieser Daten war es, die Auswirkungen eines Vorschul-
projektes evaluieren zu ko¨nnen, welches zwischen den beiden Erhebungswellen in der
untersuchten Gemeinde begann. Ein Teil dieser Evaluation, der sich mit den kurzfristi-
gen Effekten auf das Arbeitsangebot von Frauen befasst, wird in Kapitel 4 dargestellt.
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In Kapitel 3 werden die Besonderheiten in der Durchfu¨hrung der Haushaltsbefragung
diskutiert und einzelne Befragungsmodule motiviert und erla¨utert. Ein Schwerpunkt
liegt hierbei auf den Alleinstellungsmerkmalen des entstandenen Datensatzes, insbeson-
dere hinsichtlich der gewonnen Maße fu¨r Zeitnutzung, Einkommensquellen und kongitive
Fa¨higkeiten der Befragten. Zwar war die Wahl der Befragungsinhalte getrieben durch
den Zweck, das Vorschulprojekt zu evaluieren, doch das Kapitel verdeutlicht auch die in-
haltliche Bandbreite der entstandenen Haushaltsdaten, die entsprechend Mo¨glichkeiten
fu¨r weiterfu¨hrende Forschung bietet.
Auf Basis der in Kapitel 3 beschriebenen Daten behandelt Kapitel 4 die Evalua-
tion des Vorschulprojekts, das in der untersuchten Gemeinde im Jahr 2010 begann.
Zuna¨chst wird in einer detaillierten deskreptiven Analyse gezeigt, dass (an Stelle alter-
nativer Maße der Betreuungssituation) insbesondere ein Indikator dafu¨r, ob alle Kinder
unter sechs Jahren einer Mutter (d.h. Kinder, die noch nicht im Grundschulalter sind)
institutionell betreut werden, relevant ist fu¨r die Stundenzahl, die eine Mutter mit
Kinderbetreuung verbringt. Zugleich zeigt sich, dass eine solche vollsta¨ndige institu-
tionelle Betreuung junger Kinder nur sehr schwach mit der Arbeitszeit der betroffenen
Mu¨tter zusammenha¨ngt.
Anschließend wird untersucht, ob dieses Ergebnis Bestand hat, wenn die empirische
Analyse die Probleme statistischer Endogenita¨t sta¨rker beru¨cksichtigt. Hierfu¨r wer-
den die Haushaltsdaten zusammengefu¨hrt mit Informationen u¨ber ein Soziales Exper-
iment, durch welches die Zulassung zur neu in der untersuchten Gemeinde errichteten
Vorschule per Zufall bestimmt wurde. Zwar gab es im beobachteten Einschulungsver-
halten starke Abweichungen von diesem randomisierten Zulassungsprozess, dennoch
erzeugte fu¨r Mu¨tter von Kindern, die fu¨r die Zulassung zur ersten Vorschulklasse angemeldet
wurden, das Soziale Experiment Variation in der Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass alle jungen
Kinder einer Mutter institutionell betreut werden. Unter Ausnutzung dieser Vari-
ation wird der Effekt einer solchen vollsta¨ndigen institutionellen Betreuung auf die
Zeitnutzung der Mu¨tter in einem Instrumental-Variablen-Modell gescha¨tzt. Zwar sind
die gescha¨tzten Effekte insbesondere auf Grund der geringen Stichprobengro¨ße nicht
statistisch signifikant, doch die Konsistenz der gescha¨tzten Koeffizienten u¨ber viele ver-
schiedene Spezifikationen und Modellvariationen hinweg legt eine Besta¨tigung des vor-
angehend deskriptiv gewonnen Ergebnisses nahe: insitutionelle Betreuung von Vorschulkindern
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verringert die Betreuungsbelastung der Mu¨tter, hierdurch steigt ihre Arbeitszeit aber
nicht in einem vergleichbaren Maß.
Kapitel 5 wendet sich einem besonderen Pha¨nomen in Grundschulen in Entwicklun-
sla¨ndern zu, das sich auch in der untersuchten togoischen Gemeinde wiederspiegelt: 20
Prozent der Schu¨ler aller Grundschulklassen wiederholen in einem laufenden Schuljahr
eine Jahrgangsstufe. Das Kapitel befasst sich mit den Konsequenzen einer so hohen
Zahl von Nicht-Versetzungen. Insbesondere geht es um die Frage, ob hierdurch Peer
Effekte erzeugt werden, dass also Mitschu¨ler eine schlechtere schulische Leistung erbrin-
gen, wenn sie gemeinsam mit vielen Wiederholern unterrichtet werden. Die fu¨r diese
Analyse verwendeten Daten basieren auf den Aufzeichnungen der Grundschulen zu den
Trimester-Punktezahlen der Grundschu¨ler aller vier Grundschulen der Gemeinde. An-
hand dieser Daten ließ sich feststellen, dass es hinsichtlich des Anteils wiederholender
Schu¨ler eine große Variation auch innerhalb von Schulen gibt. Vor dem Hintergrund der
stark durch eine leistungsbasierte Regel gepra¨gten Versetzungsentscheidung la¨sst sich
transparent darstellen, welche Faktoren diese Variation im Wiederholer-Anteil einer
Klasse erzeugen ko¨nnen. Darauf aufbauend wird argumentiert, dass die empirischen
Modelle, die fu¨r Schul-Fixed Effects sowie fu¨r vorangehende individuelle Punktezahlen
kontrollieren, den Peer Effekt des Wiederholer-Anteils identifizieren. Die Ergebnisse
zeigen, dass die Erho¨hung des Wiederholer-Anteils in einer Klasse um eine Standard-
abweichung die individuelle Punktezahl von Schu¨lern um durchschnittlich 13 Prozent
einer Standardabweichung verringert.
Schlagwo¨rter: Arbeitso¨konomik, Bildungso¨konomik, Entwicklungso¨konomik
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Abstract
This thesis covers diverse topics in the fields of labor economics, education economics
and development economics which share an emphasis on solving issues of statistical en-
dogeneity associated with the respective empirical research questions. While the anal-
ysis in chapter 2 uses a regression discontinuity design to study the impact of pension
reductions on labor supply using data from low-skilled workers in Germany, chapters 3
through 5 turn to issues of education and labor supply in developing countries.
To estimate the effects of large cuts in pensions on labor force participation, the
analysis in chapter 2 exploits three natural experiments in which such cuts affected a
group of mostly low-skilled repatriated ethnic German workers. In two of these natural
experiments, the pension rate was cut by between 8 and 16 percent, yet, according to
regression discontinuity estimates, there was no significant delay in retirement. The
results cannot be explained by selection bias due to increased mortality in response to
the reforms. In the third natural experiment, the workers were given an incentive to
avoid a pension cut by retiring earlier, but the analysis demonstrates that there was no
significant effect for earlier retirement. All these results are consistent with low-skilled
workers in Germany being frozen in a corner-solution equilibrium in which the optimal
choice is to retire as early as possible.
Chapter 3 turns to the analysis of data from developing countries. It describes a
unique household survey of the full population of a Togolese community conducted in
2008 and in 2011, linking individual observations from both survey waves. The main
motivation for collecting the data was to evaluate the impact of a preschool program
which started in the studied community in between the survey waves. Part of that eval-
uation, regarding the short-run impact on female labor supply, is discussed in chapter
4. Chapter 3 discusses particularities of the survey implementation, and it motivates
and explains the survey’s modules. Emphasis is laid on the uniqueness and quality
of its sections concerning the measurement of time use, income sources, and cognitive
skills. While the choice of topics covered by the survey has been dictated largely by its
original purpose of allowing the evaluation of a preschool project, the chapter illustrates
the richness of the data, leaving opportunities for future research.
Making use of the data described in chapter 3, chapter 4 discusses the evaluation
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of the preschool program which started in the studied community in 2010. First, in
a thorough descriptive analysis, it is shown that among measures of enrollment, an
indicator for whether a mother’s children younger than six years are all enrolled in
either preschool or primary school (which I call ”full enrollment”) is particularly relevant
to the number of hours these women spend with child care. Apparently, child care
responsibilities are high on average as soon as at least one young child remains at home,
and conditional on at least one child staying at home, other variables capturing the
number of children and their enrollment status are not associated with the mother’s time
use. Furthermore, the descriptive analysis shows that the strong relationship between
full enrollment and hours of child care is not mirrored by a comparable association
between full enrollment and hours of work.
In order to substantiate this result, endogeneity concerns need to be taken into
account. Accordingly, household data are combined with information on a social ex-
periment, where the access to a newly constructed preschool in the studied community
had been randomized. Even though compliance with randomization was poor, hav-
ing a child admitted to the first grade of preschool significantly increases a mother’s
likelihood of full enrollment. This relationship is, apparently, partly due to the random-
ization affecting primary school enrollment. In the studied community, primary schools
accept some children who would be considered too young in light of the regular school
entry age, so they constitute an alternative institution providing daycare for children.
Exploiting the variation in full enrollment induced by the randomization of access to
first grade of preschool, I estimate instrumental variables models of time use. Although,
due to the small sample size, estimated effects are generally not statistically significant,
results from a wide range of different model specifications suggest a clear pattern: full
enrollment reduces the time mothers spend caring for young children by at least three to
four hours. However, confirming the descriptive results, this effect is not accompanied
by any noticeable change in time use related to work. Since this result is in line with
OLS results for the full population of mothers of young children (including those not
participating in the preschool admission procedure), I argue that the lack of a response
in labor supply cannot be attributed solely to the short time frame of the evaluation
or to the selectivity of the sample of participants. A full evaluation of the benefits of
an expansion of publicly provided preschool education in developing countries would,
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however, have to take into account the direct benefits of such programs on participating
children.
As described in chapter 4, primary schools in the studied community accept some
children of preschool age. This leads to strong heterogeneity of students in the first
grades of primary school with respect to age and, consequently, school readiness. In
fact, this may be one of the reasons for so many primary school students failing test
score targets, and, accordingly, having to repeat a grade: on average, in the community’s
primary schools, more then 20 percent of students in each class are retained instead of
being promoted to the next grade. Chapter 5 investigates the consequences of such a
high incidence of grade repetitions. More specifically, it addresses the potential peer
effects which may result from being exposed to many repeaters.
The data used to estimate the peer effects of grade retention in chapter 5 are ad-
ministrative records of individual student trimester exam scores obtained from all four
primary schools in the studied community. They reveal that there is very strong within-
school variation in the share of repeating classmates. Given that within schools, there
is only one class per grade in each school year, and in light of a merit-based retention
rule which explains a large share of repetitions, the sources of variation in the share of
repeaters per class are rather transparent. The identifying assumption for the models
estimated in this chapter is that the share of repeaters per class is exogenous in re-
gression models of individual exam scores in third trimester when controlling for first
trimester scores, school dummies, and individual repeater status. The results indicate
that a one standard deviation increase in the share of repeaters per class reduces indi-
vidual test scores by 13 percent of a standard deviation. As various modifications of
the model specification demonstrate, the result is robust to changes in the source of
variation in the share of repeaters per class.
Key words: Labour economics, economics of education, development economics
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Much of the empirical research in labor economics centers on solving issues of statistical
endogeneity. The types of problems that occur (e.g. unobserved heterogeneity) and
the methods employed to solve them are rather universal. The diversity of topics
covered in this thesis illustrates this notion. While the analysis in chapter 2 uses
a regression discontinuity design to study the impact of pension reductions on labor
supply using data from low-skilled workers in Germany, chapters 3 through 5 turn to
issues of education and labor supply in developing countries.
To estimate the effects of large cuts in pensions on labor force participation, the
analysis in chapter 2 exploits three natural experiments in which such cuts affected a
group of mostly low-skilled repatriated ethnic German workers. In two of these natural
experiments, the pension rate was cut by between 8 and 16 percent, yet, according to
regression discontinuity estimates, there was no significant delay in retirement. The
results cannot be explained by selection bias due to increased mortality in response to
the reforms. In the third natural experiment, the workers were given an incentive to
avoid a pension cut by retiring earlier, but the analysis demonstrates that there was no
significant effect for earlier retirement. All these results are consistent with low-skilled
workers in Germany being frozen in a corner-solution equilibrium in which the optimal
choice is to retire as early as possible.
Chapter 3 turns to the analysis of data from developing countries. It describes a
unique household survey of the full population of a Togolese community conducted in
2008 and in 2011, linking individual observations from both survey waves. The main
motivation for collecting the data was to evaluate the impact of a preschool program
which started in the studied community in between the survey waves. Part of that eval-
uation, regarding the short-run impact on female labor supply, is discussed in chapter
4. Chapter 3 discusses particularities of the survey implementation, and it motivates
and explains the surveys modules. Emphasis is laid on the uniqueness and quality of its
sections concerning the measurement of time use, income sources, and cognitive skills.
While the choice of topics covered by the survey has been dictated largely by its origi-
nal purpose of allowing the evaluation of a preschool project, the chapter illustrates the
richness of the data, leaving opportunities for future research.
Making use of the data described in chapter 3, chapter 4 discusses the evaluation
of the preschool program which started in the studied community in 2010. First, in
a thorough descriptive analysis, it is shown that among measures of enrollment, an
indicator for whether a mother’s children younger than six years are all enrolled in
either preschool or primary school (which I call ”full enrollment”) is particularly relevant
to the number of hours these women spend with child care. Apparently, child care
responsibilities are high on average as soon as at least one young child remains at home,
and conditional on at least one child staying at home, other variables capturing the
number of children and their enrollment status are not associated with the mother’s time
use. Furthermore, the descriptive analysis shows that the strong relationship between
full enrollment and hours of child care is not mirrored by a comparable association
between full enrollment and hours of work.
In order to substantiate this result, endogeneity concerns need to be taken into
account. Accordingly, household data are combined with information on a social ex-
periment, where the access to a newly constructed preschool in the studied community
had been randomized. Even though compliance with randomization was poor, hav-
ing a child admitted to the first grade of preschool significantly increases a mother’s
likelihood of full enrollment. This relationship is, apparently, partly due to the random-
ization affecting primary school enrollment. In the studied community, primary schools
accept some children who would be considered too young in light of the regular school
entry age, so they constitute an alternative institution providing daycare for children.
Exploiting the variation in full enrollment induced by the randomization of access to
first grade of preschool, I estimate instrumental variables models of time use. Although,
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due to the small sample size, estimated effects are generally not statistically significant,
results from a wide range of different model specifications suggest a clear pattern: full
enrollment reduces the time mothers spend caring for young children by at least three to
four hours. However, confirming the descriptive results, this effect is not accompanied
by any noticeable change in time use related to work. Since this result is in line with
OLS results for the full population of mothers of young children (including those not
participating in the preschool admission procedure), I argue that the lack of a response
in labor supply cannot be attributed solely to the short time frame of the evaluation
or to the selectivity of the sample of participants. A full evaluation of the benefits of
an expansion of publicly provided preschool education in developing countries would,
however, have to take into account the direct benefits of such programs on participating
children.
As described in chapter 4, primary schools in the studied community accept some
children of preschool age. This leads to strong heterogeneity of students in the first
grades of primary school with respect to age and, consequently, school readiness. In
fact, this may be one of the reasons for so many primary school students failing test
score targets, and, accordingly, having to repeat a grade: on average, in the community’s
primary schools, more then 20 percent of students in each class are retained instead of
being promoted to the next grade. Chapter 5 investigates the consequences of such a
high incidence of grade repetitions. More specifically, it addresses the potential peer
effects which may result from being exposed to many repeaters.
The data used to estimate the peer effects of grade retention in chapter 5 are ad-
ministrative records of individual student trimester exam scores obtained from all four
primary schools in the studied community. They reveal that there is very strong within-
school variation in the share of repeating classmates. Given that within schools, there
is only one class per grade in each school year, and in light of a merit-based retention
rule which explains a large share of repetitions, the sources of variation in the share of
repeaters per class are rather transparent. The identifying assumption for the models
estimated in this chapter is that the share of repeaters per class is exogenous in re-
gression models of individual exam scores in third trimester when controlling for first
trimester scores, school dummies, and individual repeater status. The results indicate
that a one standard deviation increase in the share of repeaters per class reduces indi-
3
vidual test scores by 13 percent of a standard deviation. As various modifications of
the model specification demonstrate, the result is robust to changes in the source of
variation in the share of repeaters per class.
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Chapter 2
Labor supply effects of changes in pensions
- Regression discontinuity evidence from low-skilled workers1
2.1 Introduction
Pension systems are currently becoming less generous in many industrialized countries,
a reform that could be expected to have positive effects on the labor supply, notably
for older workers, especially in the presence of myopic savings behavior, liquidity con-
straints, or unexpected pension cuts (cf. Card et al. (2007)). These potential labor
supply effects should in turn induce important fiscal effects by increasing tax and so-
cial security revenues and decreasing pension fund payouts. The size of these effects,
however, depends on the labor supply elasticity of mostly older workers, a factor that
is hard to determine empirically because of the rarity of exogenous shocks to budget
constraints (wages, pension rights).
In this paper, we use administrative data from the German pension register to esti-
mate labor supply and mortality reactions to a series of large pension cuts for repatriated
ethnic German men, which occurred in the 1990s and can be regarded as natural experi-
ments. This group of older repatriated ethnic Germans resembles low-skilled workers in
Germany in that 54 percent of the males aged 55-65 work in blue-collar jobs compared to
1This chapter is co-authored with Patrick Puhani. Part of this research was supported by the Ger-
man Research Foundation (DFG) within the project ’Labour Market Effects of Social Policy’, which
is part of the research initiative ’Flexibility in Heterogeneous Labour Markets’. The chapter was
presented at conferences and seminars at CLE, UC Berkeley; at IZA, Bonn; the German Economic As-
sociation, the European Association of Labour Economists; the European Economic Association; at the
Universities of Frankfurt and Nuremberg; and at the research initiative’s IAB meeting in Nuremberg.
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56 percent of low-skilled (i.e. without vocational training/apprenticeship) male German
workers aged 55-65. These numbers differ significantly from the 29 percent figure for
all German workers in that age group (see Table 2.10 in the appendix for occupational
distributions and dissimilarity indices).2 In addition, these older low-skilled workers
constitute a sizable enough group that they should interest policy makers: 35 percent
of adult men and 39 percent of adult women are over 55, and 12 percent of men and 27
percent of women aged 55-65 are low skilled, as defined by not even having completed
an apprenticeship (author calculations based on the German Microcensus 2005).
Low-skilled workers are a key target group of labor market and social policies, be-
cause they face low wages so that they either risk belonging to the working poor or - as
in many European countries - have limited incentives to work because their potential
earnings hardly exceed social benefits.
Our study demonstrates this situation for older low-skilled workers in a continental
European economy. More specifically, the three natural experiments investigated pro-
vide two types of incentives: The first two experiments reduced pension rates and hence
increased the price of leisure, meaning that we would expect workers to retire later. The
third provided incentives for early retirement to avoid a pension cut. Because the first
set of cuts was based on the repatriation date and enacted retrospectively, it can be
analyzed using regression discontinuity designs. However, we find no significant effects
of these reforms on labor supply and estimate an upper bound for the extensive life-time
Marshallian labor supply elasticity of 0.07 for men. Based on the third experiment, we
also observe that workers do not react to incentives for early retirement to avoid a pen-
sion cut and thus argue that low-skilled German workers are already retiring as young
as is feasible according to administrative rules. We therefore conclude that low-skilled
men are bogged down in a ”corner solution” made up of incentives to retire as early as
possible.
The German case investigated here can be seen as an example of how some European
2Many repatriated ethnic Germans might have been regarded as skilled in their source countries, but
differences in production methods and working cultures and lack of recognition of educational degrees
from former socialist countries, combined with language problems, devalued much of their human
capital. The attachment of the repatriated ethnic Germans to German culture varied considerably,
with some people still speaking German at home, whereas others spoke no German at all so that some
repatriated ethnic Germans were seen as ”foreign” immigrants by some German observers. According
to Bauer and Zimmermann (1997), p. 365, between 41 and 53 percent of ethnic Germans arriving
between 1989 and 1993 were enrolled in German language courses.
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welfare systems provide few labor supply incentives/opportunities for older low-skilled
workers. Given the high replacement rates of state pensions in many European coun-
tries, our study therefore exemplifies how generous social security benefits can impact
the labor supply.3
Ours is one of the few causal studies on the effects of pension rights reduction on re-
tirement behavior, an analysis made possible by the fact that two of the pension cuts we
consider were enacted retrospectively for repatriated ethnic Germans after immigration
into Germany, the cuts being dependent on the immigration date. Krueger and Pischke
(1992) analyze a pension cut of similar size as that in our study by exploiting the 1977
amendments to the Social Security Act in the United States. Over a transitional period
of a few years, these legislative changes gradually decreased the average social security
pensions by about 13 percent for the 1920 birth cohort compared to those of the 1916
birth cohort. Yet the authors find no effect for this large cut on retirement behavior
and conclude that the continuing downward trend in male labor force participation in
the United States cannot be explained solely by increasing social security benefits, even
though these variables are negatively correlated over a long time period in the post-war
era.
The two factors used by Krueger and Pischke (1992) to explain their findings - private
pensions or private wealth substituting for pensions - cannot explain the absence of any
pension cut effect on retirement age in our study. Having returned to Germany from
former socialist countries, the repatriates we analyzed can safely be expected to have
had almost no private wealth or company pension. Rather, their alternative income
sources are their spouse’s pension/earnings or support from their children, who under
German law at the time were obligated to care for parents who are not eligible to draw
social security benefits.4
3It is also worth noting that Germany relies mostly on a mandatory pension system for all employees
(except many self-employed workers and civil servants), with company pension plans acting only as
supplements.
4Although a social welfare program for the elderly was in place when the individuals in our sample
retired, the Federal Statistical Office and the German Parliament report that take-up rates were gen-
erally low because many elderly shied away from asking their children - who were required by law to
support parents in need - to disclose their financial situations (Bundesamt (2008); Bundestag (2001);
fu¨r Sozialforschung und Gesellschaftspolitik (1999) also reports that the share of pensioners overall
who received social welfare in 1997 was only 1.3 percent and for repatriated ethnic Germans who mi-
grated before 1993, that figure was as low as 3.3 percent (fu¨r Sozialforschung und Gesellschaftspolitik
(2002)). There is no separate figure for repatriated ethnic Germans who are pensioners. However, it is
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Yet, even though the actual pensions received were 8-16 percent lower for the treat-
ment than for the control group, we find no significant effects of pension cuts on retire-
ment age. Such comparative large falls in income from an already low level raise the
question how they affected the health and life expectancy outcomes of these low-income
pensioners. However, for the pension cuts we investigate here, we find no increase in
mortality (the only health indicator we observe in our data).
A similarly sized pension cut in a natural experiment in Russia (the Russian pension
crisis) produced an effect in terms of increased mortality Jensen and Richter (2004);
however, this latter finding contrasts with Snyder and Evans (2006) report of positive
health results from working longer. The difference between these results may be ex-
plained by the fact that Germany like most European countries (and the U.S. for elderly
people) has universal health care coverage and the natural experiments in Germany and
in the U.S. did not reduce anybody’s pension payment to zero, which is what happened
in Russia.
To sum up, given our low labor supply elasticity estimates, we conclude that signifi-
cant changes in the pension rate for low-skilled workers in either direction seem mostly
to have redistributive consequences, without any significant changes in the labor supply
or mortality of the affected workers.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 sketches the retirement system in
Germany, as well as the pension situation for repatriated ethnic Germans. Section
2.3 describes the reforms of the repatriates’ pension rights as well as the data source,
Section 5.4 presents the results, and Section 2.5 concludes the paper.
important to note that when the individuals in our sample retired, eligibility determination for social
security took into account both spouse’s and children’s income, as well as other income sources. Hence
although pensions for people in our sample were generally low, high labor force participation rates for
both men and women in former socialist countries generally resulted in ”family pensions” above the
subsistence level. Based on these observations, the pension cuts analyzed here could not simply have
been cushioned by higher social welfare receipt.
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2.2 Institutional background: the German public
pension system and special rights for repatri-
ated ethnic Germans
2.2.1 Retirement in the German public pension system
Before explaining the particular rules pertaining to repatriated ethnic Germans, we
briefly sketch the key features of the German pension system. For the cohorts we study,
the system was characterized by a comparatively high pension rate and considerable
flexibility concerning the age of retirement, with built-in incentives to retire early. In
Germany, the most important component of income in old age is the mandatory ’pub-
lic pension insurance’, which covers about 85 percent of workers (generally excluding
civil servants, who have a separate pension system, and self-employed workers, who are
mostly voluntarily self-insured; Berkel and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004). By international com-
parison, this system is characterized by a high replacement rate of about 70 percent
(according to Borsch-Supan (2000), p. F29; only 58 percent according to Boeri and
van Ours (2008), p. 123), meaning that public pension benefits constitute by far the
most important source of income for elderly Germans (over 80 percent of income for
households headed by persons over 64 years of age; Borsch-Supan (2000).
Although the statutory retirement age for men in Germany during our observation
period was 65, under certain preconditions, some workers could receive public pension
payments earlier, most notably at ages 63, 60 or even earlier. For instance, any individ-
ual whose employment history (as far as relevant to the pension insurance) exceeded 35
years could retire flexibly between the ages of 63 and 65. Several other arrangements
also allowed workers to receive pension payments as early as age 60; most particularly,
the so-called ’reduced earnings capacity’ of, for example, workers who were adminis-
tratively classified as not being ’appropriately employable’ because of ’health or labor
market reasons’. The eligibility criteria for such pensions were also met if no vacancies
were available at the labor office for the worker’s specific job description and changing to
a different job type would cost the worker an earnings loss of at least 50 percent.5 Dur-
5More precisely, when these criteria were met, an individual would not necessarily receive a full
pension but could be awarded a reduced pension. However, during the 1990s, the underlying rules
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ing the 1990s (our observation period), these rules were interpreted liberally enough
that Berkel and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004) term them ’soft eligibility rules’. As a result,
Arnds and Bonin (2002) suggest that at that time, many individuals had at least some
discretionary power to retire as early as 60.6 In fact, under these same rules, male
workers could receive a pension due to ’reduced earnings capacity’ even before reaching
60 as long as they had contributed to the insurance system for at least five years and
had worked three out of the last five years Riphahn (1997). Women, on the other, hand,
could generally retire at age 60 provided they had worked for at least 10 years since age
40.
None of the above retirement schemes, however, were accompanied by an actuar-
ial adjustment of the monthly pension benefit (Arnds and Bonin (2002)). Rather, in
the case of early retirement, pension benefits were lowered only because during the
years remaining until the regular retirement age of 65, the individual accumulated no
additional pension rights. No additional actuarial adjustment was made, however, to
take into account the fact that by retiring earlier, individuals increased their expected
duration of pension receipt, which, in turn, increased social security wealth (i.e. the ex-
pected present value of cumulative pension payments). The lack of any such adjustment
created very strong incentives for early retirement, and empirical studies of retirement
over time suggest that actual retirement behavior was strongly influenced by changes
in these incentives (Borsch-Supan and Schnabel (1998); Borsch-Supan (2000)).
2.2.2 Repatriated ethnic Germans
In this study, we evaluate a population that was affected by large cuts in pension rights;
namely, repatriated ethnic Germans (Aussiedler). Germany, like Israel, has a ’right-of-
return’ law that allows ethnic Germans to settle in the Federal Republic of Germany as
German citizens immediately after arrival. More specifically, according to the German
constitution, both citizens and refugee ethnic Germans are ’Germans’.
were interpreted so generously that most workers who retired because of ’reduced earnings capacity’
received a full pension. Another pathway to early retirement was a worker’s having been unemployed
for at least one year out of the previous 1.5 years after having contributed payments to the pension
insurance for at least 8 out of the previous 10 years. Individuals could also retire at any age in case of
severe disability.
6Other possibilities for retiring before age 60 were by way of so-called ’partial retirement plans’ or
the disability retirement allowable at any age for sufficiently severe disabilities.
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Ethnic German immigration into (West) Germany from 1950 to 2005 amounted to
about 4.5 million people (Wikipedia), about 5.5 percent of Germany’s total population,
many of whom came from the former Soviet Union (2.3 million), Poland (1.4 million),
and Romania (0.4 million). Although the criteria for who is an ethnic German and
who may immigrate as a citizen have recently been made stricter, the laxer rules in
place during the cold-war period were still in effect during our observation period of the
1990s.7
Yet, despite these generous immigration and naturalization laws for ethnic Germans,
initially, few ethnic Germans settled in West Germany because the Iron Curtain pre-
vented them from exercising their right to West German citizenship. This situation
changed radically in the late 1980s, however, when the law finally felt the effect of the
Iron Curtain’s fall.8
2.2.3 Pensions for repatriated ethnic Germans
Given that many repatriated ethnic Germans spent large parts of their working lives
outside of Germany without paying contributions to the German public pension insur-
ance, an Alien Pension Law (Fremdrentengesetz, FRG) was legislated in West Germany
in 1959. Under this law, the pension system acknowledged the period of employment
7The main motivation for the right-of-return law enacted in the (West) German constitution were
considerable settlements of people of German decent in central and eastern Europe, as well as in other
territories of the former Soviet Union. Many of these settlements have in one way or another remained
German in culture and even language. The historical reasons for settlement include Russia’s invitation
in the 18th century for Germans to settle on its territory and the fact that in the 19th century, large
parts of central Europe were part of either Germany or Austria-Hungary, which produced pockets of
German-speaking settlements all over central Europe (see Figure C1 for a map). Although many ethnic
Germans were forced to leave these territories after the Second World War, some remained for personal
reasons like intermarriage or simply because the countries ’forgot’ to expel them, meaning that German
minorities remained in the Soviet Union, Poland, Romania, and several other countries. Because
the Federal Republic of Germany felt that these minorities were disadvantaged in their countries of
residence by their German ethnicity, it granted them the right to settle in Germany and become
citizens immediately upon arrival. The Federal Republic of Germany, unlike the Republic of Austria,
also assumed responsibility for ethnic Germans from former territories of Austria-Hungary. As a result,
ethnic Germans from Romania could become citizens of modern-day Germany but not of modern-day
Austria, and all East German residents were likewise regarded as West German citizens.
8After the initial heavy population movement immediately after World War II, ethnic Germans
moved to Germany in relatively small numbers, but with the collapse of the Soviet Union, their
number quickly increased again, with 1.5 million immigrating from 1989 to 1993 (see Figure C2). As
a result, during the 1990s, German legislation gradually changed until the criteria for approval as
an ethnic German refugee became stricter and fewer potentially ethnic German migrants set out for
Germany (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1997). For example, although ethnic Germans living abroad can
still migrate to Germany, they must now pass a language test. The population studied here, however,
immigrated to Germany before 1997 and is hence part of the large influx of the early 1990s.
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in the previous country of residence (e.g. Soviet Union) exactly as if the individual had
worked in the same occupation in West Germany. Based on this recognition, it granted
repatriated ethnic Germans generous pension rights. Hence, an ethnic German coming
to Germany at age 65 after having worked in the Soviet Union for 40 years could go
straight into retirement and receive a full pension just like a German-born individual
who had worked in Germany for 40 years in the same type of job. Retirement earlier
than 65 (i.e. at age 63, 60, or earlier) was similarly possible, because the same rules
applied to repatriated ethnic Germans as applied to native Germans: time worked in
the source country (e.g. Soviet Union) counted just like time worked in Germany for
application of the rules outlined in Section 2.2.1.
After the fall of the Iron Curtain, however, this rule led to a significant drain on
the pension system because repatriated ethnic Germans (and East Germans) could
receive pensions without ever having paid into the system. The outcome was a series of
reforms cutting these repatriated ethnic Germans’ pensions. For instance, for most of
the immigration cohorts in our study, although all years worked in the source countries
(e.g. Soviet Union) still counted as active work, the pension level was calculated based
on East German rather than West German pay scales.9
In the German public pension system, pension rights are usually based on the con-
tributions made by employees over their working life, which are translated into so-called
’earnings points’ that reflect the employee’s earnings position relative to other workers
in the economy. One earnings point corresponds to the average earnings in the econ-
omy in a given calendar year. Therefore, depending on individual earnings in any given
year, the individual may gain more or less than one earnings point per calendar year,
depending on his or her position in the wage distribution. The pension level is calcu-
lated based on the total number of earnings points collected. The reforms we investigate
reduced pensions by cutting the number of earnings points obtained by a repatriated
German through previous employment in the original country of residence (hereafter,
9First, repatriated ethnic Germans are assigned to a ’qualification group’ according to a supplement
to the German social security law that classifies the educational attainment of repatriated ethnic
Germans into five categories. The worker’s former job is then allocated to one of 23 industries. To
simulate the earnings points for the pension rights, each qualification-industry combination has a
hypothetical income assigned for each calendar year since 1950. The data used for analysis, however,
do not include information on the qualifications and industries used for this simulation, only the number
of earnings points accumulated by each individual.
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source country).
Having immigrated mostly at a relatively high age (55 and older), the repatriated
ethnic Germans studied in this paper spent most of their working lives outside Germany
and their pension rights, rather than being based on actual contributions to the system,
were mostly calculated by type and length of employment in the source country. The
reforms we investigate that involve cuts in these pension rights, therefore, translate into
large reductions of the repatriated immigrants’ total pension rights.
The pension level is not, however, a linear function of the earnings points, which
explains why the pension cuts observed in the data are smaller than the original cuts in
earnings points. That is, after being cut according to the described legislative changes,
the earnings points earned before 1993 (the date after which this rule was repealed)
were increased again so as not to fall below a certain threshold. In other words, the
German public pension insurance ’beefed up’ low pension levels by raising part of an
individual’s pension by up to 50 percent.10
2.3 Pension reforms for repatriated ethnic Germans
during the 1990s and corresponding administra-
tive data
During the 1990s, repatriated ethnic Germans effectively faced several cuts in the pen-
sion rights they had accumulated outside Germany. In order to exploit these pension
reforms as natural experiments that allow estimation of low-skilled workers’ reactions
to unexpected cuts in pension benefits, we first briefly describe both the reforms and
the corresponding administrative data. More detailed descriptions of the reforms are
provided in German by both Polster (1990), Polster (1992), Polster (1997), and Heller
(1997).
Our administrative data are taken from the Federal German Pension Insurance
(Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, DRV-Bund), the mandatory state pension system
for most German workers, which began providing access to a sample of its administrative
10 This rule, which increased only the part of a pension based on social security-relevant activities
(primarily, dependent employment) before the year 1993, has not yet been replaced by any other
variant of a minimum pension for pension earnings points gained after 1993.
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data in 2005. We obtained remote access to the complete population of pension data on
repatriated ethnic Germans for the calendar year 2008, the only year for which ’date of
immigration’ (accurate to the day) - a necessary variable for our regression discontinuity
analyses - was available. We base our analysis on the full population of ethnic German
immigrant birth cohorts covered in the data set.
These administrative data provide personal information on the entire population
of repatriated ethnic Germans who retired before 2008 and were still alive in 2008,
including pension level in euros, year and month of retirement, individual’s age, date of
immigration into Germany, and source country. Unfortunately, however, they include
no additional socioeconomic characteristics. We must also exclude from the sample
repatriated ethnic Germans who immigrated from Poland because a special regulation
prevented them from being affected by any of the subsequent reforms.11
Natural Experiment 1: On July 25, 1991, earnings points acquired abroad (and used
to calculate the pension level) were cut by 30 percent for all repatriated ethnic Germans
who had immigrated after December 31, 1990 (according to Renten-U¨berleitungsgesetz,
RU¨G, Art. 14,20a and Art. 15). Due to the nonlinear relationship between earnings
points and pensions, actual pensions were reduced by about 8 to 11 percent, only a
little less than the 13 percent in the reform analyzed by Krueger and Pischke (1992).
Because the legislation was passed after the date of immigration, it amounted to an ex-
post reduction in pension rights. Hence, the effect of the reform can be evaluated using
a regression discontinuity design that compares the retirement behavior of immigrants
arriving shortly before and after December 31 1990. Because the 1st of January is often
a date when new laws or regulations are implemented, we checked whether there were
any other rule changes affecting the budget constraint of immigrants arriving after that
date: we found no such changes.
The oldest cohorts in our estimation samples are individuals who turned 60 in 1992
(and were thus 76 years of age when observed in 2008) and were not yet retirement age
when the reform was implemented (i.e. cohorts born on or after January 1 1932). The
youngest cohorts are individuals born in March 1936 (who were 72 years of age in 2008)
11We initially considered using immigrants from Poland as a control group in a difference-in-
differences identification strategy; however, the number of people immigrating from Poland was at
a very low level from 1991 onwards (see Figure C2) so that the sample sizes for the cohorts we consider
are too small.
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because the retirement behavior of cohorts younger than these were potentially affected
by the Natural Experiment 3 irrespective of their immigration date.
As part of the regression discontinuity design implementation, we use the immigra-
tion date to define a sample that is a subset of the population of repatriated ethnic
Germans in these birth cohorts. This subset is restricted to individuals who immi-
grated between July 1990 and June 1991. Those who immigrated between January
and June 1991 comprise the treatment group and those who immigrated between July
and December 1990 make up the control group. Two additional discontinuity samples
use ’tighter’ immigration date windows around the cutoff: workers that immigrated
between October 1990 and March 1991 (a 6-month window) and those who immigrated
in December 1990 or January 1991 (a 2-month window). Although our administrative
data contain the population of repatriated ethnic German pensioners, the sample re-
strictions by cohort and immigration date leave us with sample sizes of 2,554, 1,083,
and 348 for the three regression discontinuity samples, respectively (see Table 2.12 and
Table 2.13 in the appendix; the figures for women are 3,405, 1,479 and 482, respectively,
see Table 2.15). We do, however, have to rely on the regression discontinuity design as
an identification strategy for lack of sufficient socio-economic control variables in the
administrative data. Tobit estimates will take account of the censoring.
When evaluating Natural Experiment 1, we also censor the retirement date relative
to April 30 1996 because after the announcement of the reform associated with Natural
Experiment 3, strategic behavior may have occurred to avoid it. Thus, in an attempt
to isolate the effects of Natural Experiment 1, we censor retirement date observations
for all individuals who had not yet retired by the end of April 1996, which results in
the censoring of about 20 percent of our estimation sample’s retirement ages.
Natural Experiment 2: On September 25 1996, an upper bound for earnings points
(acquired abroad) was introduced for all repatriated ethnic Germans who immigrated
after May 6 1996 (according to the Wachstums- und Bescha¨ftigungsfo¨rderungsgesetz,
WFG, Art. 3 and Art. 4, September 25 1996). The limit was 25 earnings points, which,
as shown below, effectively amounted to a reduction in actual pensions of between 10
and 16 percent, similarly to the reform analyzed by Krueger and Pischke (1992).12 The
12The limit of 25 earnings points applied to singles, the calculation for married couples was more
complicated.
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causal effect of the cut in pension rights on retirement behavior can thus be derived
using a regression discontinuity design as long as those immigrating just before versus
just after the cutoff date do not differ systematically on other characteristics.
Natural Experiment 2 was generated by the same law as Natural Experiment 3 (see
below). In order to separate the effects of these two regulation changes, we consider
only men who turned 60 in 1997 or later - that is, the cohorts born on or after January 1
1937. We thereby minimize the number of individuals who could strategically retire and
avoid the reform associated with Natural Experiment 3. The youngest cohorts are those
born in December 1941 because individuals in all succeeding birth cohorts might not yet
have retired by 2008.13 For this analysis, the discontinuity samples consist of 12-month
(immigrated between November 6 1995, and November 6 1996), 6-month (immigrated
between February 6 1996 and August 6 1996), and 2-month (immigrated between April
6 and June 6 1996) sampling windows (with May 6 1996 as the cutoff date). Table A1
and Table A4 show how this leaves us with 1,902, 849 and 319 observations for men in
our regression discontinuity samples. The corresponding numbers for women are 2,687,
1,191, and 474, respectively (Table A5).
Natural Experiment 3: This reform, generated by the same law as Natural Exper-
iment 3 (the Wachstums- und Bescha¨ftigungsfo¨rderungsgesetz, WFG, Art. 3 and Art.
4), cut earnings points acquired in the source country by 40 percent for all repatriated
ethnic Germans retiring after October 1 1996 irrespective of immigration date. Hence,
in contrast to Natural Experiments 1 and 2, which provided incentives for later retire-
ment, it provided incentives for men who would normally have retired later (i.e. after
October 1996) to retire before that date to avoid the pension cut. We use two different
identification strategies to evaluate this natural experiment, described in Section 4.4
below.
2.4 Results
Figure 1 plots the survival estimates for age at retirement for men. As the figure shows,
the retirement behavior of repatriated ethnic Germans is similar to that of low-skilled
13Extending the sample somewhat by including adjacent birth cohorts changes neither the point
estimates nor the standard errors in any relevant way.
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Germans (those having below apprenticeship education). Both these groups have a
modal retirement age of 60, with the second most common retirement age being 63. In
contrast to qualified Germans, very few men in these groups retire at age 65. For women,
the corresponding graph is given in Figure A1: both repatriated ethnic German women
and low-skilled German women have a modal retirement age of 60, in contrast to skilled
German women for whom the modal retirement age is 65. Hence, repatriated ethnic
Germans are not only similar to low-skilled workers in terms of their job distributions
(as demonstrated in the Introduction), but they are also similar to low-skilled workers
in their retirement behavior.
Because our administrative data set only provides information on the formal act
of retirement and not on labor supply, we draw additional data from the German
Microcensus to gauge how retirement correlates with labor force participation. Using
2005 Microcensus data, we find that among repatriated ethnic German men/women who
had immigrated since 1990 and were aged 55 to 65, 88/64 percent (66/52 percent) of
men/women not receiving a pension were participating (working) in the labor market
(n = 393/434) and 7/13 percent (5/12 percent) of men/women receiving a pension
were participating (working) in the labor market (n = 299/407). These numbers are
almost identical to those observed for low-skilled workers overall in Germany (n = 1637;
1525).1415
These figures suggest that measuring labor supply based on retirement might over-
estimate labor supply elasticities, meaning that the labor supply elasticities reported
below can be seen as upper bounds on the true elasticities.16 It seems that for both
men and women, the decision to retire is highly, albeit not perfectly, correlated with
the decision to stop supplying labor.
14For males, these figures are almost exactly identical; for females, however, the labor force partici-
pation (employment) rate of low-skilled German women is somewhat lower at 45(39) percent than that
of repatriated ethnic Germans at 64(52) percent.
15For lack of data, we do not analyze the relationship between unemployment benefit receipt and
(early) retirement here. Tatsiramos (2010) shows that low employment rates of older workers in Europe
can partly be explained by generous unemployment benefits which often act as a ”pathway [in]to early
retirement”. Similar effects are found by Lalive (2008) for Austria and Kyyra¨ and Ollikainen (2008)
for Finland.
16The only information provided in the administrative pension data is whether a pensioner earns
more than Euro 400 per month, at which point the pension is reduced. Only 0.7 percent of repatriated
ethnic Germans who had retired in the previous three years (as of 2008) had had their pension reduced
because they were earning more than Euro 400 through work.
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2.4.1 Effect of the two pension cut reforms on age at retire-
ment
Table 2.13 through Table 2.17 in the appendix list the population means for men and
women for the first two natural experiments that consist of ex post pension cuts for
people having immigrated after the corresponding cutoff date. Because the administra-
tive data cover so few sociodemographic characteristics, we must rely on the regression
discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of pension cuts. The only sociodemo-
graphic characteristic that allows assessment of the ’balancing quality’ of the regression
discontinuity sampling windows is the source country. As Table 2.13 and Table 2.15
demonstrate, for Natural Experiment 1, the samples with a 12-month window for an im-
migration date around the cutoff point are not well balanced in terms of source country
(i.e. the treatment group is more likely to immigrate from the former USSR than from
Romania). As soon as we consider a 6-month (or 2-month) sampling window, however,
the treatment and control groups are well balanced for this variable. Nevertheless, al-
though we control for source country and immigration date in the estimates reported
below, the paucity of socioeconomic information in the administrative data leads us
to regard the 6-month sampling window as more reliable for the estimation of causal
effects than the 12-month window. By the same token, the 2-month sampling window
provides an even more credible regression discontinuity design identification strategy,
although the standard error is comparatively large because, compared to the 6-month
sampling window, the number of observations is limited.
Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 summarize the effects of the reforms in terms of the effective
pension cuts for men and women combined (Table 2.19 in the appendix presents the
results for women only), and Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 present the corresponding estimates
for age at retirement for this same combined sample (Table 2.20 reports the results for
women only).17
17Figure A4 (Figure A6) plots individual pension levels by date of immigration for men (women) for
Natural Experiments 1 (Panel A) and 2 (Panel B). The graphs illustrate the pension cuts, including
the pension cap introduced with Natural Experiment 2 (Panel B), but also the significant variation in
pension levels both above and below the fitted lines due to the absence of a minimum pension.
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In Table 2.3 and Table 2.4, we estimate the following regression discontinuity model:
yi = α + τ1(zi > cz) + δzi + βxi + i, E[i | xi] = 0 (2.1)
where the outcome variable y is the date of retirement (measured by the actual day,
although in Germany retirement is only possible on the first day of each month), and
z is the date of immigration into Germany (measured by the day). 1() is the indicator
function, which equals 1 if the individual arrived in Germany after the critical date and
is thus affected by the reform (treated), and x is a vector of the few available control
variables (date of birth measured by the month and dummy variables for the source
country). By including the birth date as a control variable, we effectively estimate the
reform’s impact on age at retirement.
In Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, we estimate a variant of equation 2.1 in which the
dependent variable is the logarithm of the actual pension paid. These estimates are
important for identifying the size of the effective pension cut generated by the two
reforms. The estimates differ, however, in the sets of control variables used. Whereas
Model 1 includes only the date of birth and the source country as controls, Model 2
adds in the date of immigration, with the treatment indicator defined as an additional
control. Model 3 then adds in a quadratic term for immigration date that serves as yet
another control (see Angrist and Lavy (1999), for an application of this approach in a
different context).
The regression discontinuity estimates in Table 2.1 suggest that Natural Experiment
1 reduced the average pension for men by between 8 percent (12- and 6-month sampling
windows) and 11 percent (2-month sampling window). The standard errors associated
with these estimates are 1, 2 and 4 percentage points, respectively. In order to obtain
more precise estimates, we will in the following combine both the samples for men
and women and the samples relating to the two natural experiments. In the combined
sample for men and women, the point estimates are smaller, ranging between 6 and 10
percent (Table 2.2), probably because for women, there are no statistically significant
pension cuts; point estimates are about 4 percent (Table 2.19). This latter might
be attributable to the fact that women, although generally exhibiting high labor force
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Tab. 2.1: Effective log pension changes caused by Natural Experiments 1 and 2: men.
Model 1 Model 3 Model 3
Natural Experiment 1 - OLS
12-month sampling window -0.07∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗
n = 2554 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
6-month sampling window -0.08∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗
n = 1083 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
2-month sampling window -0.07∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
n = 348 (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Natural Experiment 2 - OLS
12-month sampling window -0.21∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
n = 2217 (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
6-month sampling window -0.14∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗
n = 989 (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
2-month sampling window -0.13∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗
n = 369 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Both Nat. Experiments pooled -
OLS
12-month sampling window -0.09∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗
n = 4456 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
6-monthsampling window -0.09∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗
n = 1932 (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
2-month sampling window -0.08∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗
n = 667 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Note: Model 1 controls for date of birth and source country, Model 2 also controls for immigration date (discontinuity
design estimator), and Model 3 additionally controls for the square of the immigration date (discontinuity design
estimator). Source: Administrative German pension data; author calculations.
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Tab. 2.2: Effective log pension changes caused by Natural Experiments 1 and 2: men
and women combined.
Model 1 Model 3 Model 3
Natural Experiment 1 - OLS
12-month sampling window -0.068∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗
n = 5959 (0.010) (0.019) (0.019)
6-month sampling window -0.075∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗ -0.058∗∗
n = 2562 (0.013) (0.027) (0.027)
2-month sampling window -0.064∗∗∗ -0.089∗ -0.095∗
n = 830 (0.024) (0.050) (0.053)
Natural Experiment 2 - OLS
12-month sampling window -0.198∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗
n = 5336 (0.008) (0.017) (0.017)
6-month sampling window -0.161∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗
n = 2376 (0.013) (0.024) (0.024)
2-month sampling window -0.157∗∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗
n = 907 (0.025) (0.032) (0.032)
Both Nat. Experiments pooled -
OLS
12-month sampling window -0.129∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗
n = 11295 (0.007) (0.013) (0.013)
6-monthsampling window -0.116∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗
n = 4928 (0.009) (0.018) (0.018)
2-month sampling window -0.106∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗
n = 1737 (0.017) (0.028) (0.028)
Note: Model 1 controls for date of birth and source country, Model 2 also controls for immigration date (discontinuity
design estimator), and Model 3 additionally controls for the square of the immigration date (discontinuity design
estimator). Source: Administrative German pension data; author calculations.
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participation rates in former socialist countries, on average have gathered fewer earnings
points than men, meaning that they were more greatly affected by the rule for ’beefing
up’ low pensions (see Footnote 10). This interpretation is substantiated by Figure A2,
Panel A, which shows that only women with higher pensions experienced pension cuts.
For Natural Experiment 2, the regression discontinuity estimates (columns 2 and 3)
of the effective pension cut reported in Table 2.1 are somewhat higher than those found
for the first, with point estimates for men varying between 11 and 18 percent and those
for men and women combined ranging between 15 and 16 percent. The more narrowly
we define the sampling window, the larger the discontinuity estimates. The precision
of the estimates remains at between 3 and 4 percentage points for men and 2 and 3
percentage points for men and women combined.
To obtain smaller standard errors for our estimates, we pool the data from both
pension cut experiments. Doing so produces pension cut discontinuity estimates of
between 9 and 14 percent for men, with a standard error of 2 or 3 percentage points,
and pension cut discontinuity estimates of between 11 and 14 percent for men and
women combined, with a standard error of 1 or 3 percentage points. The largest point
estimate is for the 2-month sampling window.
The question remains, however, of how repatriated ethnic Germans reacted to these
pension cuts. We report estimates for the reforms’ effects on retirement age in Table
2.3 (men only), Table 2.4 (men and women combined), and Table 2.20 in the appendix
(women only).18 The first striking result is that none of the estimates are statistically
significant. For Natural Experiment 1, unexpectedly, most point estimates are negative
rather than positive. For men, the results based on the 12- and 2-month sampling
windows show point estimates close to zero, with the estimated retirement age changing
by between -0.06 and 0.03 years (see Models 2 and 3 for the tobit estimates); that is,
between -22 and 11 days. The associated standard errors are between 0.15 and 0.37
years (55 and 137 days), respectively, so that the estimated confidence interval is not
18In this table, whenever we use data from Experiment 1, we estimate both the OLS and tobit
models because individuals in the sample used to evaluate this experiment were also affected by a
further pension cut if they decided to retire after September 1996. In order not to confound these two
reforms, we censor the date of retirement at April 30 1996 and estimate both OLS models using the
censored outcome variable or corresponding tobit models to better take account of the censoring. As
Table 2.13 in the appendix shows, about 20 percent of the observations in the sample for Experiment
1 are censored. In the sample used to evaluate Experiment 2, in contrast, no outcome variables are
censored.
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very narrow around zero for the smallest sampling window. For the 12-month sampling
window, the estimated confidence interval for Model 2 has lower and upper bounds
of -96 (i.e. (0.03 - 1.96 × 0.15) × 365) and 118 (i.e. (0.03 + 1.96 × 0.15) × 365)
days, respectively. The point estimate based on the 6-month sampling window is more
negative at -0.26 years, with a standard error of 0.22 yielding an estimated confidence
interval with lower and upper bounds of -0.70 years (-252 days) and 0.17 years (62 days),
respectively. The estimates for Natural Experiment 2 are also insignificantly different
from zero.19
19Individual retirement ages by date of immigration are plotted in Figures A5 and A7 for men and
women, respectively.
23
2.4. RESULTS
Tab. 2.3: Effects of pension cuts on retirement age: men.
Model 1 Model 3 Model 3
Natural Experiment 1 - OLS
12-month sampling window -0.06 0.00 -0.05
n = 2554 (0.05) (0.11) (0.11)
6-month sampling window -0.04 -0.21 -0.23
n = 1083 (0.08) (0.16) (0.16)
2-month sampling window -0.09 -0.16 -0.14
n = 348 (0.14) (0.29) (0.30)
Natural Experiment 1 - Tobit
12-month sampling window -0.12 0.03 -0.03
n = 2554 (0.07) (0.15) (0.15)
6-month sampling window -0.04 -0.26 -0.26
n = 1083 (0.10) (0.22) (0.22)
2-month sampling window -0.12 -0.06 -0.06
n = 348 (0.17) (0.37) (0.37)
Natural Experiment 2 - OLS
12-month sampling window 0.09 -0.09 -0.09
n = 2217 (0.08) (0.16) (0.16)
6-month sampling window -0.00 0.05 0.06
n = 989 (0.12) (0.22) (0.23)
2-month sampling window 0.14 0.28 0.28
n = 369 (0.19) (0.37) (0.36)
Both Nat. Experiments pooled -
OLS
12-month sampling window 0.00 -0.05 -0.03
n = 4771 (0.05) (0.10) (0.10)
6-monthsampling window -0.03 -0.09 -0.08
n = 2072 (0.07) (0.14) (0.14)
2-month sampling window -0.04 0.20 0.08
n = 717 (0.12) (0.25) (0.25)
Both Nat. Experiments pooled -
Tobit
12-month sampling window -0.06 -0.01 -0.02
n = 4771 (0.06) (0.13) (0.13)
6-monthsampling window -0.03 -0.14 -0.15
n = 2072 (0.09) (0.19) (0.19)
2-month sampling window -0.04 0.19 0.16
n = 717 (0.15) (0.31) (0.31)
Note: Model 1 controls for date of birth and source country, Model 2 also controls for immigration date (discontinuity
design estimator), and Model 3 additionally controls for the square of the immigration date (discontinuity design
estimator). Source: Administrative German pension data; author calculations.
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Tab. 2.4: Effects of pension cuts on retirement age: men and women combined.
Model 1 Model 3 Model 3
Natural Experiment 1 - OLS
12-month sampling window 0.057 0.073 0.050
n = 5959 (0.036) (0.075) (0.075)
6-month sampling window 0.069 0.011 -0.014
n = 2562 (0.053) (0.108) (0.108)
2-month sampling window -0.003 -0.068 -0.074
n = 830 (0.092) (0.204) (0.208)
Natural Experiment 1 - Tobit
12-month sampling window 0.043 0.084 0.057
n = 5959 (0.045) (0.092) (0.094)
6-month sampling window 0.074 -0.018 -0.019
n = 2562 (0.064) (0.132) (0.132)
2-month sampling window -0.015 -0.041 -0.041
n = 830 (0.110) (0.234) (0.234)
Natural Experiment 2 - OLS
12-month sampling window 0.087∗ -0.029 -0.028
n = 5336 (0.045) (0.092) (0.091)
6-month sampling window 0.032 -0.057 -0.055
n = 2376 (0.068) (0.131) (0.131)
2-month sampling window 0.009 -0.028 -0.020
n = 907 (0.110) (0.226) (0.226)
Both Nat. Experiments pooled -
OLS
12-month sampling window 0.071∗∗ 0.013 0.031
n = 11295 (0.029) (0.060) (0.059)
6-monthsampling window 0.042 -0.018 -0.031
n = 4928 (0.043) (0.086) (0.085)
2-month sampling window -0.035 0.060 -0.016
n = 1737 (0.072) (0.155) (0.154)
Both Nat. Experiments pooled -
Tobit
12-month sampling window 0.045 0.036 0.031
n = 11295 (0.038) (0.078) (0.078)
6-monthsampling window 0.058 -0.083 -0.095
n = 4928 (0.055) (0.109) (0.109)
2-month sampling window -0.064 0.016 -0.012
n = 1737 (0.089) (0.182) (0.183)
Note: Model 1 controls for date of birth and source country, Model 2 also controls for immigration date (discontinuity
design estimator), and Model 3 additionally controls for the square of the immigration date (discontinuity design
estimator). Source: Administrative German pension data; author calculations.
25
2.4. RESULTS
Combining the estimation samples for Natural Experiments 1 and 2 in order to
increase the precision of the estimated coefficients yields no statistically significant point
estimates either, with the largest point estimate for men being 0.19 for the 2-month
sampling window (with a standard error of 0.31; Table 2.3, Model 2, bottom). If the
samples for men and women and both natural experiments are combined, the maximum
point estimate is 0.036 (with a standard error of 0.078; 2.4, Model 2, bottom). For the
6-month sampling window, the estimated OLS confidence interval for Model 3 has lower
and upper bounds of -72 (i.e. (-0.031 - 1.96 × 0.085) × 365) and 49 (i.e. (-0.031+ 1.96
× 0.85) × 365) days, respectively. As the sample means show, the 6-month sampling
window already balances the distribution of the source country well. By narrowing the
sampling window even further, down to two months, we obtain a confidence interval
lower and upper bounds of -104 (i.e. (0.016 - 1.96 × 0.154) × 365) and 116 (i.e. (0.016 +
1.96 × 0.154) × 365) days, respectively. For women, none of the regression discontinuity
design estimates (Models 2 and 3) is statistically significant and the point estimates are
even more consistently close to zero than those for men (Table 2.20 in the appendix).
2.4.2 Implied extensive labor supply elasticities
We then consider what extensive labor supply elasticities these estimates imply given
the following lifetime extensive labor supply elasticity. To this end, we want to know
how lifetime labor supply reacts to changes in the price of leisure (w-r). However, what
we estimate is the reaction of lifetime labor supply to changes in the pension rate r.
Assuming that the wage rate is unaffected by the reforms in question, we obtain the
following relationship between the labor supply elasticity and the effect of a pension
change on the retirement age, i.e. what we estimate:
ηLFP,price of leisure =
d(years worked)
d(w−r) × w−ryears worked
≈ ∆(years worked)
∆(w−r) ×
wmedian,MZ−rbefore
years worked
≈ ∆(years worked)−∆r ×
wmedian,MZ−rbefore
years worked
(2.2)
To gauge the price of leisure, we use pensions and net earnings data for repatriated
ethnic Germans from the German Microcensus (MZ) and include these figures into the
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above formula. Based on a net earnings estimate of 1,000 Euros from the microcensus
data minus the average pension from the administrative pension data, we ’guesstimate’
the price of leisure for men in the control group to be around 140 Euros per month in
Natural Experiment 1 and 400 Euros per month in Natural Experiment 2. For women,
we find that net earnings are around 500 Euros, and an average pension is about the
same or a little higher, yielding a price of leisure that is zero or negative. We therefore
focus on men for the simulation of the labor supply elasticity.
The statistics needed to calculate the extensive life-time labor supply elasticity for
men - derived from our estimates, the administrative pension data, and the microcensus
data - are given in Table 2.11 in the appendix. The number of years worked is 39 and
36 for the control groups in Natural Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. The table also
reports the price of leisure on an annualized basis before and after the reforms associated
with the two natural experiments.
The elasticity estimates are given in Table 2.5, which summarizes the estimates for
the first and second terms (derivative and means ratio) of the product that represents
the elasticity given in equation 2.2. Based on our standard error estimates for the
reforms’ labor supply (retirement) effects, we also provide upper and lower confidence
limits, treating the means ratio as non-stochastic. As Table 2.5 shows, both the point
estimates and the confidence limits are close to zero. For the first reform, the estimated
elasticity is -0.013, with a lower and upper limit of -0.034 and 0.008, respectively. For
the second, the point estimate is 0.008, with lower and upper limits of -0.050 and 0.065,
respectively. All these numbers are very small.
2.4.3 Does selective mortality affect the results?
If the reforms under study have an impact on the mortality rate of the affected work-
ers, our estimates might be subject to selection bias. That is, workers who retired at
a later age because of lower pensions might have died earlier and be systematically
underrepresented in our sample, which is taken from the stock of living pensioners in
2008. In addition, mortality is an interesting dependent variable in its own right which
has been investigated in the pension cut studies by Snyder and Evans (2006) for the
United States and Jensen and Richter (2004) for Russia. The pension cuts investigated
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Tab. 2.5: Estimates of the extensive labor supply elasticity.
(1) (2) (3)
Difference Means
Ratio ratio Elasticity
Nat. Exp. 1
Point estimate -0.00030 43 -0.013
Lower limit -0.00079 43 -0.034
Upper limit 0.00020 43 0.008
Nat. Exp. 2
Point estimate 0.00006 133 0.008
Lower limit -0.00037 133 -0.050
Upper limit 0.00049 133 0.065
Note: Columns (1) and (2) provide the figures for the first and second terms of equation (2), respectively, whose
product equals the extensive labor supply elasticity provided in column (3). Source: Administrative German pension
data; German Microcensus; author calculations.
here affect low-income groups, and for them, changes in their budget constraints could
affect health investments, leading to lower life expectancy.
In Table 2.6, we draw on the 2006-2008 administrative data on exits from the pen-
sion system because of death to estimate whether workers affected by the pension cut
generated by Natural Experiments 1 and 2 had a higher probability of dying during
the years 2006 through 2008 (the only time span for which such data were available).
Unfortunately, the administrative data made available do not contain the exact date of
immigration, but only the year of immigration, so that we cannot build the discontinuity
samples as we would like and as we did in the Section 2.4.1. Hence, the samples used for
this analysis are larger than those previously discussed because of the necessarily larger
sampling windows. Sample means for the estimation samples are provided in Table 2.21
and Table 2.22 in the appendix. Between 5 and 11 percent of men and between 2 and
5 percent of women passed away within this 3-year interval, depending on the natural
experiment and sample considered. We use the same restrictions as before concerning
the birth date intervals for the estimation samples.
For Natural Experiment 1, we create two estimation samples, which, because the
exact immigration date is not observed, must include all repatriated ethnic Germans
who immigrated at any time during 1990 or 1991. Some workers who immigrated in
1990, however, experienced additional pension cuts through another reform that could
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not be evaluated here because of data issues. Nevertheless, even without the exact
immigration date, we were able to identify whether an individual was affected because
the data allowed us to de facto exclude workers who immigrated in the first half of 1990
from Sample A.20 In Sample B, we include all 1990 immigrants in the control group.
For Natural Experiment 2, we build two further samples, for which we again do
not observe the exact immigration date, only the year plus an indicator of whether the
individual was affected by the reform associated with the natural experiment. Sample A
includes only those who immigrated in 1996, whereas Sample B also includes immigrants
who arrived in 1995 (control group) or 1997 (treatment group).
Table 2.6 reports the estimates for the reforms (with treatment defined by immi-
gration year) both on the log pension and on mortality for men in the 3-year period
from 2006 through 2008. The estimates we obtain for the effective pension cuts are
mostly similar to those for the regression discontinuity discussed in Section 4.1. For
the two ’B samples’, the estimates are larger, indicating a 20 percent cut in pensions,
to be expected given the additional reform that cut pensions for immigrants arriving in
the second half of 1990 (Natural Experiment 1) and the fact that all immigrants who
arrived in 1997 were affected by pension cuts related to both Natural Experiment 2 and
Natural Experiment 3.
For Natural Experiment 1, we find no statistically significant evidence for a mortality
effect of pension cuts: the point estimates are around zero, at -0.9 and 0.9 percentage
points for Samples A and B, respectively. For Natural Experiment 2, as in Snyder and
Evans (2006), the point estimate is both negative and statistically significant, implying
that a pension cut of 14 percent decreased mortality by 2.3 percentage points (Sample
A, significant only at the 10 percent level). The point estimates for men and women
combined are somewhat smaller (Table 2.7), because the point estimates for women are
closer to zero than those for men. For women, only the estimate for Sample A, Natural
Experiment 2, is statistically significant (Table 2.23 in the appendix).
These results contrast with those by Jensen and Richter (2004) for Russia, where
decreases in household income by 24 percent on average pension increased male mor-
20Even though the month (and day) of immigration is not observed in this sample, the data do
include a marker that identifies those who immigrated before July 1990 provided they retired before
1996.
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Tab. 2.6: Pension cuts and mortality: men.
Dependent variable Sample A Sample B
Natural Experiment 1
Died in 2006-2008 -0.009 0.009
(0.012) (0.008)
Log(net pension) -0.11∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
Observations 2,923 8,227
Natural Experiment 2
Died in 2006-2008 -0.023∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.006)
Log(net pension) -0.140∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.006)
Observations 2,266 7,361
Note: Sample B = immigrated in 1990 and 1991; Sample A excludes those who immigrated before July 1990
and those who retired after 1995. Source: Administrative German pension data; German Microcensus; author
calculations.
Tab. 2.7: Pension cuts and mortality: men and women combined.
Dependent variable Sample A Sample B
Natural Experiment 1
Died in 2006-2008 -0.016 -0.009
(0.006) (0.003)
Log(net pension) -0.080∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008)
Observations 7,113 18,195
Natural Experiment 2
Died in 2006-2008 -0.016∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.003)
Log(net pension) -0.145∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.004)
Observations 5,355 17,146
Note: Sample B = immigrated in 1990 and 1991; Sample A excludes those who immigrated before July 1990
and those who retired after 1995. Source: Administrative German pension data; German Microcensus; author
calculations.
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tality by almost 6 percentage points within a 2-year interval (with no effects on female
mortality). However, contrary to the case of German repatriates, some households tem-
porarily received no pension during the Russian pension crisis, and the Russian public
health system is not comparable with the one in Germany. Regarding the result of
Snyder and Evans (2006) for the U.S., on the other hand, it seems to be confirmed by
our estimates. These authors find that pension cuts stemming from the social security
notch decreased mortality by 2 percentage points within a 5-year interval. Nevertheless,
without precise information on immigration date, the estimates presented in tables 2.6,
2.7 and in table 2.23 in the appendix are not true regression discontinuity estimates.
Therefore, doubts remain about whether they are a result of the pension cut reform or
of unobserved differences between treatment and control groups that are unrelated to
pensions but cannot be controlled for because of the paucity of sociodemographic in-
formation in the administrative data. Hence, keeping this caveat in mind, we conclude
that with the data at hand, we can detect no significant effects of the pension reforms
in terms of increased mortality. We assume that the significant negative effects found
for Natural Experiment 2 would not hold in narrow discontinuity samples such as those
built in Section 2.4.1.
2.4.4 Can workers retire earlier to avoid a pension cut?
Having found that pension cuts do not increase the labor supply significantly, we ask
whether the reverse is true: are low-skilled workers willing to decrease their labor supply
if given incentive to do so? Such an incentive is provided by Natural Experiment 3
for repatriated ethnic Germans, one on which we draw to investigate this question.
Specifically, repatriated ethnic Germans immigrating to Germany before 1991 (and
hence unaffected by the first reform) faced a 40 percent cut in earnings points if they
retired on or after October 1 1996, although, as already explained, actual pension cuts
were smaller, albeit still significant, because earnings points translate nonlinearly into
pension levels.
To investigate whether workers evaded this reform, we compare repatriated ethnic
Germans who turned 60 before (treatment) or after (control) September 1996, the rule
being that one can retire on the first day of the month following one’s critical birthday.
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This design is motivated by the fact that, as confirmed by both the regulations discussed
in Section 2.2.1 and the empirical evidence on the survivor functions that show the
retirement age distribution, retirement before age 60 was much more difficult than
retirement at or after that age.
Table 2.8 shows that retiring before October 1, 1996 is associated with a 11-13
percent higher pension level. Table 2.9 provides the regression discontinuity estimates
(models 2 and 3), where the treatment group is defined based on birth date such that a
person turns 60 years of age before September 1996.21 Sampling windows are defined on
birth dates within 12, 6, 4 and 2 months’ intervals, so that the 12-month interval runs
from birth months March 1936 through January 1937. The size of the point estimates,
which are all statistically insignificant, suggests that turning 60 before the cutoff date
leads to a retirement age about 0.296 × 12 = 3.6 months younger. The standard error
for this estimate is 0.221 × 12 = 2.65 months (models 2/3 for the 2-month discontinuity
sample). If we assume that those people who retire at age 60 because of the reform
would have retired at age 63 in the absence of the reform, our point estimate implies that
3.6 / (3 × 12) = 10 percent of repatriated ethnic Germans react to Natural Experiment
3. Such a result may be interpreted to mean that, by and large, the vast majority of
repatriated ethnic German workers retired as early as the regulations would allow and
hardly any were able to retire even earlier to avoid the cut in pension rights.
To obtain another perspective on Natural Experiment 3, we plot in Figure 4 the
transition rates into retirement by calendar time to test whether there is any heaping of
transitions into retirement in September 1996, that is immediately before the cutoff date.
We consider all repatriated ethnic German men of the birth cohorts 1927 through 1942
who immigrated between 1980 and 1990 and were at least 55 years old at their age of
retirement. These are birth cohorts similar to the ones analyzed in Natural Experiments
1 and 2 who are at or close to retirement age around the cutoff date and immigration
cohorts who are not affected by pension cut reforms 1 and 2, so that they have most
to gain from retiring before October 1, 1996. In Figure 4, we compare repatriated
ethnic Germans affected by Natural Experiment 3 (treatment group) with repatriated
21Because so many women retire at age 60 and it is difficult to retire earlier, we expect it to be
much more likely to observe an effect for men, so that we limit ourselves to this group. Retirement
before the age of 55 is excluded because it is mostly governed by more severe medical conditions and
not relevant for the cohorts investigated in Natural Experiments 1 and 2.
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Tab. 2.8: Effect on log pensions of retiring before October 1 1996.
Month-of-birth
interval around 1
September 1936 Model 1 Model 3 Model 3
12-month (n = 2,611) 0.113∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
6-month (n = 1,342) 0.107∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
4-month (n = 926) 0.126∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
2-month (n = 492) 0.129∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
Note: Model 1 controls for date of birth and source country (raw gap); Model 2 also controls for the
month of birth, and Model 3 additionally controls for the square of the month of birth. Because we
do not observe the exact birth date, models 2 and 3 are identical for the 2-months sampling window.
Source: Administrative German pension data; author calculations.
Tab. 2.9: Effect on retirement age of turning 60 before September 1 1996 (with possible
retirement before October 1 1996).
Month-of-birth
interval around 1
September 1936 Model 1 Model 3 Model 3
12-month (n = 2,611) -0.090 -0.086 -0.083
(0.159) (0.159) (0.159)
6-month (n = 1,342) -0.272 -0.242 -0.243
(0.230) (0.229) (0.229)
4-month (n = 926) -0.377 -0.304 -0.237
(0.300) (0.299) (0.324)
2-month (n = 492) -0.339∗ -0.296 -0.296
(0.192) (0.191) (0.191)
Note: Model 1 controls for date of birth and source country (raw gap); Model 2 also controls for the
month of birth (discontinuity design estimator), and Model 3 additionally controls for the square of the
month of birth (discontinuity design estimator). Source: Administrative German pension data; author
calculations.
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ethnic Germans from Poland, who are not affected due to a German-Polish Accord
(control group). It is shown that there is some heaping of transition into retirement
shortly before the cutoff (September 1996 and to some extend August 1996) among
the treatment group but not among the control group. However, this heaping is hard
to distinguish from the amplitude of the general ”noise” (variation) in these data. A
difference-in-differences estimator for the transition rate differences between treatment
and control groups immediately before and after the cutoff date (September versus
October) yields an effect of (0.0130-0.0106) - (0.0098-0.0092) = 0.0018, with a standard
error of 0.0016. This would be an increase in the transition rate of about 16 percent (21
percent) in September compared to the level observed in July (March) for the treatment
group. However, this effect is not statistically significant.
2.4.5 Explanations for the empirical results: ”corner solution”
or behavioral approach?
Combining the above observations with the estimates of the labor supply effects of
exogenous pension cuts as implemented in Natural Experiments 1 and 2, a standard
labor supply model would suggest that low-skilled workers like the repatriated ethnic
Germans are mired in a ’corner solution’ of retiring at the earliest possible date (as
learnt from Natural Experiment 3) and that reducing their pensions did not significantly
increase their labor supply in the form of later retirement (as learnt from Natural
Experiments 1 and 2). Theoretically, this finding can be explained by the fact that
in this corner solution, the marginal rate of substitution between leisure time spent in
retirement and consumption is higher than the price of leisure, a fact that still held true
even after the cuts in the price of leisure brought about by Natural Experiments 1 and
2.22
22To illustrate, consider a simple labor supply model where the budget constraint faced by the worker
can be represented as
C = Tw − (w − p)R (2.3)
where C is total consumption, T is the time left from the earliest possible retirement date until
the expected end of life, w is the wage rate that the individual could earn (per period), p is the
pension earned per period, and R is the number of periods spent in retirement. Given a relatively
low w (Calculations based on the microcensus data show that the median income of repatriated ethnic
German men or women who immigrated after 1997, being older than 55 in 2005 and currently out of
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Behavioral economics can provide an alternative explanation why Natural Experi-
ments 1 and 2 have not increased labor supply. We can think of a reference-dependent
utility model, where even after the pension cuts, repatriated ethnic Germans are likely
to have had pension incomes above their ”aspiration levels”, thanks to the windfall gains
of obtaining a German pension. These aspiration levels may have been defined earlier
on in their lives when ethnic Germans still lived in the Soviet Union or Romania (the
main source countries for people in our samples). It is unclear whether in the case
of ethnic Germans, aspiration levels would not have increased by moving to Germany.
Bertrand et al. (2000) show that networks defined by location and language groups
have an impact on welfare participation, a finding that might be interpreted such that
these groups define aspiration/reference levels. On the other hand, we observe that the
distribution of occupations and the retirement age for repatriated ethnic Germans are
very similar to the ones of low-skilled ethnic Germans. Ethnic Germans might therefore
have adapted their aspiration levels to those of other low-skilled Germans. Hence, not
only the job and retirement outcomes of these two groups, but also their reactions to
reforms as the ones we analyze may be similar. This would imply that the estimates we
have obtained for repatriated ethnic Germans are informative for low-skilled German
workers in general. Of course, because there was no such reform for other low-skilled
Germans, we cannot test whether this reasoning holds empirically.
2.5 Conclusions
Theoretically, the three natural experiments on pension reforms analyzed here, by ex-
posing workers to exogenous pension cuts and the possibility of avoiding a decrease in
pension, provided incentives for both later (Natural Experiments 1 and 2) and earlier
(Natural Experiment 3) retirement. We therefore analyze the effects of these compar-
the labor market, is around 500 Euros - income data are given only in intervals -. For the same group,
working men earn between 1,000 Euros and 1,200 Euros and working women around 500 Euros) and
a relatively high p (albeit one still lower than w), we expect the budget constraint to be relatively
flat when drawn in C-R space (or even to have a positive slope, which is not indicated by the figures
discussed above, though). A reform that lowers p, like the one considered here, will slope the budget
line even more negatively, and even more so if the slope was negative before reform. As regards a
corner solution in which workers retire as soon as the administration allows - meaning that R = T -
such a solution could still conceivably exist post reform if the difference between w and the new pension
level is still sufficiently small relative to the marginal rate of substitution of R for C in the point where
R=T and C=Rp.
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atively large pension changes (between 8 and 16 percent) on the retirement age of one
specific group of low-skilled workers, repatriated ethnic Germans, the only group to
whom the pension reforms applied.
First, we find hardly any reaction to exogenous pension cuts (Natural Experiments 1
and 2) in terms of retirement behavior. Rather, combining our regression discontinuity
design estimates with descriptive evidence on the price of leisure, we find an upper
bound for the extensive lifetime labor supply elasticity estimate of 0.07, a very small
number. Second, we find no evidence that the pension cuts increased mortality in either
men or women. Third, according to the results for Natural Experiment 3, there was
barely any worker reaction to incentives to retire earlier in order to avoid the 13-16
percent pension cut.
Overall, our study demonstrates that because European welfare states, of which
Germany is an exemplary case, provide few work incentives for older low-skilled workers;
for most, quitting the labor market as early as possible seems the optimal choice. More
specifically, low-skilled workers in Germany, as represented here by repatriated ethnic
Germans, are bogged down in a ’corner solution’ of retiring as early as possible, one
in which the price of leisure is so low that even the comparatively large pension cuts
analyzed here provide no incentives to work longer.
One major policy implication of this finding is that even significant decreases or
increases in the pension rate - for example, of between 8-16 percent as analyzed here
- have virtually no incentive effect in terms of labor supply and thus have predom-
inantly distributional consequences (assuming the intensive labor supply elasticity to
also be low). There thus seems ample scope for redistribution in both directions through
changes in the pension rate.
2.6 Appendix: additional tables and figures
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Tab. 2.10: Occupational distribution of workers aged 55-65: repatriated ethnic Germans
versus low-skilled and skilled Germans.
Men Women
Low- Low-
REGs Sk. Skilled REGs Sk. Skilled
Self-employed w/o employees 6 10 10 3 5 7
Self-employed w/ employees 6 6 12 2 2 5
Home worker (family business) 0 1 1 2 6 4
Civil servant or judge 4 2 11 1 0 8
White-collar employee 29 25 41 42 43 61
Blue-collar employee 54 56 26 49 44 16
Index of dissimilarity to REGs - 7 28 - 6 33
Note: REG = repatriated ethnic Germans immigrated in 1990 or later; low-skilled workers = employed individuals
without even apprenticeship education; skilled workers = employed individuals with apprenticeship education or
higher. Source: German Microcensus 2005; author calculations.
Tab. 2.11: Statistics for calculating labor supply elasticity.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Annual Annual
pension pension PoL PoL Years
Coeff. change change before after worked
Nat. Exp. 1 -0.26 -873 10,308 1,692 2,565 39
(s.e.) (0.22)
Nat. Exp. 2 0.06 -1,048 7,183 4,817 5,866 36
(s.e.) (0.23)
Note: PoL = price of leisure in euros per year; the tables provides the statistics needed for the
calculation of the labor supply elasticity as given in equation (2) of the paper. To calculate the
elasticity, first, the estimated coefficient, given in column (1) is divided by the change in the price of
leisure, which equals the annual pension change, that is column (2) equals column (4) minus column
(5). This ratio is then multiplied by the ratio of the price of leisure before the reform, column (4),
divided by the average number of years worked before the reform, column (6). The annual pension
before the reform, column (3), is given for descriptive purposes. Source: Administrative German
pension data; German Microcensus; author calculations.
37
2.6. APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES
Tab. 2.12: Sample selection for Natural Experiments 1 and 2.
Nat. Experiment 1 Nat. Experiment 2
All Former All Former
All USSR All USSR
Born Jan. 1932-Mar. 1936/Sep. 1936-Dec. 1941 128,032 188,424
Males 56,748 84,765
Excluding former Polish residents 36,223 55,170
Date of immigration available 35,829 54,359
Immigrated Jul. 1990-Jun. 1991/Nov. 1995-Nov.
1996
2,645 2,286
Date of retirement available 2,640 1,567 2,283
Retired after immigration (Sample 1A/2A) 2,554 1,547 2,217 2,097
Immigrated Oct. 1990-Mar. 1991/Feb. 1996-Aug.
1996 (Sample 1B/2B)
1,083 779 989 939
Immigrated Dec. 1990-Jan. 1991/Apr. 1996-Jun.
1996 (Sample 1C/2C)
348 270 369 348
Source: Administrative data on the German pension insurance.
Tab. 2.13: Sample means for Natural Experiment 1 - treatment and control groups in
different discontinuity samples: men.
12-month window 6-month window 2-month window
Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
Age at retirement 60.5 60.8 60.5 60.5 60.3 60.5
(1.76) (1.96) (1.86) (1.85) (1.71) (1.79)
Date of retirement 1994.8 1995.0 1994.8 1994.7 1994.6 1994.6
(2.21) (2.41) (2.29) (2.27) (2.20) (2.28)
Date of retirement (censored) 1993.8 1993.7 1993.7 1993.7 1993.7 1993.7
(1.41) (1.51) (1.46 (1.45) (1.41) (1.42)
Share - censored 0.23 0.30 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.21
Retired before October 1996 0.81 0.76 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.82
Pension payment in Euros 786.0 836.7 789.0 859.0 810.7 874.7
(118.2) (161.6) (114.4) (165.1) (109.7) (195.6)
Date of birth 1934.3 1934.2 1934.3 1934.2 1934.3 1934.1
(1.24) (1.26) (1.24) (1.26) (1.25) (1.27)
Age on January 1 1990 55.8 55.8 55.7 55.8 55.7 55.9
(1.24) (1.26) (1.24) (1.26) (1.25) (1.27)
From Romania 0.25 0.45 0.24 0.27 0.17 0.21
From the former USSR 0.72 0.53 0.73 0.71 0.79 0.76
From another country 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
Number of observations 1,007 1,547 500 583 145 203
Source: Administrative German pension data; author calculations. Standard deviations are given in paren-
thesis.
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Tab. 2.14: Sample means in Natural Experiment 1 - treatment and control groups in
different discontinuity samples: women
12-month window 6-month window 2-month window
Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
Age at retirement 60.23 60.31 60.17 60.05 60.06 60.06
(1.88) (2.2) (1.9) (1.99) (1.74) (1.94)
Date of retirement 1994.4 1994.52 1994.42 1994.26 1994.24 1994.27
(2.12) (2.41) (2.08) (2.19) (2.03) (2.19)
Date of retirement (censored) 1993.83 1993.71 1993.86 1993.68 1993.76 1993.67
(1.45) (1.6) (1.46) (1.59) (1.56) (1.6)
Share - censored 0.12 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.14
Retired before October 1996 0.9 0.86 0.9 0.9 0.92 0.9
Pension payment in Euros 675.68 661.04 679.2 711.64 702.83 737.19
(211.62) (249.9) (207.23) (226.32 (196.54) (223.62)
Date of birth 1934.17 1934.21 1934.25 1934.22 1934.18 1934.21
(1.27) (1.24) (1.24) (1.26) (1.27) (1.33)
Age on January 1 1990 55.83 55.79 55.75 55.78 55.82 55.79
(1.27) (1.24) (1.24) (1.26) (1.27) (1.33)
From Romania 0.24 0.44 0.23 0.25 0.16 0.17
From the former USSR 0.72 0.53 0.74 0.7 0.8 0.78
From another country 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05
Number of observations 1,339 2,066 676 803 182 300
Source: Administrative German pension data; author calculations. Standard deviations are given in paren-
thesis.
Tab. 2.15: Sample means in Natural Experiment 1 - treatment and control groups in
different discontinuity samples: women
12-month window 6-month window 2-month window
Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
Age at retirement 60.23 60.31 60.17 60.05 60.06 60.06
(1.88) (2.2) (1.9) (1.99) (1.74) (1.94)
Date of retirement 1994.4 1994.52 1994.42 1994.26 1994.24 1994.27
(2.12) (2.41) (2.08) (2.19) (2.03) (2.19)
Date of retirement (censored) 1993.83 1993.71 1993.86 1993.68 1993.76 1993.67
(1.45) (1.6) (1.46) (1.59) (1.56) (1.6)
Share - censored 0.12 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.14
Retired before October 1996 0.9 0.86 0.9 0.9 0.92 0.9
Pension payment in Euros 675.68 661.04 679.2 711.64 702.83 737.19
(211.62) (249.9) (207.23) (226.32 (196.54) (223.62)
Date of birth 1934.17 1934.21 1934.25 1934.22 1934.18 1934.21
(1.27) (1.24) (1.24) (1.26) (1.27) (1.33)
Age on January 1 1990 55.83 55.79 55.75 55.78 55.82 55.79
(1.27) (1.24) (1.24) (1.26) (1.27) (1.33)
From Romania 0.24 0.44 0.23 0.25 0.16 0.17
From the former USSR 0.72 0.53 0.74 0.7 0.8 0.78
From another country 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05
Number of observations 1,339 2,066 676 803 182 300
Source: Administrative German pension data; author calculations. Standard deviations are given in paren-
thesis.
39
2.6. APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES
Tab. 2.16: Sample means in Natural Experiment 2 - treatment and control groups in
different discontinuity samples: men.
12-month window 6-month window 2-month window
Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
Age at retirement 60.88 60.8 60.89 60.89 60.84 60.83
(1.84) (2.08) (1.82) (2.01) (1.75) (2.05)
Date of retirement 2000.03 1999.98 2000.01 2000 1999.85 2000.21
(2.54) (2.83) (2.57) (2.81) (2.51) (2.96)
Pension payment in Euros 514.58 637.96 518.06 607.43 506.97 601.64
(86.97) (131.52) (86.25) (132.21) (84.44) (134.38)
Date of birth 1939.15 1939.18 1939.12 1939.11 1939.01 1939.38
(1.49) (1.47) (1.47) (1.49) (1.44) (1.51)
Age on January 1 1990 50.85 50.82 50.88 50.89 50.99 50.62
(1.49) (1.47) (1.47) (1.49) (1.44) (1.51)
From Romania 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.03
From the former USSR 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.92 0.97
From another country 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
Number of observations 1,120 1,097 554 435 191 178
Source: Administrative German pension data; author calculations. Standard deviations are given in paren-
thesis.
Tab. 2.17: Sample means in Natural Experiment 2 - treatment and control groups in
different discontinuity samples: women.
12-month window 6-month window 2-month window
Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
Age at retirement 60.22 60.14 60.25 60.21 60.18 60.2
(1.32) (1.43) (1.36) (1.49) (1.41) (1.55)
Date of retirement 1999.39 1999.34 1999.35 1999.44 1999.33 1999.53
(1.98) (2.06) (1.98) (2.07) (1.99) (2.05)
Pension payment in Euros 495.97 603.6 493.88 589.41 483.28 576.28
(97.14) (144.87) (99.33) (136.24) (105.13) (134.99)
Date of birth 1939.17 1939.19 1939.11 1939.23 1939.15 1939.33
(1.49) (1.51) (1.49) (1.49) (1.48) (1.49)
Age on January 1 1990 50.83 50.81 50.89 50.77 50.85 50.67
(1.49) (1.51) (1.49) (1.49) (1.48) (1.49)
From Romania 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05
From the former USSR 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.92
From another country 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03
Number of observations 1533 1586 758 629 268 270
Source: Administrative German pension data; author calculations. Standard deviations are given in paren-
thesis.
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Tab. 2.18: Sample means for Natural Experiment 3 - treatment and control groups in
different discontinuity samples: includes individuals born in September 1936.
12-month window 6-month window 4-month window 2-month window
Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
Age at retirement 61.20 61.46 61.26 61.52 61.26 61.41 61.16 61.43
(2.11) (2.21) (2.12) (2.14) (2.13) (2.13) (2.25) (2.09)
Date of retirement 1997.32 1998.59 1997.64 1998.4 1997.77 1998.15 1997.74 1998.09
(2.14) (2.23) (2.13) (2.15) (2.13) (2.13) (2.25) (2.09)
Retired at age 60 0.33 0.29 0.33 0.28 0.35 0.30 0.36 0.31
Pension payment in
Euros
891.25 827.57 877.71 832.66 873.98 844.42 870.31 859.15
(193.59) (160.36) (187.20) (159.62) (187.10) (164.66) (200.48 (161.18)
Date of birth 1936.12 1937.13 1936.38 1936.87 1936.51 1936.75 1936.58 1936.67
(0.29) (0.29) (0.15) (0.15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00)
Age on January 1
1990
53.88 52.87 53.62 53.13 53.49 53.25 53.42 53.33
(0.29) (0.29) (0.15) (0.15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00)
From Romania 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.44 0.46
From the former
USSR
0.40 0.44 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.40 0.42 0.43
From another coun-
try
0.14 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.11
Number of observa-
tions
1,248 1,363 646 696 444 482 250 242
Source: Administrative German pension data; author calculations. Standard deviations are given in paren-
thesis.
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Tab. 2.19: Effective log pension changes for women caused by Natural Experiments 1
and 2.
Model 1 Model 3 Model 3
Natural Experiment 1 - OLS
12-month sampling window -0.07∗∗∗ -0.05∗ -0.06∗∗
n = 3405 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
6-month sampling window -0.07∗∗∗ -0.04 -0.04
n = 1479 (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
2-month sampling window -0.06 -0.03 -0.04
n = 482 (0.04) (0.07) (0.08)
Natural Experiment 2 - OLS
12-month sampling window -0.19∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗
n = 3119 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
6-month sampling window -0.18∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗
n = 1387 (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
2-month sampling window -0.18∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗
n = 538 (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Both Nat. Experiments pooled -
OLS
12-month sampling window
n = 6524 -0.13∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗
6-monthsampling window (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
n = 2856 -0.12∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗
2-month sampling window (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
n = 1020 -0.11∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
Not(0.02)e: Model(0.04) 1 contr(0.04)ols for date of birth and source country, Model 2 also controls for immigration
date (discontinuity design estimator), and Model 3 additionally controls for the square of the immigration date
(discontinuity design estimator). Source: Administrative German pension data; author calculations.
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Tab. 2.20: Effects of pension cuts for women on age of retirement.
Model 1 Model 3 Model 3
Natural Experiment 1 - OLS
12-month sampling window 0.15∗∗∗ 0.13 0.13
n = 3405 (0.05) (0.10) (0.10)
6-month sampling window 0.15∗∗ 0.17 0.15
n = 1479 (0.07) (0.14) (0.15)
2-month sampling window 0.06 0.00 -0.04
n = 482 (0.13) (0.28) (0.29)
Natural Experiment 1 - Tobit
12-month sampling window 0.15∗∗∗ 0.13 0.13
n = 3405 (0.06) (0.12) (0.12)
6-month sampling window 0.16∗∗ 0.14 0.14
n = 1479 (0.08) (0.17) (0.17)
2-month sampling window 0.04 0.00 -0.00
n = 482 (0.15) (0.30) (0.30)
Natural Experiment 2 - OLS
12-month sampling window 0.09∗ -0.00 -0.00
n = 3119 (0.05) (0.10) (0.10)
6-month sampling window 0.04 -0.08 -0.08
n = 1387 (0.08) (0.15) (0.15)
2-month sampling window -0.04 -0.08 -0.08
n = 538 (0.13) (0.27) (0.27)
Both Nat. Experiments pooled -
OLS
12-month sampling window 0.12∗∗∗ 0.06 0.08
n = 6524 (0.03) (0.07) (0.07)
6-monthsampling window 0.09∗ 0.06 0.04
n = 2856 (0.05) (0.11) (0.11)
2-month sampling window -0.01 0.02 -0.02
n = 1020 (0.09) (0.19) (0.19)
Both Nat. Experiments pooled -
Tobit
12-month sampling window 0.12∗∗ 0.07 0.07
n = 6524 (0.05) (0.09) (0.09)
6-monthsampling window 0.11 -0.01 -0.03
n = 2856 (0.07) (0.13) (0.13)
2-month sampling window -0.06 0.01 -0.04
n = 1020 (0.11) (0.22) (0.22)
Note: Model 1 controls for date of birth and source country, Model 2 also controls for immigration date (discontinuity
design estimator), and Model 3 additionally controls for the square of the immigration date (discontinuity design
estimator). Source: Administrative German pension data; author calculations.
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Tab. 2.21: Sample means for mortality estimates: men.
Natural Experiment 1 Natural Experiment 2
Sample A Sample B Sample A Sample B
Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
Share who
died 2006-
2008
0.10 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07
Age at re-
tirement
59.63 59.62 60.32 60.69 61.10 60.70 60.96 60.84
(1.31) (1.51) (1.85) (1.95) (2.05) (2.25) (2.11) (2.25)
Date of re-
tirement
1993.54 1993.44 1994.52 1994.72 2000.58 2000.08 2000.48 2000.11
(1.35) (1.52) (2.23) (2.29) (2.82) (3.16) (2.92) (3.13)
Pension pay-
ment in Eu-
ros
771.32 856.35 767.21 935.42 518.27 641.93 518.66 611.97
(153.97) (174.30) (149.71) (217.80) (84.36) (139.76) (85.27) (142.96)
Date of birth 1933.91 1933.82 1934.20 1934.02 1939.48 1939.38 1939.52 1939.27
(1.19) (1.21) (1.26) (1.26) (1.74) (1.74) (1.73) (1.74)
From Roma-
nia
0.26 0.41 0.28 0.44 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.09
From the for-
mer USSR
0.66 0.55 0.65 0.33 0.98 0.93 0.98 0.88
From an-
other coun-
try
0.08 0.04 0.07 0.23 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
Number of
observations
1,716 1,207 2,280 5,947 3,731 4,476 1,768 756
Note: For Natural Experiment 1, Sample A includes those who immigrated between July 1990 and December 1991
(we only observe the year of immigration, but the data include an implicit indicator for immigration before July
1990); Sample B includes those who immigrated in 1990 or 1991. For Natural Experiment 2, Sample A includes those
who immigrated in 1996 (we distinguish between treatment and control groups based on an indicator of whether an
individual was affected by the reform); Sample B includes those who immigrated between 1995 and 1997. Source:
Administrative German pension data; author calculations. Standard deviations are given in parenthesis.
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Tab. 2.22: Sample means for mortality estimates: women.
Natural Experiment 1 Natural Experiment 2
Sample A Sample B Sample A Sample B
Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control
Share who
died 2006-
2008
0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
Age at re-
tirement
59.59 59.39 60.17 60.33 60.23 60.05 60.23 60.19
(1.15) (1.40) (1.91) (2.10) (1.43) (1.61) (1.44) (1.52)
Date of re-
tirement
1993.64 1993.46 1994.36 1994.36 1999.73 1999.40 1999.71 1999.48
(1.37) (1.61) (2.15) (2.32) (2.17) (2.35) (2.23) (2.32)
Pension pay-
ment in Eu-
ros
707.8 723.21 661.08 644.38 503.56 597.14 499.82 571.41
(168.47) (189.31) (217.41) (234.28) (90.66) (150.39) (92.65) (150.53)
Date of birth 1934.04 1934.06 1934.18 1934.03 1939.51 1939.35 1939.48 1939.29
(1.19) (1.18) (1.25) (1.24) (1.70) (1.73) (1.70) (1.74)
From Roma-
nia
0.21 0.38 0.25 0.44 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.10
From the for-
mer USSR
0.73 0.59 0.67 0.36 0.98 0.91 0.97 0.86
From an-
other coun-
try
0.06 0.03 0.08 0.19 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04
Number of
observations
2,406 1,784 2,951 7,017 4,835 5,989 2,320 1,081
Note: For Natural Experiment 1, Sample A includes those who immigrated between July 1990 and December 1991
(we only observe the year of immigration, but the data include an implicit indicator for immigration before July
1990); Sample B includes those who immigrated in 1990 or 1991. For Natural Experiment 2, Sample A includes those
who immigrated in 1996 (we distinguish between treatment and control groups based on an indicator of whether an
individual was affected by the reform); Sample B includes those who immigrated between 1995 and 1997. Source:
Administrative German pension data; author calculations. Standard deviations are given in parenthesis.
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Tab. 2.23: Pension cuts and mortality: women.
Dependent variable Sample A Sample B
Natural Experiment 1
Died in 2006-2008 0.002 0.002
(0.007) (0.005)
Log(net pension) -0.068∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.011)
Observations 4,190 9,968
Natural Experiment 2
Died in 2006-2008 -0.014∗∗ -0.003
(0.006) (0.003)
Log(net pension) -0.141∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.005)
Observations 3,089 9,785
Note: Sample B = immigrated in 1990 and 1991; Sample A excludes those who immigrated
before July 1990 and those who retired after 1995. Source: Administrative German pension
data; German Microcensus; author calculations.
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Fig. 1. Survival estimates for age at retirement: men. Source: Administrative German pension data; author
calculations.
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A. Natural Experiment 1
B. Natural Experiment 2
Fig. 2. Effects of pension cuts on the distribution of pension payments. The graphs are based on the data for the
6-month sampling window. Source: Administrative German pension data; author calculations.
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A. Natural Experiment 1
B. Natural Experiment 2
Fig. 3. Effects of pension cuts on retirement behavior. The graphs are based on the data for the 6-month sampling
window. Source: Administrative German pension data; author calculations.
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A. Treatment Group: Repatriated Ethnic Germans Not Affected By
German-Polish Accord
B. Control Group: Repatriated Ethnic Germans Affected By
German-Polish Accord
Fig. 4. Transition into retirement rates for repatriated ethnic Germans affected (Panel A) and not affected (Panel B)
by Natural Experiment 3. Source: Administrative German pension data; author calculations.
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Fig. A1. Survival estimates for age at retirement: women. Source: Administrative German pension data; author
calculations.
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A. Natural Experiment 1
B. Natural Experiment 2
Fig. A2. Effects of pension cuts on the distribution of pension payments for women. The graphs are based on the
data for the 6-month sampling window. Source: Administrative German pension data; author calculations.
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A. Natural Experiment 1
B. Natural Experiment 2
Fig. A3. Effects of pension cuts on retirement behavior of women. The graphs are based on the data for the 6-month
sampling window. Source: Administrative German pension data; author calculations.
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A. Natural Experiment 1
B. Natural Experiment 2
Fig. A4. Pension payments and date of immigration: men. The graphs are based on the data for the 6-month
sampling window. Source: Administrative German pension data; author calculations.
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A. Natural Experiment 1
B. Natural Experiment 2
Fig. A5. Age at retirement and date of immigration: men. The graphs are based on the data for the 6-month
sampling window. Source: Administrative German pension data; author calculations.
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A. Natural Experiment 1
B. Natural Experiment 2
Fig. A6. Pension payments and date of immigration: women. The graphs are based on the data for the 6-month
sampling window. Source: Administrative German pension data; author calculations.
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A. Natural Experiment 1
B. Natural Experiment 2
Fig. A7. Age at retirement and date of immigration: women. The graphs are based on the data for the 6-month
sampling window. Source: Administrative German pension data; author calculations.
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Chapter 3
A two-wave household panel survey of the population
of a Togolese community, 2008-20111
3.1 Introduction
This chapter describes a household survey that I conducted with a local team in a rural
community in southern Togo in October 2008 and in January 2011. The major purpose
of implementing the survey was to allow evaluating a preschool project which started
in the studied community in between the two survey waves. Using the household data,
chapter 4 will discuss the analysis of the short-run impact of the preschool program
on time use of affected mothers. In addition to the choice of the community under
study, the purpose of being able to evaluate the preschool project dictated most other
aspects of the survey. In particular, the whole community was surveyed resulting in a
dataset with 3615 (3541) individuals in 2008 (2011).2 Furthermore, it had to be insured
1Part of this research was supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) within the project
’Ein Paneldatensatz zur Analyse von Humankapitalinvestitionen im fru¨hen Alter in la¨ndlichen Regionen
von Entwicklungsla¨ndern’, and by the Leibniz Universita¨t Hannover (”Forschungsfond”).
2The survey included a second, smaller community, located about eight Kilometers south of the main
community. 335 (351) individuals were interviewed in that village in 2008 (2011). The main objective
for collecting data there was to gather information on an additional control group which could help
identify the impact of the preschool program in the larger community. Since between the two waves
of the survey the provision of public preschool education did not change in the smaller community
(in fact, it had its own preschool since before 2008), differences in changes in behavior related to
preschool enrollment between the two communities are likely to be attributable to the introduction of
the preschool in the larger community. Unfortunately, as regards the evaluation of the preschool project
discussed in chapter 4, the smaller community did not provide enough observations meeting the data
requirements discussed there, in order to implement a difference-in-differences estimator exploiting
differences between the communities. To ease the presentation of the survey data, answers from
households in the smaller community are not included for all calculations and figures presented in this
chapter, and all further explanations concentrate on the main community.
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that individuals in the dataset are uniquely identifiable in order to match observations
between survey waves, and to link individuals to the preschool project. Finally, and most
importantly, the choice of topics covered by the survey was made with the evaluation
of the preschool project in mind.
As illustrated by table 3.1, this implied covering a wide range of socio-demographic
characteristics of all household members, their education, labor supply, agricultural
activities, health status, time use, and cognitive ability. The order of topics in the table
reflects the order of modules in the 2011 questionnaire which is shown in the general
appendix 6.2 (the 2008 questionnaire is shown in general appendix 6.2). It sketches the
main purpose for collecting information on each of the subjects, stating whether it is
seen as providing outcome or explanatory/control variables for the empirical analysis,
and giving examples for hypothesized relationships. Table 3.1 already illustrates that,
despite the originally relatively narrow purpose, the survey is designed broadly enough
such that it allows studying a wide range of issues. Accordingly, an exploitation of all
benefits of the data is beyond the scope of the analysis presented in chapter 4. It rather
leaves opportunities for future research.
Questionnaire design consisted of translating the topics listed in table 3.1 into fea-
sible and consistent survey questions. Many parts of the questionnaire were straight-
forward to implement and are rather self-explanatory, and they will not be discussed
further in this chapter. A starting point for the design of many of these rather stan-
dard elements of the questionnaires have been questionnaires used for conducting Living
Standards Measurement Study Household Surveys (LSMS) in various countries3. Other
inspirations included Weinert et al. (2007) and Kurth (2007) for the construction of the
module assessing personality traits and physical development of children; questions
pertaining to trust in other people as well as prejudices towards minorities have been
adapted from the World Values Survey, particularly questions A124, A165, and A168
according to the integrated questionnaire for the 1981-2008 surveys that is published
on the World Values Survey homepage.4
Apart from these rather standard sections of the questionnaire, other modules de-
3A general reference to LSMS surveys is provided by Grosh and Glewwe (1998)
4http://www.asep-sa.org/wvs/wvs 1981-2008/WVS 1981-2008 IntegratedQuestionnaire.pdf. Date
accessed: January 16, 2012.
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serve greater attention. Among them, three required particular effort for their design:
time use, income sources, and cognitive skills. All these modules have in common that
the data obtained from them require transformations before they can be used for analy-
sis. Accordingly, this chapter elaborates on what motivated the specific designs of these
questionnaire sections, and how their results are interpreted. The time use module (sec-
tion 3.1.1) meets the requirement of adequately measuring intensive labor supply and
capturing child care arrangements while being lean enough not to consume too much
time during interviews. The results regarding labor supply form the time use model are
fairly consistent with those obtained from the employment module. The approach taken
in the income sources module (section 3.1.2) was to valuate the output of households’
farms and non-agricultural enterprizes. Its results are, together with salaries obtained
in the employment section, consistent with the households’ own coarse evaluation of
income, but they are likely to provide a more accurate ranking of households with re-
spect to their financial opportunities. Finally, the cognitive skills module (section 3.1.3)
implemented a stripped-down version of what could be called a psychological test of
cognitive development. As opposed to many psychological tests, the goal is not to break
down cognitive ability into subscales. Rather, the single composite score obtained from
this test, which took 10 to 15 minutes per child in its 2011 version, yields a reliable
measure of ability that is correlated with cognitive achievement.
Section 3.2 shortly characterizes the community in which the survey was carried
out. Section 3.3 describes particularities of the survey implementation, where one of
the greatest difficulties was to ensure that it would be possible to match individual
observations from both waves of the survey. A good overall data quality was achieved,
leading to relatively few missing responses. Since the number of individuals who were
eligible for particular questions varied between questionnaire modules, the response rate
cannot be expressed as a single number. However, to give a few examples, the share of
illegible individuals in 2011 who responded to basic questions regarding their schooling
(number of completed school grades, school diploma obtained, number of years spent in
primary school, number of years spent in secondary school, last school attended) varied
between 91 and 98 percent. Even for more demanding sections of the questionnaire,
response rates were still acceptable. For instance, 95 percent of eligible individuals
responded to the time use questions, and 92 percent of 3- to 14-year old children took
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part in the cognitive tests.
Tab. 3.1: Questionnaire modules and their purpose
Module Purpose Example/explanation
Demographic infor-
mation
Control Sex and age are most likely correlated with different uses
of time; religion and ethnicity may capture heterogeneity
in preferences
Technical Information used to uniquely identify individuals and link
observations between survey waves (see section 3.3)
Fertility Control Reflects fundamental differences that may affect schooling
choices; recent fertility affects time use of mothers
Schooling Outcome Does having attended preschool affect the likelihood of en-
rollment in primary school?
Control Education of parents affects schooling choices they make for
their children as well as their labor market opportunities;
schooling expenditures as a measure of parental investments
human capital
School choice
(2011)
Outcome Do students self-select into schools?
Employment/
working hours/
months worked/
frequency of going
to work
Outcome How do childcare arrangements affect labor supply of co-
habiting adults?
Control Accounting for previous labor supply accounts for individ-
ual heterogeneity in models of current labor supply
Occupation (in-
cluding information
on household
enterprizes)
Control Determinant of income; determinant of time use
Place of work Control Determinant of time use
Time use Outcome How do childcare arrangements affect time use of cohabiting
adults?
Cognitive skills
(adults)
Control Potential determinant of schooling choices as well as pro-
ductivity/labor market opportunities
Agriculture Outcome How does caring for a child while working affect productiv-
ity?
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Control Determinant of income
Household infras-
tructure/ owner-
ship of production
and luxury goods
Control Approximate household wealth as an alternative to mea-
suring income; determinant of health status
Access to schools Control Determinants of enrollment decisions
Transfers from
other households
Control Determinant of income (remittances)
Recent deaths in
family
Control Potentially measures exogenous negative income shock (fu-
neral expenditures, loss of labor income); may also capture
health shocks to the whole family
Opinions regarding
child care ar-
rangements/ labor
supply of women/
mothers
Control Capture preferences that potentially determine both enroll-
ment and time use decisions
Opinions regarding
NGO/ preschool
Control Determinants of preschool enrolment
Opinions regarding
trust and attitude
towards minorities
Outcome Does being exposed to peers from different religions and
ethnicity reduce prejudice?
Control Determinants of participation in a public project
Household work of
children
Outcome Does early enrollment reduce the likelihood of children to
be working in the household in the future?
Personality traits Outcome Does preschool education affect children’s personality?
Control Determinants of enrolment decisions and learning behavior
Child
health/physical
development
Outcome Do child care arrangements affect the physical development
of children?
Control Determinant of enrollment and learning behavior
Cognitive develop-
ment of children
Outcome Does preschool education affect cognitive development of
children?
Control Determinant of enrollment and learning behavior
Direct measures of
income
Control Determinant of investments in human capital
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3.1.1 Time use
The research questions which motivated the implementation of the household survey are
intimately related to different uses of time, most importantly, work and child care. More
generally, measuring the intensity of human capital investments and more accurately
measuring labor supply in contexts where most labor is informal has frequently been
the objective of surveys designed to capture time use (Harvey and Taylor (2000)).
Furthermore, economic theory provides hypothesis that could be tested by use of time
use surveys.5 In addition, accounts of time use have been the subject of household
surveys in many fields (see Gross (1984) for an example from anthropology) for a long
time. Still, the empirical analysis of the determinants of different uses of time based
on time use data is still a relatively young field (Hamermesh and Pfann (2005)). In
particular, analysis of time allocation of women in developing countries are very rare.6
While acknowledging that measuring time use is important for a number of economic
research questions and for the analysis of child care arrangements in particular, it might
be argued that, in a very simple form, measures of time use could be easily implemented
in household surveys by asking respondents, for example, to indicate the number of
hours per week they spend with work or child care. However, for a number of reasons,
researchers have found it to be advantageous to implement questionnaire modules which
allow a more thorough assessment of time use where the objective is to fully account
for individuals’ activities throughout a given time period (Harvey and Taylor (2000)).
Three arguments are particular relevant to the analysis here.
First, a separate time use module may be better designed in order to reduce to
probability that respondents have difficulties to accurately recall their use of time. In
the Togolese survey, as a means to help respondents in recalling timing and duration
of their activities, interviewers guided them through the day so that respondents could
indicate beginning and end of an activity such that the length of the activity could be
deduced.
5Becker (1965) and Leibowitz (1974) provided foundations for the economic analysis of the allocation
of time.
6Malathy (1994) constitutes an exception.
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Second, a time use module may come closer to fully accounting for time uses of all
household members. If, for instance, time use information is only gathered in specific
sections, then there will be no information on time use available for individuals for
whom these sections do not apply. For example, if only hours of work are measured
(in the work module), then there would be no information on time use for individuals
who do not work. Regarding the research questions central to the project, this would
preclude analyzing the impact of child care arrangements on mother’s activities other
than working as well as studying the impact of children’s time use (e.g. the number of
hours they spend at home) on other household members’ time use.
Third, contextual information such as location as well as information on concurrent
activities are more easily recorded in a separate time use module. This quality is par-
ticularly useful regarding research questions related to issues of child care arrangements
(Harvey and Taylor (2000)): For instance, it will allow to study determinants and con-
sequences of mothers caring for children parallel to other activities as well as mothers
and children spending time either at home or outside the home. In fact, given such
flexible forms that child care arrangements can take, economists recognized long ago
that accurately measuring how much time individuals devote to child care is hard to
measure outside tailored time use modules which usually are not included in household
surveys (Hill and Stafford (1980)).
In light of these considerations, the Togolese surveys had to reconcile two opposed
goals. On the one hand, it had to be detailed enough in order to provide useful mea-
surements of labor supply and child care arrangements. On the other hand, it had to
be succinct just not to consume too much time during interviews and not to overstrain
interviewers and respondents. A stylized activity log simpler than the one proposed by
(Harvey and Taylor (2000)) was implemented, where the main differences are that the
set of activities to choose from is less detailed, and that the number of distinct time
periods per day, for which activities are recorded separately, is reduced.7.
Regarding the activities captured by the time use module, several types of activ-
ities were precoded, and individuals were asked to indicate how many hours within
7A more complete picture regarding time use may be given by more complex modules, for example,
what Harvey and Taylor (2000) call an open interval time diary. One additional difficulty associated
with such modules are the considerable complications that they add to data entry.
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a given time period on an average weekday8 they spend with activities falling under
each of these categories. These activity groups were: going to school, doing home-
work/studying at home, work as an apprentice, doing household work/chores, working
in a work shop/shop/etc. outside the home, working at home, running errands, doing
nothing, other activity.9 This seemingly short list of activities, including a residual
category of ”other activities”, already permits reliably retracing the course of a typical
day for the largest part of any population, and measures of intensive labor supply based
on these questions can be assumed to be fairly accurate. Moreover, it allows studying
the impact of social programs such as the preschool project described in chapter 4 on a
whole range of outcomes for all household members, which would not be feasible using
data from a regular household survey. Thus, despite its simplicity relative to other time
use surveys that have been conducted in the past, the module used for the Togolese
survey adds significantly to the opportunities of investigating the research questions
which motivated it.
As regards the number of distinct time periods per day implemented in the time
use model, a much higher number was chosen in 2008 than in 2011, which leads to the
quite different appearances of the sections in the two years. The 2008 questionnaire
distinguishes between periods of 30 minutes within one day whereas the 2011 question-
naire only distinguishes between the two halves of one day (where up to two activities
per half-day and the length of the major activity are recorded, and, in addition, the
number of hours caring for a child). Effectively, however, they do measure time use in
almost the exact same way. A higher number of periods within a day has the virtue of
capturing both the incidence and the timing (meaning the temporal location) of activi-
ties more accurately. Evidently, this is most relevant in cases where individual behavior
is such that one typically observes many relatively short spells of activities within one
day. At the level of aggregation that was chosen for activity classification, though, the
spells of activities that can be observed in the 2008 Togolese data are rather long. In
other words, only in rare cases more than one activity spell related to work or educa-
8In 2008, respondents were actually asked to indicate what they do on an average weekday. In 2011,
each respondent reported his activities for two weekdays of the previous seven days, and the average
responses for an individual is interpreted as describing his time use on an average weekday.
9The number of precoded activities was smaller in the 2008 questionnaire. However, in 2008, a
separate row in the questionnaire recorded the place of an activity. Combining these infirmations
allows to construct activity categories analogous to the ones used in 2011.
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tion fall within one half of a day. Thus, regarding the measurement of timing and the
length of the major activities, a module distinguishing between periods of 30 minutes
within a day and a module distinguishing between the two halves of a day are, by and
large, performing equally well.10 Accordingly, this simplification was implemented for
the 2011 survey, which tremendously reduced the amount of time necessary for filling
out the time use section during interviews.
While one of the motivations given above for implementing a time use module was
to obtain more accurate measures than would be obtained by, for example, simply
asking for hours of work within the occupation module, the latter was done as well,
because it is not very costly to do so. This allows for cross-validating measures for
the length of various activities obtained from both the time use module and other
sections of the interviews. Significant correlations between the measurements would
indicate consistency of the responses, increasing confidence in that they capture what
was originally intended to be measured. As figures 3.1 and 3.2 show, measures of labor
supply computed based on the two different modules reveal a consistency of answers for
a very large share of individuals, where the two measures of working hours are either
identical or very close to each other. However, there are also deviations, as indicated by
observations lying far off the 45-degree-line in these figures. This result highlights that
there are potential gains in accuracy from implementing a time use module. While it
is not valid to presume that the measure obtained from the time use module always is
more accurate, having both measures adds flexibility for empirical analysis, which can,
for example, be exploited by investigating the robustness of empirical results to the
choice of the labor supply measure. Figure 3.3 makes a similar comparison regarding
hours spent with homework. It shows that the duration of homework according the
time use module is systematically shorter. This may either imply that individuals
exaggerate if they are asked to indicate the time they spend doing homework without
being confronted with the context of a whole day’s activities. On the other hand, the
choice of reducing the distinct time periods per day in the time use module may have
10In addition, issues related to the temporal location of activities, which have been the explicit focus
of other time use surveys (Harvey and Taylor (2000)), are not particularly relevant to the research
questions that the Togolese survey has been designed for. For instance, when evaluating the impact
of institutional child care on mothers’ labor supply (see chapter 4), there is no relevant variation in
temporal location within such a social program that can be exploited, because the working hours of
schools and child care institutions are identical for everyone who is affected.
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resulted in underestimating the incidence of relatively short activities such as homework.
Fig. 3.1: Average daily working hours from employment module vs. average daily
working hours from time use module
Sample: Individuals from the household survey in 2011 with non-missing data on working hours in both the employment
and the time use module who indicated to have an occupation, and who reported more than zero working hours per
day in either the employment or the time use module; 14 observations have been dropped because they were considered
to be outliers (these were responses according to which individuals claimed in the employment module to work, on
average, 20 hours or more per day); N=999. The size of markers in the graph corresponds to the frequency with which
the respective combination of values for average working hours from the two questionnaire modules is observed in the
data. The correlation between the two variables is equal to 0.44. If only observations are included where more than zero
working hours are indicated in both the employment and the time use module (N=811), then the correlation coefficient
is equal to 0.64.
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Fig. 3.2: Average working hours per day implied by weekly working hours from em-
ployment module vs. average daily working hours from time use module
Sample: Individuals from the household survey in 2011 with non-missing data on working hours in both the employment
and the time use module who indicated to have an occupation, and who either reported more than zero working hours
per week in the employment or more than zero daily working hours in the time use module; N=1062. The size of markers
in the graph corresponds to the frequency with which the respective combination of values for average working hours
from the two questionnaire modules is observed in the data. The correlation between the two variables is equal to 0.46.
If only observations are included where more than zero working hours are indicated in both the employment and the
time use module (N=860), then the correlation coefficient is equal to 0.59.
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Fig. 3.3: Average hours of homework per day from child characteristics module vs.
average hours of homework from time use module
Sample: Individuals from the household survey in 2011 with non-missing data on homework hours in both the child
characteristics, who either reported more than zero homework hours per day in the child characteristics or more than zero
daily homework hours in the time use module; N=723. The size of markers in the graph corresponds to the frequency with
which the respective combination of values for average working hours from the two questionnaire modules is observed in
the data. The correlation between the two variables is equal to 0.11.
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3.1.2 Measuring income
It was considered important to this project to assess the economic situation of house-
holds in order to be able to construct useful control variables for the empirical analysis
which account for significant heterogeneity associated with the outcomes under study.
For instance, income can affect the demand for education, particularly if households tend
to be credit constrained (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011)). Unfortunately, reliably
assessing household’s income and living standards constitutes one of the biggest chal-
lenges to all household surveys conducted in developing countries, particularly in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Stifel and Christiaensen (2007)). The approach taken in this project
was to focus on measuring salaries, and, most importantly, output from the house-
holds’ farms and from non-agricultural enterprizes (in other words, partly measuring
the valuation of factor incomes)11
One major difficulty that makes measuring income in developing countries so com-
plicated is that it is often very uncommon for respondents to keep accounts of economic
activities. Accordingly, when being asked to indicate profits from farms or household
enterprizes, individuals usually do not have the information necessary to indicate the
respective amount right away. In addition, individuals may be reluctant to reveal infor-
mation on the amount of their income (McKay (2000)). Consequently, simply asking
individuals to indicate their income is not feasible.
An alternative approach used very frequently has been to measure total consumption
of households (Deaton (1997), Lipton and Ravallion (1995) as cited in McKay (2000)) as
a measure of living standards. The idea is that in developing countries, income sources
a very volatile and subject to strong seasonal effects, and it is argued that consumption
is a measure that better reflects long-run resources or permanent income (Ghuman et al.
(2005)). However, that approach was not suitable for this project either, because it is
unreasonably costly. I rather chose to approximate a valuation of factor incomes which
was possible to implement by adding only relatively few additional survey questions,
mostly to modules that would have existed anyway (e.g. employment). Measuring
consumption, on the contrary, would have required a large module on its own.12 As
11These three sources are expected to explain the largest share of incomes. Other parts of the
questionnaires that are also related to the measurement of income include a question on whether a
household has received transfers from another household.
12Moreover, there was no need to measure consumption in addition to income, because the project
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regards income from agricultural and non-agricultural enterprizes, the approach was
further simplified by focusing on the measurement of output rather than revenues from
these enterprizes, thus avoiding the measurement of production inputs.13 It is reasonable
to assume that, in the studied community, labor is by far the most important input
to production for agricultural and non-agricultural enterprizes. Thus differences in
farm output will mainly reflect differences in the amount of labor input and in the
productivity of labor. The survey assesses the labor supply of all household members
as well. Combined with this information, measuring household enterprizes’ output will
allow to appropriately group households according to their financial opportunities.
Assessing the salary of employees was straightforward to implement in the ques-
tionnaires. Salaries are recorded in the employment module, and they have been stan-
dardized to CFA per week. Measuring the output from household enterprizes, however,
required the combination of information from several survey items with external sources
of information.
In particular, the survey data from the agriculture module14 is combined with ad-
ditional information on prices, and information from the non-agricultural household
enterprize module is matched with external data on average revenues. The price data
must also include information on the conversion of local units of measurement into the
units for which price data are available (in many developing countries, particularly in
West Africa, respondents will only be able to indicate quantities of agricultural goods
in local units, Jolliffe (1995) as cited in Reardon and Glewwe (2000)). During the im-
plementation phase of the 2011 survey, two project staff members interviewed informed
citizens on prizes of agricultural goods and average revenues of entrepreneurs. Respon-
did not aim at computing household savings.
13Many household surveys in developing countries dedicate a large share of their questionnaires to
the accurate measurement of agricultural revenue by assessing inputs, outputs and other determinants.
Often, the objective is to be able to estimate agricultural production functions or to investigate issues
of intra-household distribution (Reardon and Glewwe (2000)), which are both not the focus of this
project.
14Additional decisions that had to be made when designing the agriculture module concerned the
level of aggregation at which farm output is measured as well as the choice of the recall period.
Regarding the level of aggregation, the survey followed the recommendation to gather agricultural
information on the plot level (rather than the household level) in order to help respondents recalling
the correct amounts of output (Reardon and Glewwe (2000)). As regards the recall period, the studied
community is part of the subhumid savanna zone with one agricultural season. Accordingly, choosing
a recall period of one year for the agricultural module is appropriate. A different recall period may
be warranted for regions with more than one agricultural season per year, because respondents might
have difficulties taking into account more than one harvest at a time.
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dents were chosen by neighborhood chiefs who were asked to indicate a neighborhood
community member whom they judged to be best informed on the local economy. In-
terviews with 11 experts were completed.
In order to compute the value of an individual’s agricultural output, all entities of
what was harvested on any fields an individual was responsible for were multiplied with
the respective good’s price as determined by averaging the prices the experts’ had indi-
cated. In order to valuate a non-agricultural household enterprize, the experts’ average
responses regarding revenues were simply matched to respective types of enterprizes and
multiplied by the fraction of the year prior to the survey during which an enterprize
was operating.
Similar to the strategy followed when measuring labor supply as described in section
3.1.1 (where it was motivated why labor supply is measured in both the time use
module and the employment module), the survey also included questions directly asking
respondents to reveal their income. In spite of the limited reliability of such information,
it was gathered because only few questions were required to do so, and in order to exploit
them as benchmarks for the alternative measures of income just described. At two
occasions, respondents were asked directly to reveal information on their income. First,
they were asked to indicate what someone would have to pay them such that they ceased
all other economic activities in order to work for that person (called ”reservation wage”
in what follows15). Second, household heads were asked to indicate the household’s
yearly income.
In order to determine whether the measures of income components discussed above
(salaries and output of agricultural and non-agricultural household enterprizes) suc-
ceed in capturing actual heterogeneity in income, I calculated correlations between
these measures and the responses to the questions asking for household income and for
reservation wage. A positive correlation between indicated household income and the
measures of income components would suggest that all these variables share a common
15While answers to this questions may partly reflect preferences for job characteristics other than
salary or revenue, respondents will, presumably, also partly reveal what they estimate to be their
current income. Note that the survey question is designed such that the respondent is supposed to
evaluate his current utility level. This is different from similar questions in other surveys which ask
respondents to indicate their reservation wage for accepting an employment offer in a hypothetical
situation of being unemployed, regardless of whether they currently are unemployed or not (Grogger
(2009))
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component that does reflect heterogeneity in income.
Table 3.2 gives pairwise correlation estimates between indicated household income16
and each of the three income components (on the household level). Table 3.3 shows
correlations between the responses to the reservation wage question and income com-
ponents on the individual level. Apparently, at least for 2011, answers to the survey
question on household income and the three income components computed in the fash-
ion described above are highly correlated. For 2008, correlations and their significance
are lower, particularly for wages. Still, for agricultural output, which, presumably, is
the most important determinant of household income, the correlation is significant.
Regarding the correlations between these income components on the individual level
and answers to the reservation wage question, however, information from these sepa-
rate elements of the survey questionnaire are much less consistent as can be seen from
table 3.3; there is only some weak correlation between reservation wage and wages from
primary occupation. That result has a number of possible explanations; probably the
most relevant one is that output from household farms and non-agricultural enterprizes
was attributed to individuals based on indications as regards which household members
are considered responsible for a particular plot or enterprize. However, responsibility
for a plot or enterprize does not necessarily imply that income generated from these
sources truly pertains to the individual. It is much more likely that income generated
by the whole farm and by all household enterprizes is shared among household members
according to some unobserved scheme (Duflo and Udry (2003)). Accurately capturing
the relevant channels of intra-household distribution is beyond the scope of this survey.
These results suggest that, at least on the household level, the information captured
by the alternative measures of income sources are relatively consistent. The quality of
the income data should be put into perspective by referring to the substantial difficulties
other survey projects in developing countries have seen. For instance, as (McKay (2000))
documents, several LSMS surveys exhibit severe inconsistencies, such that, for example,
income and consumption are only weakly correlated, and comparisons between average
16Note that in the questionnaire, in order to encourage respondents not to refuse answering, house-
hold income is recorded in intervals (where for 2008, the lower bound of the high income interval is
lower than in 2011). For the calculations in table 3.2, each income category was assigned the average
of its lower and upper bound; for the highest income interval, it was chosen to be equal to 400 000 for
the highest income group in 2011 and equal to 350 000 for the highest income group in 2008.
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Tab. 3.2: Correlation of gross household income with measures of income components
for households
2008 2011
Total salaries Correlation 0.0676 0.2985
P-value 0.1219 0.0000
Agricultural output Correlation 0.1381 0.1876
P-value 0.0015 0.0000
Revenue non-agric. enterprize Correlation 0.1021 0.1937
P-value 0.0193 0.0000
Sample: All households with non-missing income data (N=525 for 2008; N=582 for 2011). In the 2011, one outlier
with respect to total salaries per household was removed from the sample.
Tab. 3.3: Correlation of reservation wage with measures of income components for
individuals
2008 2011
Salary, primary occupation Correlation 0.0777 0.0610
P-value 0.0226 0.0805
N 861 823
Salary, secondary occupation Correlation 0.0664 0.0767
P-value 0.2124 0.1925
N 354 290
Agricultural output Correlation 0.0073 0.0246
P-value 0.8239 0.4064
N 925 1142
Revenue non-agric. enterprize Correlation 0.0531 0.0396
P-value 0.3682 0.4403
N 289 381
Sample: All individuals with non-missing responses to the reservation wage question (N=925 for 2008; N=1142 for
2011). Additional observations are removed when the second variable used to compute the correlation coefficient
has missing values. Resulting sample sizes are given in the table. In the 2011, one outlier with respect to salary for
the primary occupation was removed from the sample.
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consumption and income imply unrealistically high dissavings rates. McKay (2000)
discusses the example of the Ghana Living Standards Measurement Survey analyzed in
an earlier study. The quality with which income was measured varied between Ghana’s
regions. However, since the data from the Togolese survey project described here are
obtained from one single community, the sampled population can be assumed to be
much more homogenous with respect to how reliably income is measured. Accordingly,
even if income is over- or under-estimated, the resulting measures should still provide
a relatively accurate ranking of households that reflects their true income distribution.
Finally, it has to be stressed that most surveys from developing countries focussing on
issues in child development do not bother to collect information on income at all, given
the difficulties associated with it (e.g. the Demographic and Health Surveys, DHS, and
the data analyzed by Ghuman et al. (2005)17).
3.1.3 Cognitive skills
Since the central aim of the survey is to allow evaluating a preschool project as well as
studying other issues related to education, measures of cognitive development of children
must be an integral part of the survey. On the one hand, measuring ability before any
kind of treatment takes places allows to take into account individual heterogeneity
that is important the optimal decision regarding investment in human capital and to
educational outcomes in the future. In addition, cognitive development may, in the long-
run, also be an outcome of educational interventions. Furthermore, decisions regarding
investments in human capital are often made by parents. These decisions may, in turn,
be affected by the parent’s cognitive abilities (e.g. if decisions depend on the ability
to process complex information regarding the returns to investments in human capital,
or on information regarding educational institutions, Ghuman et al. (2005)). Since,
in addition, individual cognitive ability is usually correlated within families (Plug and
Vijverberg (2003)), being able to measure cognitive ability of adults as well is beneficial
17These two surveys took another route to measuring living standards by assessing a household’s
physical assets in order to construct a measure of household wealth. Similarly, the Togolose survey also
included some questions on characteristics of the home and on the ownership of various types of goods.
Answers to these questions are, for example, used as explanatory variables for the analysis presented
in chapter 4.
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to the survey’s value.18 Measuring child development for the age group eligible for
preschool is also relatively rare for surveys from developing countries, because they
often focus on infants and children up to three years of age (see, for example, the DHS
surveys and the data analyzed by Ghuman et al. (2005)).
Regarding the design of appropriate cognitive tests for the Togolese survey, two
conflicting needs had to be weighed against each other. On the one hand, a major
criterion for implementing meaningful tests of cognitive ability is whether a test is
reliable, that is, whether it would yield approximately the same result if the same
individual were to take it several times. On the other hand, the resulting survey module
had to be lean in enough in order not to demand too much resources.19
All common psychological tests of cognitive development (e.g. the often used Wech-
sler Intelligence Scale for children) are very large and take one hour per subject and
even longer. Typically, such tests are structured into various parts, and within each
part, test items are iterated, slightly modifying them at each step. Such groups of many
items similar can be seen as thorough attempts to measure one single construct, i.e.
one ”aspect of intelligence”.20 The motivation for repeating similar items many times
is to increase the reliability of the test. In other words, each item within a group is
considered to provide a valid measurement of the same aspect of intelligence, but each
measurement may contain an error. By using information on a large number of mea-
surements of the same aspect of intelligence, the error is supposed to be reduced. The
number of items typically used is also inflated by the fact that psychological tests of
cognitive development are usually intended to allow some kind of diagnosis regarding
the development of one particular child. Accordingly, cognitive development is usually
18The remainder of this section discusses the details of the design of the cognitive tests for children.
The tests administered to adolescents and adults constituted a modified version of the test for 11- to
14-year-old children described below. Males between 15 and 25 years and females between 15 and 30
years were eligible for this section of the questionnaire. The age limits were chosen in order to avoid
refusal, given that, during the preparatory period, interviewers argued that older adults would mostly
feel humiliated by being asked to perform such a test.
19In particular, the duration of a feasible test was constrained by the fact that in some households,
up to 10 children between 3 and 14 years were to be tested; the average number of children in that age
group per household was 2.4 (as of 2011).
20For example, in their evaluation of an East African preschool project, Mwaura et al. (2008) imple-
ment a total of seven item groups which are adapted from the British Ability Scales II and the African
Child Intelligence Test. The item groups are called block building, verbal comprehension, early number
concept, picture similarity, verbal meaning, exclusion and closure.
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broken down into several dimensions21 , and since each dimension is supposed to be
reliably measured, the number of items necessary increases.
Since, in the context of this project, the principal aim of testing children and adults
is not to break down test scores into several dimensions of cognitive ability but rather to
compute a single composite score per individual, the number of items can be reduced.
In fact, the number of test items could be chosen arbitrarily small, but any reduction
would come at the cost reduced reliability of the resulting composite measure.
Based on this reasoning, the approach taken for the Togolese survey was to imple-
ment a number of test items which could be interpreted as a subset of items from a
comprehensive psychological test. This was implemented by designing items inspired by
parts of the German version of the Kaufman assessment battery for children (K-ABC,
Melchers and Preuß (2005)) as well as LSMS (see section 3.1).22 Regarding the choice of
types of items, the following criteria had to be met: the overall test length was chosen
to be less than 10 to 15 minutes per subject; test items would have to require only
limited additional testing material, and they had to be straightforward enough to be
handled by interviewers who are not trained psychologists.
Table 3.4 provides an overview of which types of items were implemented as cognitive
tests for different age groups. The following paragraphs give a quick explanation of the
item types listed in the table.
In order to assess visual processing capabilities, children were shown only partially
completed drawings of objects. Children hat to mentally fill in gaps in these draw-
ings such that they were able to indicate the correct name or description of an object
(”Gestalt Closure”).
Short term memory was a prominent component of the employed test, and it was
implemented using several types of items. In three of the exercises, children had to
repeat sequences of the interviewer’s actions or indications. These actions could include
hand movements23, reading out a list of names of objects which the child had to indicate
21To illustrate, results obtained from implementing the seven item groups in Mwaura et al. (2008)
as mention in footnote 20 were used to calculate seven corresponding ”subscales”.
22Another virtue of common psychological tests is that they are standardized, meaning that the
distribution of test scores for a reference population is known. Since the only objective in the context
of the Togolese survey was to provide a ranking of individuals according to their cognitive abilities that
is meaningful within the surveyed population, it is not necessary to use a standardized test.
23Interviewers were given instructions to demonstrate sequences using the gesture elements of making
a fist, placing the flat hand on the table/thigh, and placing the edge of the hand on the table/thigh.
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on pictures in the correct order24, and reading out a sequence of numbers which the
child had to repeat in the correct order. Furthermore, in two exercises, children also
had to repeat what the interviewer read to them, but this time without being obligated
to stick to a specific ordering of elements. In one case, these were just names of objects,
but in between the interviewer reading out the objects’ names and asking the child to
repeat them, the child was being asked other, unrelated questions. In the other case, a
very short story was read to the child, and the task was to repeat as many core elements
of the story as possible.
In order to measure general reasoning, the well known Raven’s progressive matrices
were used (see Moore et al. (2008) for another example of applying a matrix reasoning
test in the context of evaluating a preschool program). The items used consisted of
matrices with either four or six graphic elements, where one element was left blank.
Respondents had to recognize the pattern or deduce the logic underlying the matrix
elements in order to choose the correct element to fill in out of several proposed solutions.
In each age group, questions were asked to test knowledge in several fields. Simple
questions that required a verbal response were asked either in the form of riddles25 or
as questions regarding general knowledge26. Another type of items consisted of showing
the child pictures of objects (for example, a bucket), and the child had to give a correct
name for the object. A further set of questions asked children to perform simple mental
arithmetic.
Finally, for the oldest group of children, a very simple (French) literacy test was
applied. They were shown a sheet with a written instruction (E.g. ”Raise your right
hand!”), and they had to perform the respective task without further instructions27.
As discussed above, the number of repetitions of the same type of item was kept
relatively low in order to make the test logistically feasible. Accordingly, none of the
scores resulting from a group of exercises of the same item type are supposed to yield
I.e. an instruction to the interviewer would look like ”fist/flat hand/fist”.
24That is, the child was shown a sheet with several images. Interviewers read a sequence of names
of objects that appeared on the sheet. The child had to point to the respective images in the correct
order.
25Interviewers would indicate characteristics of an object, and the child had to name the object.
Example: ”What has feathers and lays eggs?”
26E.g. ”What is the name of the President?”
27Admittedly, other characteristics of the child such as his physical development may affect results
of this test. However, literacy is likely to be the most important determinant of responses to this type
of exercise.
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Tab. 3.4: Types of items used for assessing cognitive development of children
Age group
3-5 years 6-10 years 10-14 years
Varname Item Position Item Position Item Position
’08 ’11 ’08 ’11 ’08 ’11
Visual recognize Gestalt 170- Gestalt 170-
processing Closure 172 Closure 172
Short repeat- Hand 173- Hand 173-
Term manual Move- 178 Move- 176
Memory ments 178 ments 176
repeatoral Word 179-
Order 183
repeatoral Number 177- Number 170-
Recall 179 Recall 174
story Story 121 191 Story 121 190 Story 121 189
Repe- Repe- Repe-
tition tition tition
recall Object 120 163 Object 120 163
Repe- Repe-
tition tition
Reasoning matrix Raven’s 180- Raven’s 175-
Pro- 183 Pro- 180
gressive 183 gressive 180
Matrices Matrices
Knowledge questions Questions 113- 184- Questions 113- 184- Questions 113- 181-
114 190 114 189 114 188
objects Naming 115 192- Naming 191- Naming 190-
Objects 194 Objects 194 Objects 192
math Mental 117- 160- Mental 117- 160-
Arith- 119 162 Arith- 119 162
metic 119 162 metic 119 162
Literacy read Written 193-
Instruc- 194
tions 194
Note: Columns entitled ’Position’ indicate where interviewers recorded the corresponding responses in the two
survey questionnaires. Note that most questions and tasks of this section do not appear in the questionnaires due
to lack of space. Interviewers were given notebooks containing the material necessary for performing the tests
described in the text. Column ’Varname’ serves as a guide to finding the corresponding variable in the dataset
. The naming pattern is as follows: cog VARNAME NUM, where VARNAME should be replaced by the strings
indicated in the ’Varname’-column, and NUM stands for the NUM’th repetition of the respective type of item in
an age group. Within each age group and item group, counting starts at one and the highest number depends on
the number of times a particular type of item is repeated in an age group. For instance, the ”Hand movements”
item is repeated four times for six to ten-year-old children, resulting in values saved in variables cog repeatmanual 1
through cog repeatmanual 4. Variables cog repeatmanual 5 and cog repeatmanual 6, however, will have missing
values for that age group.
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a reliable measure of the respective aspect of knowledge or intelligence. For example,
the intention of asking three questions of the ”gestalt closure” item type is not expected
to result in a scale which reliably reflects heterogeneity in visual processing.28 Still,
as I consistency check, I computed correlations between subscores corresponding with
item types and a measure of schooling (school grade completed minus age plus six
years). Results for the two tested age groups who are eligible for primary or secondary
school are given in table 3.5. For some of the item types, they show consistently strong
and statistically significant correlations with education, particularly for the questions
of general knowledge and math (except for 10- to 14-year-old children in 2011), as well
as the short literacy test for 10- to 14-year-old children in 2011. This finding seems
reasonable, since these items arguably measure aspects of knowledge that are, more
than the other items, both enhanced in school and resulting in better performance in
school. It is not possible to distinguish whether the scores reflect ability that lead to
better performance in school, or whether high scores in the respective items are an
outcome of school education. Still, the pattern shown in table 3.5 at least suggest that
most elements in the questionnaire module do succeed in grouping children according
to their cognitive abilities.
The main goal, however, is rather to combine information from the complete ques-
tionnaire module in order to compute one single composite score per child that, hope-
fully, constitutes a good general measure of knowledge and intelligence. Accordingly,
the reliability of the measure should be evaluated taking into account all item measure-
ments contributing to the composite score. For 2011 (2008), the respective Cronbach’s
alpha29 is equal to 0.77 (0.47) for 3- to 5-year-old children, 0.75 (0.81) for 6- to 10-
year-old children, and 0.66 (0.72) for 11- to 14-year-old children. I conclude that, while
results for 3- to 5-year-old children in 2008 (which are based on only three questions)
and those for 11- to 14-year-old children in 2011 need to be interpreted carefully, overall
the questionnaire module resulted in reasonably reliable measure of cognitive ability and
28Accordingly, Cronbach’s alpha, the commonly used measure for reliability (Schnell et al. (2008)), is
relatively low for some item groups. The measure relies on correlations between responses to different
items in order to asses inter-item consistency. It is usually stated that 0.7 is a minimum value for
alpha that is desirable. A few of the item groups listed in table 3.4 actually meet this requirement:
Literacy for 10- to 14-year-old children in 2011 (0.79), mental arithmetic for all groups except for 10-
to 14-year-old children (0.72 to 0.81), as well as questions, word order and hand movement for 3- to
5-year-old children in 2011 (0.70, 0.78, and 0.70, respectively).
29See explanation in footnote 28.
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Tab. 3.5: Correlation between composite scores from cognitive test item groups and
grade for age
Age group
6-10 years 10-14 years
Varname 2008 2011 2008 2011
recognize Correlation 0.1055
P-value 0.0420
N 372
repeat-manual Correlation 0.0801
P-value 0.1254
N 367
repeatoral Correlation 0.1041 0.1684
P-value 0.0507 0.0213
N 353 187
story Correlation 0.2095 0.0338 -0.0225 -0.0107
P-value 0.0000 0.5180 0.7338 0.8827
N 456 368 231 192
recall Correlation 0.1935 0.0799 0.1334 0.0700
P-value 0.0000 0.1209 0.0411 0.3371
N 459 378 235 190
matrix Correlation 0.0469 0.2506
P-value 0.3713 0.0005
N 365 190
questions Correlation 0.3448 0.1656 0.3596 0.0883
P-value 0.0000 0.0025 0.0000 0.2400
N 467 330 234 179
objects Correlation 0.1170 0.1973
P-value 0.0262 0.0068
N 361 187
math Correlation 0.4229 0.3116 0.2792 0.1482
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0424
N 459 375 231 188
read Correlation 0.3410
P-value 0.0000
N 153
Note: Composite scores of item subgroups are defined as deviation of the individuals number of correct responses
per item type from the age specific mean of correct responses for an item type.
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knowledge. Figure 3.1.3 shows histograms for the composite test scores for all children
in 2008 and in 2011.
3.2 Choice and characterization of the studied com-
munity
The choice of the community under study was essentially driven by the rare opportunity
to evaluate a preschool project, including the ability to cooperate with the NGOs re-
sponsible for the project long before the opening of the preschool. In addition, though,
the community proved to provide an interesting research environment more generally.
Given its economic activities, infrastructure, and its ethnic and religious composition,
it can be viewed as somewhat representative for small towns in rural areas of southern
West Africa. In fact, the larger geographical area has been a field of study for several
other economists before.30
The community is situated in the Badou-region of southern Togo, a rural area close
to the Ghanaian border. It is the main town of a small geographic area (a so called
”canton”), and its market and secondary schools are of local importance. It receives
many secondary school students from all over the ”canton” who either commute, are
fostered-in 31 (a phenomenon quite common in West Africa, see Serra (2009), Glewwe
and Jacoby (1994)) or rent rooms in the community. 53.4 percent of the households
farm, comprising 64.4 percent of the population. Many do so on a subsistence level, some
produce cocoa or coffee for export 32. While the climate is very humid, the mountainous
landscape as well as the soil type do not permit the cultivation of large plantations.
Other economic activities found are services and a few crafts, industry does not exist.
The infrastructure is poor (no lights, no running water, and only main roads are paved).
The Badou-region lies in the sphere of the Ewe, a people scattered over southern Togo
30For instance, Besley (1995) and Goldstein and Udry (2008) study land usage rights and their
impact on agricultural production in two nearby Ghanaian regions.
3118.5 percent of all children in the dataset under 15 with at least one living parent report not to be
living in the same household with either parent in 2011
3229.0 percent of all households had cultivated any cocoa during the last 12 months in 2011, 4.9 had
cultivated any coffee.
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and south-eastern Ghana. The most important ethnicity in the community is Akposso
(39.3 percent of the interviewed population in 2011), who share a cultural similarity
with the Ewe. Furthermore, the community has experienced considerable immigration
from other parts of Togo and neighboring countries, leading to a mix of ethnicity33 as
well as religion, with Christian churches dominating 34.
It is difficult to find a valid source of information which could help to crosscheck
these figures, because, to the best of my knowledge, no comparable data have been
collected for a population that comprises the studied community. As an alternative, I
compare descriptive statistics from my household survey data with equivalent statistics
from a comparable survey dataset collected in neighboring Ghana, the Ghana Living
Standards Survey from 1988/1989. For an exemplary comparison, I choose means of
completed years of school, grouped by age, sex, and participation in off-farm work.
The comparable statistics computed based on GLSS data are available from table 2
in Jolliffe (2004). Table 3.6 compares the respective means from both data sources.
Accordingly, the pattern of how education varies among the groups displayed is similar
in both datasets: The number of years of completed schooling tends to decrease with
age, and it is lower for women; individuals who are participating in off-farm work are
better educated. However, the overall level of education is higher in the Togolese data
than in the Ghanaian data from the late 1980s. This is consistent with the fact the
Ghanaian data were sampled from the whole country, including remote areas, whereas
the population in the Togolese community lives in walking range to both primary and
secondary schools. Furthermore, the decrease in education with age is less pronounced
in the Togolese data. This could be explained by the fact that the Ghanaian data
will also include data from cities like Accra which have a University, whereas young
individuals from the Togolese community who want to study at a University will have
left the community and cannot be part of the sampled population. Overall, even though
the choice of characteristics used for the comparison is very limited, these results suggest
that the Togolese data capture socio- economic patterns that can be found throughout
a larger geographic region, including neighboring countries.
33Other mentionable ethnic groups in the community are Ewe (20.7 percent), Kabye (11.0), and
Kotokoli (9.3). The latter two ethnic groups originally settled in northern Togo.
34According to the 2011 data, 43.4 percent of the population are catholic, 32.5 percent belong to
protestant, pentecostal and other Christian churches, 19.5 percent are muslim.
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Tab. 3.6: Comparison with GLSS data analyzed in Jolliffe (2004): Years of completed
schooling by sex, age, and off-farm participation
Age Full sample Fam work only Off-am work
Male Female Male Female
Togo GLSS Togo GLSS Togo GLSS Togo GLSS Togo GLSS
All adults (20+) 6.02 4.23 7.10 4.0 4.52 1.5 7.70 6.3 4.89 3.3
20-24 7.33 6.13 8.98 6.3 6.60 3.1 7.50 7.9 5.38 5.2
25-29 6.36 5.89 8.46 5.8 5.52 3.0 6.60 8.0 5.60 4.7
30-34 6.54 5.93 7.03 6.6 4.80 3.1 8.76 7.9 5.59 5.0
35-39 6.02 5.16 6.87 4.6 5.13 2.3 7.42 7.5 4.25 3.9
40-44 6.05 4.48 6.74 4.1 4.00 1.0 8.47 7.3 4.25 2.9
45-49 6.87 3.24 7.12 3.9 3.86 0.6 8.37 5.5 6.35 1.8
50 and older 4.54 1.19 6.01 1.5 2.42 0.2 6.42 2.5 3.07 0.5
Consistent with table 2 in Jolliffe (2004), the sample includes member of all farming households who are 20 years of
age and older; ’Off-farm work’ includes all individuals who work off the farm, regardless of whether they also work
on the farm. N=834.
3.3 Survey implementation: identification of house-
holds and realization of interviews
As outlined in the introduction, the main motivation for conducting the household
surveys was to allow evaluating a preschool program. Since the number of potential
participants in the project was rather small, it was necessary to survey the whole pop-
ulation of households potentially participating in the project in order to insure that the
resulting dataset would be large enough to allow statistical analysis. This reasoning
suggested to include the community’s whole population in the survey. Accordingly, no
further decisions regarding a sampling scheme had to be made. A much grater challenge
was to ensure that the data would allow matching individual observations from both
waves.35
Ensuring that the data produced by the survey would constitute a two-wave panel
required that individual observations as well as households from both waves be uniquely
identifiable. In Togo, as in most African countries, streets are not officially given names,
and houses are not numbered. The first measure taken to meet this requirement was to
record the respondents’ full names in addition to demographic characteristics36. Sec-
35As the list of datasets in Foster and Rosenzweig (2008) suggests, the number of available panel
datasets from developing countries is very limited. Furthermore, the authors point out that these data
usually suffer from strong panel attrition. An important reason for both the limited availability and
the high attrition might in fact be that linking individuals in developing countries over time requires
overcoming severe technical and organizational difficulties.
36Linking households and individuals between waves is the only purpose the names were used for.
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ondly, before effecting the first survey in 2008, the interviewer team cartographized the
community. That is, free-hand maps were drawn that indicated the geographic location
of all dwellings. Each dwelling was assigned a unique number which was marked on the
maps as well as on the dwellings wall. With the resulting maps at hand, interviewers
were able to trace any dwelling when given the respective number. After the comple-
tion of the first survey, the free hand maps were digitalized and assembled to a full
community map. A copy of that map, fit to two DIN A4 pages is given in appendix
6.3. During the second survey in 2011, interviewers worked with delimited portions of
that map, an example of which is given in appendix 6.4.
Based on the cartography of the communities, it was possible to link any house-
hold questionnaire to the dwelling a household lives in, i.e. the dwelling numbers were
recorded on the questionnaire. Thus, if a household had not moved between 2008 and
2011, the two respective questionnaires from the two surveys could be linked. More-
over, during the second survey, the interviewers took with them household rosters from
2008 for all households that had been living in the dwellings that they were revisiting
for second wave interview. Thus, for immobile households, they were able to record
the individual 2008 household member identification number for those present in 2011
(question 7 in the 2011 questionnaire). This measure allowed to link individual obser-
vations between waves during the preparation of the data for statistical analysis.
For individuals (questions 9 through 12 in the 2011 questionnaire) and households
(front page of the 2011 questionnaire) who had moved between 2008 and 2011, it was
recorded whether that move had taken place within the community. Since in 2011, all
households were interviewed, regardless of whether they had been living in the same
dwelling in 2008 or not, movers must be observed in the 2011 data as long as they
have not left the community. Out of the pool of households and individuals that had
been indicated to have moved within the community, pairs of matching observations
were searched after the completion of both surveys making use of the full names and
demographic characteristics. For this task, an algorithm was programmed in Stata,
consisting of two steps. In a first step, the closest matches between pairs of names found
in both waves. This is achieved based on calculating Levenshtein distances between all
Naturally, they will not be included in any published data.
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possible pairs of names as a measure of similarity.37 This information was combined
with similarities with respect to demographic characteristics in order to both find sets of
potential matches and, in case an observation from one wave has been linked to several
concurrent potential matches in the other wave, to decide which pair of observation
within the set of potential pairs constitutes the closest match. In the end, out of the
3615 individuals who were interviewed in 2008, 2363 could be recovered in 2011
The logistics of realizing the interviews relied on a large staff. I was able to obtain
access to Togolese graduate students, university graduates and academics during the
preparation period for the 2008 survey. These prospective collaborators, in turn, ad-
vertised my search for interviewers and supporting staff on Lome´ university campus.
At the beginning of the 2008 field trip, I had received enough high quality applications
to choose 30 members for the project team. In 2010, a core group of that team be-
came responsible for recruiting additional staff for the second survey in 2011. Out of
the 2008 team, 14 members were interested in (and available for) participating in the
second survey as well. For the last week of each field trip, the interviewers with the
best computer skills were hired for data entry. CSPro software was used to implement
a graphical interface for data entry based on the questionnaire structure.38. As recom-
mended by Grosh and Glewwe (1998), the risk of errors was reduced by mirroring the
skip patterns from the questionnaire and letting the software perform simple plausibility
checks during data entry (e.g. alerting data entry operators when out-of-range values
are entered). The resulting data base can be stored as a tab separated file and thus
easily be imported into statistical software packages like Stata.
37For calculating the Levenshtein distances, the name data are first transformed into sequences of
numbers. Then, similarity measures are calculated using the sqom command from the Stata module
for sequence analysis (Kohler et al. (2006)).
38CSPro stands for Census and Survey Processing System, and it is provided by the U.S. Census
Bureau (see http://www.census.gov/population/international/software/cspro/).
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Fig. 3.4: Composite score of cognitive ability
Note: Composite scores are calculated by first transforming individual results for each item-subgroup (see table 3.4) into
deviations from the age-specific mean for the respective item-subgroup. The mean of the resulting deviations is then
interpreted as the composite cognitive test score. N=1164 (921) for 2008 (2011).
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Chapter 4
Child care and time use of young mothers in developing countries
- Experimental evidence from Togo1
4.1 Introduction
This paper studies the impact of preschool enrollment on time use of young mothers.
While this research question has been studied extensively by economists using data
from industrial countries, there exists almost no evidence from the developing world.
The issue is of high relevance for policy makers, though, since both the public provi-
sion of child care in developing countries currently is at a low level and creating new
opportunities for women in these countries to participate in economic activities may be
a particularly effective means to reduce poverty in developing countries (Lokshin et al.,
2000).
The empirical strategy of this paper is to evaluate the impact of a preschool program
in a Togolese community. Before the start of the preschool project in October 2010,
young children2 in the studied community had very limited access to institutionalized
care. Using household data collected before and after the introduction of the preschool
program, I exploit the variation in enrollment induced by the randomization of access to
preschool. Since compliance with the randomization is imperfect, the main strategy is
to use the result of the admission experiment to construct an instrumental variable for
1Part of this research was supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) within the project
’Ein Paneldatensatz zur Analyse von Humankapitalinvestitionen im fru¨hen Alter in la¨ndlichen Regionen
von Entwicklungsla¨ndern’, and by the Leibniz Universita¨t Hannover (”Forschungsfond”).
2Throughout this chapter, the term young children will refer to children younger than six years.
Children who are between two and five years old will be called preschool age children.
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enrollment. In addition, it is argued that the likelihood of responding to the introduction
of the preschool program depended on the age of a mother’s youngest child in fall
2010. Consequently, a difference-in-differences approach is applied which estimates the
difference of the impact of being admitted to preschool between groups of mothers
whose youngest children are from different cohorts.
In order to understand whose time use may potentially be affected the most by any
variations in child care necessities, it is important to know which household members
spend the most time caring for young children. As documented in Lokshin et al. (2000)
for the case of Kenya (also see LeVine et al. (1994)), in African households child care may
often be delegated to other household members than the mother.3 However, as table
4.1 shows, even though grand mothers and aunts of young children are also important
providers of child care in the studied community, the children’s mothers are by far the
most important providers. Other groups of female cohabitants and male cohabitants
are negligible regarding their small contribution to child care efforts or due to their
group size.4 Thus, this study will focus on the impact of child care arrangements on the
time use of mothers of young children. Given their high level of hours spent caring for
children in combination with their relatively high working capacity (compared to grand
mothers of young children, for instance), they are plausibly the group most likely to be
constrained in their labor supply by child care responsibilities.
Descriptive results in section 4.2 show that for mothers of young children the most
important enrollment measure associated with their time use is an indicator for ”full
enrollment”, that is, whether or not all of their young children are enrolled in either
preschool or primary school. In case of full enrollment, mothers spend much fewer
hours caring for young children, and the time during which child care and other non-
work activities overlap is significantly shorter. However, the association with hours of
work is weak.
The enrollment of preschool age children is likely to be an endogenous variable in
3Stansbury et al. (2000) documents such flexible child care arrangements for rural Ecuador as well.
4Table 4.10 in the appendix in the appendix repeats the analysis in a more detailed fashion by using
less aggregated categories of time use, and by distinguishing between the first and the second half of
the day. The pattern described here is not associated with the timing of activities, i.e. it is equally
observed during the morning/noon and the afternoon/evening. An additional result shown in these
tables, which is consistent with other empirical studies in developing countries (Malathy (1994)), is
that women spend much more time working at home than men do.
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models of mothers’ time use, because unobserved characteristics of mothers and children
can be expected to simultaneously determine both the decision to work and the decision
to enroll children. Furthermore, studies using cross sectional data representing a popu-
lation from a large region or a country will typically be confronted with the complication
that the placement of public programs to promote early childhood development is often
driven by political and antipoverty considerations, resulting in a correlation between
program placement and unobserved community characteristics (Ghuman et al. (2005)).
In order to investigate the relationship between full enrollment and time use in a
framework that allows to cope with issues of endogeneity, a randomized experiment
was carried out, which was designed to evaluate the preschool project introduced to
the studied community. Half a year before the newly constructed preschool started
operating in October 2010, access to the first two grades of preschool was determined by
separate lotteries for each grade among all children who were signed up for the admission
procedure. Unfortunately, compliance with the randomization was poor. However, I
argue that the specific circumstances of the admission procedure resulted in the lottery
affecting both the admitted children’s likelihood of enrollment in preschool and their
likelihood of enrollment in primary school - taking into account that, in the studied
community, primary schools constitute alternative child care institutions. As it turns
out, enrollment in either preschool or in primary school is significantly increased for
the children accepted for the first grade of preschool5 This variation in the likelihood
of enrollment of individual children translates into variation in the likelihood of full
enrollment (i.e. of all of a mother’s young children being enrolled) from the point of
view of mothers.
Exploiting this variation, I estimate instrumental variables models of time use of
mothers participating in the randomized admission procedure, using an indicator for
whether the mother has a child who was accepted for preschool as an instrument for
full enrollment.
Furthermore, I identify subpopulations of women who are more likely to respond
to the introduction of the preschool than others. More specifically, I argue that the
likelihood of full enrollment depends to a large extent on the enrollment status of a
5The terms being ”accepted for” and ”admitted to”, and ”having access to” preschool are used
interchangeably throughout this chapter. They are distinct from actual enrollment in preschool.
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mother’s youngest child. By the start of the preschool project, a mother’s youngest
child may have been too young to be eligible for preschool. As a result, their mother’s
probability of having all her young children enrolled is much less likely to increase
in response to the preschool project. Accordingly, mothers whose youngest child is
two or three years old are more likely to respond to treatment than mothers whose
youngest child is younger. I exploit this variation in the likelihood of responding to
the introduction of the preschool by comparing the impact of admission to preschool
between mothers whose youngest child is at least two years old, and mothers whose
youngest child is younger than two years in a difference-in-differences framework.
Proximity to the preschool construction site is discussed as an alternative source of
variation. Since for very young children the distance to school may constitute a con-
straint to enrollment, mothers living close to the preschool are more likely to be affected
by it in the sense that it reduces the distance to the closest institution available for their
young children - again, accounting for the fact that primary schools also accept children
of preschool age. In fact, variation in the indicator of whether the preschool constitutes
the closest institution translates into variation in the likelihood of full enrollment, but
this relationship is not estimated to be statistically significant.
For developing countries, the relationship between child care and female labor sup-
ply has not been investigated empirically so far (Lokshin et al. (2000), which shows a
positive relation between early childhood development programs and female employ-
ment in Kenya, is, to the best of my knowledge, the only exception). A few studies
investigate the relationship for emerging economies (see Connelly et al. (1996) for the
case of Brazil, Berlinski and Galiani (2007) for the case of Argentina, and Wong and
Levine (1992) for a study using data from Mexico). A few studies have focused on how
institutional child care in developing countries affects the cognitive development of the
children (Mwaura et al. (2008)).
A major limitation to investigating the issue has been the still very low investments
into institutionalized child care in developing countries (UNESCO (2007); until only
a few years ago, many African countries did not have any public preschools, as docu-
mented for Botswana in Taiwo and Tyolo (2002)), which imply that opportunities to
conduct field experiments are rare. Furthermore, it is difficult to conduct observational
studies on the issue using existing survey data from developing countries (e.g. Demo-
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graphic and Health Surveys), because these data sets usually do not include information
on enrolment status of children younger then primary school age.
In industrial countries, on the other hand, a strong link between child care and
mothers’ labor supply is generally accepted and has manifested itself in numerous re-
search papers. Unfortunately, among them, there are only very few experimental or
quasi-experimental studies.6 Instead of relying on variation in observed household ex-
penditures or area-level averages of prices or expenditures for child care to identify the
response in female labor supply, a few studies have tried to exploit natural experiments.
An example of a study that uses a natural experiment is Berger and Black (1992) who
use women on the waiting list as a comparison group for recipients of child care subsi-
dies and find positive employment effects. Several studies take advantage of expansions
of preschool provision or child care subsidy programs. Baker et al. (2008) exploit the
expansion of subsidized provision of child care in a Canadian province, and they find a
positive effect of child care use on maternal labor supply for married mothers. Cascio
(2009) studies the impact of the introduction of preschool subsidies in the U.S. during
the 1960s and 1970s. She finds that kindergarten attendance has an effect only on sin-
gle mothers whose youngest child is five years old. Schlosser (2005) studies the impact
on labor supply of the gradual implementation of compulsory preschool laws in Arab
towns in Israel. She finds that preschool provision increases maternal labor supply.
Finally, Berlinski and Galiani (2007) find a positive impact of a large-scale construction
program of preschools in Argentina.
I find that, even though estimation results consistently show that full enrollment
reduces the amount of time mothers spend caring for children, mothers whose children
of preschool age children are all enrolled do not work significantly more hours.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides a de-
scriptive analysis of the Togolese data, looking at associations between child care ar-
rangements and enrollment of children of preschool age. Motivated by the concerns
regarding problems of statistical endogeneity which may be present in such a descrip-
6Numerous studies use US- or Canadian data to simulate child care price elasticities of female labor
supply on the basis of parameter estimates of structural models (see Michalopoulos et al. (1992), for
instance), and they typically find a negative elasticity although there exists a large range of estimates,
and the results are ambiguous for single mothers. Ribar (1992) and Anderson and Levine (1999) include
surveys of that literature and related studies from the US; see Michalopoulos and Robins (2002) as an
example for a study using Canadian data
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Tab. 4.1: Average time use of individuals cohabiting with young children
Mothers
of
young
children
Grand
moth-
ers,
aunts
Sisters
older
than
5
Other
fe-
male
relatives
Non-
related
female
M.
child
older
than
5
Cohab.
male
adult
Hours of care 10.02 5.68 0.97 1.78 7.18 0.26 0.53
(5.27) (6.08) (2.90) (4.28) (6.56) (1.24) (2.01)
Hours of work 4.94 4.63 1.05 4.83 6.50 0.32 5.34
(4.03) (4.08) ( 2.6) (4.67) (4.27) (0.95) (4.45)
Care/work overlapping 3.09 1.70 0.19 0.55 3.73 0.04 0.15
(3.64) (3.05) (1.09) (1.54) (4.58) (0.50) (0.92)
Observations 264 116 189 20 20 196 349
Sample: Calculations are based on Sample B (see table 4.9 in the appendix for details), and each column of the
table refers to a subsample of Sample B. Note that some of these categories are not mutually exclusive. For instance,
a women may be both the mother of one cohabiting child and the aunt of another. In addition, in few cases, the
relationship between household members is not deducible due to missing data, which is why the sum of observations
in this table differs slightly from the number of observations in Sample B (standard deviations in parentheses).
tive analysis, section 4.3 describes the randomized preschool program introduced in
the studied community and how that project induced variation in enrollment of young
children. The empirical strategy exploiting that variation in enrollment is explained
in section 4.4 which also describes the sample used for the analysis. Section 5.4 dis-
cusses the empirical results for the impact of full enrollment on time use of mothers,
and section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Descriptive analysis: associations between child
care arrangements and enrollment of preschool
age children
The objective of this study is to investigate the causal effect of increased enrollment of
young children on their mothers’ labor supply, i.e. whether increased enrollment both
reduces the number of hours mothers spend caring for children and increases their hours
of work. After a short discussion of patterns in time use among women of preschool age
children, I first associations between young children’s enrollment and the different uses
of time of their mothers, for now ignoring concerns regarding causality.
The data used for both the descriptive analysis discussed in this section as well
as for the evaluation of the preschool project (sections 4.3 through 5.4) are from a
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household survey conducted in the studied community in 2008 and in 2011, which has
been described in detail in chapter 3. Since the objective is to investigate the impact
of enrollment of preschool age children on mothers’ time use, the population of interest
throughout the remainder of this chapter consists of mothers of children in the studied
community who are eligible for preschool, that is, children who are between two and
five years old. Table 5.6 in the appendix shows descriptive statistics for all time use
variables as well as all explanatory variables used for the analysis. The columns of
the table correspond with different samples, including the full sample of mothers of
preschool age children as well as various subsamples which are defined in table 4.9 in
the appendix.
To lay ground for a descriptive analysis of time use it is useful to consider the oc-
cupational structure of the population of interest.7 Table 4.12 in the appendix shows
average time use separately for the most important occupations of women with young
children in the studied community. Taken together, these five categories comprise 89
percent of these women. The number of women in each category is indicated at the
bottom of the table. Agriculture and small commerce constitute the most important
occupations for young mothers. In addition, a significant number of women is work-
ing as sewers, and 18 percent of the women (36 women) indicate not to have a proper
occupation. Regarding average time use, some patterns in the data suggest consis-
tency between indicated occupations and responses to time use questions. For instance,
women in agriculture work by far the most time on a field compared to women in other
categories. In turn, they are less likely to spend time working in a work shop or at home
than women in commerce or sewers. Furthermore, time uses associated with education
or apprenticeship are only relevant to women without an occupation.
Regarding the average time spent caring for young children as a function of occupa-
tion, there does not appear to be a very clear pattern. However, women in commerce
do spend somewhat more time caring for young children, which appears to be driven
by more hours of overlap between child care and work. It seems reasonable that women
working in a shop or a sales stall can more easily supervise children than women leaving
the village to go work on a field.
Another characteristic that is likely to affect time use of young mothers is the num-
7
94
CHAPTER 4. CHILD CARE AND TIME USE OF YOUNG MOTHERS
ber of young children that they have. For instance, looking out for children while
simultaneously working may be much more feasible when there is only a single young
child rather than two or more. Since, in addition, fertility and enrollment decisions
are usually assumed to be affected by common unobserved characteristics, taking into
account fertility outcomes when investigating the impact of child care arrangements is
important. However, as the 9th and 10th column in table 4.11 in the appendix show,
mothers with more than one young child do not differ from mothers with just one young
child as clearly as might have been expected. In particular, they do not work system-
atically fewer hours, although they spent somewhat less time working in work shops.
Furthermore, they spend only about two hours per day more caring for children than
mothers with only one child. Interestingly, the average overlap between child care and
work is almost identical for the two groups of women.
Turning now to the association between time use and enrollment of young children,
table 4.11 in the appendix documents that an indicator for whether or not all of a
woman’s young children are enrolled (either in primary school or in preschool) helps
dividing mothers into two groups that differ substantially with respect to the amount
of time they spend caring for children (7th and 8th column). The difference in average
time spent caring for children is equal to about more than 3.5 hours during the first half
of the day and more than 2.5 hours during the second half of the day. The fact that
this difference is more pronounced during the first half of the day is consistent with the
fact that the larger share of class time in schools takes place before noon. Strikingly,
however, the sharp difference regarding child care between these two groups of women
does by no means correspond with any equally pronounced differences in the time spent
working.
Summing up the results for the bivariate analysis of time use survey data discussed
so far, while hours of care are strongly associated with whether a mother’s young chil-
dren are all enrolled in school, her labor supply is not associated with that enrollment
measure. Furthermore, variables that would usually be expected to affect time use,
such as occupation and the number of children, are only weakly correlated with hours
of child care. Turning now to a multivariate analysis that takes into account several of
the variables discussed so far at once, the upper panel of table 4.2 presents results from
regressing different categories of time use on various variables capturing the number of
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children in different age groups a mother has as well as how many young children are
enrolled in school.
The first column shows that higher enrollment of young children is associated with
cohabiting mothers spending fewer hours per weekday caring for young children. Con-
trolling for the total number of children in the age groups of 0 years, 1 year and 2 to 5
years, they spend, on average, 2.8 fewer hours taking care of a child younger than six.
However, as the second column indicates, the fewer hours spent caring for young
children are not mirrored by longer working hours of these mothers. An explanation
for this observation could be that higher enrollment rather reduces the number of hours
that mothers spend working while looking after children at the same time. In fact, as
the third column of table 4.2 shows, the overlap between hours spent taking care of a
child and hours doing other things is negatively associated with the enrollment of young
children. According to column four, though, an additional child enrolled in school is
associated with only about one hour less spent both caring and working.8
The analysis so far has not yet taken into account that women may well care for
several children at once, and increasing the number of children a mother has to care for
from, say, one to two would not necessarily mean that the number of hours she spends
caring for young children increases as well. Consequently, in terms of time use, the more
relevant factor may be whether or not any young children remain at home and need
to be taken care of. The lower panel in table 4.2 thus adds an indicator for whether
or not all of the mother’s children below 6 years of age are enrolled in (pre-)school as
an explanatory variable (this indicator will be called ”full enrollment” in what follows).
The results confirm that this indicator really is the variable driving the association
between enrollment status of young children and time use of cohabiting mothers: while
full enrollment is significantly associated with a large reduction in hours spent with
child care, the coefficient for the number of children enrolled is small and insignificant.
Full enrollment is associated with a statistically insignificant and small increase in
hours of work of 1.2. The coefficient for the overlap with other activities is statistically
significant and negative, and, according to the rightmost column, the largest part of that
8As the last two columns indicate, that reduction in the total overlap between child care and other
activities evenly over work activities and non-work activities. The categories captured by the dependent
variables in columns four and five are mutually exclusive, and taken together, they are equal to the
total overlap used for column three.
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Tab. 4.2: Enrollment status of preschool age children and time use of their cohibiting
mothers
Dependent variable:
Hours of
care
Hours
working
Total
overlap
Overlap
with
work
Overlap
with
oth. ac-
tivities
# 0-5 year-olds in school -2.84∗∗∗ 0.52 -1.42∗∗∗ -0.91∗ -0.51
(0.66) (0.53) (0.55) (0.48) (0.49)
# 0-year-olds in household 2.60∗∗ 1.02 1.39 0.59 0.80
- (1.01) (0.81) (0.85) (0.74) (0.76)
# 1-year-olds in household 3.47∗∗∗ -0.78 1.42∗ 0.88 0.54
(0.95) (0.76) (0.80) (0.70) (0.71)
# 2-5 year-olds in household 0.83 -0.34 -0.10 0.22 -0.32
(0.82) (0.66) (0.69) (0.60) (0.61)
Controlling for whether all young children are enrolled
All <6 years are enrolled -5.69∗∗∗ 1.18 -3.14∗∗∗ -0.88 -2.26∗∗
(1.20) (1.01) (1.04) (0.93) (0.94)
# 0-5 year-olds in school -0.27 -0.01 -0.01 -0.52 0.51
(0.83) (0.70) (0.72) (0.64) (0.64)
# 0-year-olds in household 0.83 -0.66 0.41 0.32 0.09
(1.03) (0.87) (0.89) (0.80) (0.80)
# 1-year-olds in household 1.56 -0.38 0.37 0.59 -0.22
(0.98) (0.83) (0.85) (0.76) (0.77)
# 2-5 year-olds in household -0.66 -0.04 -0.92 -0.01 -0.91
(0.84) (0.71) (0.73) (0.65) (0.65)
Sample: All mothers with at least one child between two and five years of age (Sample E, see table 4.9 in the
appendix for details), N=197. Additional control variables: number of 6-12-year-old children, age of the individual
Standard errors given in parentheses.. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01..
association is attributable to fewer hours of overlap between child care and activities
other than work. After controlling for full enrollment, the coefficient for the number
of young children enrolled is insignificant for all outcomes considered, confirming that
full enrollment is a measure much more relevant to the time use of mothers than other
enrollment measures. Thus, the remainder of this paper will focus on full enrollment as
the explanatory variable of interest. Accordingly, in the following sections, it will be of
primary interest how the evaluated preschool project not only affected the enrollment
status of individual young children, but also how it affected the likelihood of their
mothers to have all of their young children enrolled in (pre-)school.
In order to account for at least some of the individual heterogeneity that may affect
both enrollment and time use decisions, I re-estimate the simple time use models dis-
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Tab. 4.3: Enrollment status of preschool age children and time use of cohabiting mothers
Using data from both waves: first differences.
Dependent variable:
Hours of
care
Hours
working
Total
overlap
Overlap
with
work
Overlap
with
oth.
activities
All <6 years are enrolled -9.51∗∗∗ 2.09 -4.76∗∗∗ -1.12 -3.64∗∗∗
(1.66) (1.32) (1.42) (1.26) (1.18)
# 0-5 year-olds in school 0.80 -1.52∗ 0.18 -0.58 0.76
(1.06) (0.85) (0.91) (0.81) (0.76)
# 0-year-olds in household 0.74 1.25 1.80∗ 1.16 0.64
(1.23) (0.98) (1.06) (0.94) (0.88)
# 1-year-olds in household -1.25 1.62 0.27 0.51 -0.24
(1.29) (1.03) (1.10) (0.98) (0.92)
# 2-5 year-olds in household -2.16∗ 1.85∗∗ -0.81 0.44 -1.25
(1.15) (0.92) (0.99) (0.88) (0.82)
Sample: the analysis used observations for all women in sample E (see 4.9 in the appendix for details) who are also
found in the 2008 data and for whom all variables used in the analysis have no missing values. The sample size is
equal to 248, i.e. observations for 124 women are included. Additional control variables: number of 6-12-year-old
children, age of the individual Standard errors given in parentheses.. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
played in the lower panel of table 4.2 using observations for mothers who are observed
in both waves of the household survey conducted in the community in 2008 and 2011 in
order to add individual fixed effects. The results are shown in table 4.3. Qualitatively,
the results shown in the two tables are almost identical. Sizes of some coefficient and
standard error estimates differ in a few cases. For instance, the negative coefficient for
full enrollment in all models is larger.
Taken together, the descriptive results in this section suggest that mothers whose
young children are all enrolled spend much less time caring for young children than
mothers who have at least one young child remaining at home. However, the association
of full enrollment with hours of work is small. Rather, hours spent with both child
care and other, non-work activities are reduced by full enrollment. Furthermore, since
the additional hours of work and the reduced hours of overlap between care and other
activities do not add up to the reduction in hours of care, the residual category (leisure)
must be positively associated with full enrollment.
Decisions regarding fertility, child care arrangements, and labor supply might well
be affected by common unobserved factors that are not sufficiently accounted for by
taking first differences between observations from two points in time. Tables 4.21 and
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4.22 inspect whether survey questions regarding opinions on child care arrangements,
female labor supply, etc., capture any such individual heterogeneity that is both relevant
to enrollment decisions to mother’s time use. If enrollment decisions are not correlated
with opinions that are also relevant for time use decisions, then enrollment is more
plausibly an exogenous variable in models of times use.
Regarding time use decisions, several significant associations are observed. A mother
of 2- to 5-year-old children who indicates that, if she are caring for a young child, the
child would have to be relatively old before she can start working again, tends to both
spend less time caring for a child and to work fewer hours. Those who indicate that
they would want to spend as much time with their child as possible tend to spent
fewer hours with caring for children. Mothers of 2- to 5-year-old children who tend
to attribute a relatively high value to (pre-)school education of children spent more
hours with caring for children.9 On the other hand, these opinions are generally not
significantly associated with full enrollment, es can be seen from table 4.22. There is
one exception, however. Mothers who to attribute a relatively low value to education
relative to other family needs actually have a higher probability of full enrollment.
Thus, some mothers are both spending fewer hours with child care and more likely to
enroll all their young children due to unobserved characteristics manifesting itself in the
opinions just described.
Although these latter effects are not very significant in terms of their size, this
coarse look into opinions affecting both enrollment and time use decisions illustrates
that simple regressions of time use on enrollment may, potentially, not be appropriately
taking into account all characteristics which affect both of these variables. Thus, in
order to obtain a credibly exogenous source of variation in enrollment, an experiment
was carried out in the studied community where access to a preschool program has been
randomized. The following section describes the experiment and how it affected child
care arrangements. Section 4.4 shows how the variation in school accessability caused
by the experiment can be exploited in order to estimate the causal effect of child care
arrangements on female labor supply.
9Furthermore, knowledge of the NGO and the details of the preschool project further described in
section 4.3 are strongly negatively associated with hours of child care, and it is positively associated
with hours of work, but, particularly with respect to child care, this association may also be the result
of the preschool project.
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4.3 Randomized preschool admission: compliance
and enrolment status of young children
The preschool program was initiated by a small NGO based in the studied community.
During group discussions with the population, members of the association established
that the population considered the introduction of institutionalized child care as the
community’s need with the highest priority. The NGO searched for external funding for
such a project, and a small German NGO agreed to support the construction of a new
preschool as well as the training of preschool staff. Given the uncertainty regarding the
actual demand for preschool enrollment, the participating associations decided to take
relatively conservative projections as a starting point. They planned for a maximum of
one class per cohort with with class size not exceeding 40 children - even though cohort
sizes of children in the relevant age range in the community typically exceed 100. In
case where actual demand would exceed 40 children per cohort, the NGOs agreed to
randomize access in order to give all signed up children equal chances of access.
In April 2010, while the construction was still ongoing, parents were asked to sign up
children for the new school year, scheduled to start in late September of that year. At
the same time, parents were informed about the rules of the inscription process, i.e. that
some signed-up children might not be accepted in case a randomization would become
necessary. The preschool accepted applications for children who would be between 2
and 5 years of age in fall 2010. Applicants were divided into three age groups: the
group of the youngest (children born in 2007 and later, called ”first grade of preschool”
in what follows), a second group of children born in 2006 (called ”second grade of
preschool”), and a third group of children born earlier than 2006 . If the number of
applicants exceeded 40 in an age group, a lottery was carried out in order to determine
which of the applying children would be accepted. For the group of the oldest children,
the number of applications did not exceed 40. For the middle group and the group of
the youngest, the number of applicants was 61 and 86, respectively. Consequently, a
randomization was carried out for both the first and the second grade of preschool.
The randomization procedure was carried out in public. The town chief, directors of
all primary schools as well as parents representing the town’s quarters attended it upon
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invitation. I was able to control the details of the procedure. For each preschool grade,
I printed out a list of random numbers which were drawn by generating, separately
for each grade of preschool, uniformly distributed random integers over [1,K] in Stata,
where K denotes the number of applications for a grade. I asked a member of the
audience to arbitrarily choose a starting point in a list (each list included 500 integers).
Another member of the audience was then asked to read out loud one random number
after another. On the lists of signed-up children, rows were ordered according to when
the respective child had been signed up. If a random number that was read out loud
matched a row number on the list, the child was marked as accepted. If the same
number appeared again, nothing was changed. This process was stopped as soon as the
target of 40 children per class was reached. In section 4.4, which compares mothers of
accepted children to mothers of children not accepted for preschool, it will be discussed
whether this randomization succeeded in balancing out differences between admitted
and non-admitted children with respect to observable characteristics.
Until the start of the preschool project in October 2010, the studied community did
not have access to institutionalized child care. This did not mean, however, that all
children younger than the standard school entry age of six years had to stay at home.
Since they faced pressure by young mothers to accept children younger than six years
for the first grade of primary school (as a substitute for daycare), it was common in
the community’s four primary schools to find children of 5 years of age, and even 4-
and 3-year-old children. This phenomenon is in line with an increase in demand for
preschool education in Africa, which, as perceived by Mwaura et al. (2008), is partly
attributable to a combination of stronger economic pressure on women to work and
a shift away from traditional extended family networks, while the supply of preschool
admission opportunities remains low. However, the likelihood of being accepted at a
primary school dropped dramatically the younger a child was.10 Thus, the community’s
parents’ demand for access to any institution caring for their young children by far
exceeded the few accessible spots in primary school.
Table 4.4 shows the status of applying children regarding residency and enrolment
10 In 2008, 5.9 percent of 2-year-old children were enrolled, in addition to 11 percent of 3-year-old
children, 45.4 percent of 4-year-old children, 65.3 percent of 5-year-old children, and 84.9 percent of
6-year-old children. In 2011, the figures for these same age groups were, respectively, 0, 14.6, 32.9,
62.9, and 72.9 percent.
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STATUS OF YOUNG CHILDREN
Tab. 4.4: Compliance with the randomization of preschool admission
Accepted Not accepted
Children signed up for first grade
staying at home 11 22
enrolled in primary school 7 2
enrolled in preschool 12 9
moved away 2 2
died 1 0
household not interviewed 7 11
total 40 46
Children signed up for second grade
staying at home 10 1
enrolled in primary school 17 12
enrolled in preschool 4 1
moved away 1 2
died 0 0
household not interviewed 8 5
total 40 21
Sample: All children participating in the randomized preschool admission procedure in April 2010.
status as of January 2011. As can be seen from the table, out of the total of 147 chil-
dren who participated in a lottery, a significant number was not part of a household
interviewed during the 2011 survey. 31 children were from households that did not
participate in the survey at all. These households have either moved out of the commu-
nity between April 2010 (when the inscription process and randomization took place)
and January 2011 (the survey period), or they could not be contacted during the survey
(usually due to temporary absence, and, in very few cases, refusal). Furthermore, 8 chil-
dren used to belong to a household which was interviewed but were no longer present
in January 2011. Usually, these children had left in order to live with a different part
of the same family but outside the studied community (as indicated by the remaining
household members during the interview; numbers not shown). Pooling both lotteries,
the likelihood of a child showing up in the household data is 76.3 percent in the group
of accepted children versus 70.1 percent in the group of children who were not accepted
for preschool. I will assume that the likelihood of being accepted is not correlated with
unobserved factors that drive selection into the household survey sample.
Focussing on children who were present in households interviewed during the 2011
survey, it becomes apparent that compliance with the randomization was far from per-
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fect. There are accepted children who were eventually not sent to preschool, and there
are also children who were not accepted during the randomized admission procedure
but who were eventually enrolled in preschool anyway. Table 4.19 provides a first im-
pression regarding potential causes for the imperfect compliance with randomization.
Households with eligible children where asked in January 2011 whether they send their
child to preschool, and they were asked to indicate reasons for not doing so in case
they did not. The table shows frequencies for responses by those households who did
not send their child to preschool even though their child was admitted to preschool.
The main reasons indicated are that they preferred to send the child to primary school,
that the child was considered to be too young, and that the distance to preschool was
considered too far. The latter two answers indicate that a problem may have been
that households were not informed well enough, despite the NGOs efforts to reach the
whole population through information campaigns surrounding the admission procedure
in April 2010. Had they been informed well enough, parents of children participating
in the admission procedure should have been able to judge their child’s readiness for
preschool and the distance to the preschool before deciding to sign up for admission.
Lack of information as a major explanation for poor compliance is consistent with an-
other odd result shown in table 4.19: out of the households with admitted children, five
apparently thought that their child was not accepted for preschool.
However, even though compliance was imperfect, the randomization did create some
variation in enrollment status of the children in the household survey sample. For
children signed up for the first grade of preschool, the likelihood of actually attending
preschool amounts to 40.0 percent for accepted children as opposed to 27.3 percent for
children who were not accepted based on the randomization. For children signed up for
the second grade of preschool such a comparison is not warranted since there is only a
total of 5 children in that group who attend preschool.
This variation in preschool enrollment is definitely insufficient to identify the impact
on time use of other household members. However, as discussed in the following section,
the preschool program also caused variation in primary school enrolment which is just
as relevant for the analysis, since preschool and primary school enrollment of all of a
mother’s young children together determine full enrollment, which, as motivated in sec-
tion 4.2, is my enrollment measure of interest. Thus, the following section discusses how
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the preschool experiment induced variation in full enrollment, and how that variation
can be exploited empirically in order to estimate the effect on mothers’ time use.
4.4 Empirical strategy
Although, as discussed in the previous section, compliance with the randomization of
preschool access was poor such that it did not cause significant variation in actual
preschool enrolment, the introduction of the preschool program is likely to have af-
fected enrolment decisions more broadly. As argued in this section, being accepted for
preschool may have also increased the likelihood of enrollment in primary school, which
is, in fact, observed for children signed up for the first grade of preschool. As discussed
below, both effects together (the increase in preschool enrollment and the increase in
primary school enrollment) translate into variation in full enrollment, that is, the like-
lihood that all of a mother’s young children do not have to be cared for at home during
the day increases. The main empirical strategy will consist of exploiting this variation
in order to implement an instrumental variables model of the effect of full enrollment
on time use of mothers. Furthermore, the strength of the instrumental variable is likely
to interact with the age of a mother’s youngest child, which is shown to imply a variant
of the estimation strategy.
In order to better understand how the preschool program affected both preschool and
primary school enrolment of all participants in the inscription process, it is necessary
to recapitulate the specific conditions under which affected families were to make their
enrolment decisions during the decisive period between April and October 2010. In
April 2010, the randomization was carried out. Then, in September 2010, parents
learned that there would be a delay in the preschool project. Finally, it was only
after inscription procedures for primary schools had been completed that the preschool
started operating by the end of October 2010.
While parents of accepted children had easier access to preschool than others, some
of them, upon learning about the delayed start of the preschool project, may have tried
to enroll their child in primary school instead. However, assuming that before the in-
troduction of the preschool, admissions to primary school were sufficiently below actual
demand, then the enrollment of accepted children in any institution (either preschool
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or primary school) can be expected to be higher than it would have been in the absence
of the preschool.
For accepted children, enrollment may have also increased due to a reduction in
uncertainty caused by the experiment. Primary school enrolment procedures usually
take place during the first week of a new school year. Since primary schools, as described
in section 4.3 were more reluctant to accept a child the younger a child was, before
the start of the preschool project parents of very young unenrolled children faced a
great deal of uncertainty regarding their child’s future enrollment status. Since parents
of accepted children knew with certainty that their child would have access to some
institution (i.e. upon learning about the randomization results in April 2010), they
were probably more likely than they otherwise would have been to make arrangements
that depended on their child being enrolled. For example, the reduced uncertainty may
have induced them to search for employment opportunities, save for school tuition and
equipment, etc.
In fact, as the data show, enrollment in both preschool and primary school actually
is higher for accepted children among the children who were signed up for the first
grade of preschool (according to table 4.4), because accepted children are more likely
to be either enrolled in preschool or in primary school. Taken together, whether or not
a child is enrolled in preschool or in primary school determine whether a child stays at
home during the day. According to the data, the likelihood of staying at home is equal
to 33.3 percent for accepted children versus 66.6 percent for children not accepted for
preschool.
For children who were signed up for the second grade of preschool, however, the
impact of randomly gaining preschool access on enrollment in preschool or in primary
school taken together is reversed. In particular, accepted children are less likely to be
enrolled in primary school. For these children, the likelihood of staying at home is
equal to 32.2 percent for accepted children versus 7.1 percent for children who were not
accepted. One could think of reasons why even a negative effect of being accepted for
preschool might in fact reasonable11. However, given the small sample size for children
11A situation where the impact of being accepted for preschool on the likelihood of total enrollment
is ambiguous might accur when the introduction of the preschool program is likely to have positively
affected enrollment rates not only for accepted children but also for remaining participants. As long
as the size of these effects cannot be determined theretically it is not clear a priori for which of the two
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signed up for the second grade of preschool, such differences between randomly chosen
groups may as well be the result of sampling variation. In fact, as will be seen in section
5.4, when focussing on mothers of children signed up for second grade of preschool, the
impact of having a child accepted for preschool on enrollment becomes insignificant
when controlling for characteristics of the mother and the mother’s household. As
regards access to first grade of preschool, on the other hand, it will be shown that the
positive effect on enrollment is robust, even though, for the first grade experiment, the
sample size is still relatively small.
Since the focus of the analysis is the time use of mothers, it is necessary to link the
sample of students participating in the randomized preschool admission procedure to
the corresponding sample of mothers. Out of the 63 children who were signed up for
the first grade of preschool and who were recovered in the household data, 60 children
live with their mother. Two of these children are of the same mother, so the sample
of mothers has a size of 59. Out of the 45 children who were signed up for the second
grade of preschool and who were recovered in the household data, 36 children live with
their mother 12 , and none of these children are of the same mother. As discussed in
section 4.3, whether or not a child signed up for first grade was accepted for preschool
can be considered random. Consequently, for the mothers in the sample, indicator of
whether or not their child has been accepted, is a random variable.13
Translating the effect of randomly gaining preschool access on mother’s time use
into an empirical mothers, for each of the two lotteries, observations for all mothers of
participating children can be used to implement a simple comparison between mothers
groups groups the impact has been stronger. For individuals not accepted for preschool, accessability
of primary school may have risen relative to a counterfactual situation without the preschool program.
For instance, participating in the preschool inscription process may have increased their awareness of
the benefits of enrolling their child. Furthermore, the notification of not being accepted for preschool
may have encouraged them to seek enrollment for their children in an alternative institution (i.e.
primary school). In addition, after the completion of primary school enrollment procedures, parents of
”left over” children from the group of children not accepted for preschool may have been more likely
than they otherwise would have been to succeed in enrolling their child in preschool because they could
argue that their child’s name can be found on ”some list”.
12In West Africa, it is very common to observe that children are fostered-out to live with relatives
other than their parents, and the likelihood for a young child to be fostered-out rises with its age
(Akresh (2009), Serra (2009), Glewwe and Jacoby (1994)).
13For the one mother who signed up two 3-year-old children the indicator for being accepted for
preschool is given a value of 0 since none of the two children has been admitted.
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of accepted children and mothers of children not accepted for preschool:
yi = σPPi + βXi + i (4.1)
where yi is the dependent variable of interest, i.e. a measure of time use. Pi is
a dummy variable indicating whether a woman has a child accepted for preschool.
Xi includes additional control variables. Since the values of Pi have been determined
randomly, σP should identify the causal effect of being accepted for preschool on the
time use of mothers.14
The focus of this study is to investigate how a mother’s child care obligations affect
her time use, so the treatment variable of interest must be some measure of (pre-)school
enrollment of young children, which, in turn, determines how many hours of care these
children need at home. As outlined in section 4.2, a good candidate for such a variable
would be an indicator for full enrollment which measures whether or not all of a mother’s
young children are enrolled an any institution (preschool or primary school). For several
reasons, this measure suggests itself for being used to define treatment in the context
of this study.
First, full enrollment is a measure that is likely to map into effective changes in child
care responsibilities, as suggested by the descriptive results from section 4.2. The fact
that it appears to capture actual variation in the child care duties better than other
enrollment measures is consistent with the notion that, in an environment where many
mothers have several young children, enrollment of a single child can be expected to
reduce the number of hours a mother needs to stay at home to a very limited extent as
long as the remaining young children are not enrolled.
Second, is a measure that is significantly affected by the introduction of and partici-
pation in the preschool project, such that the random variation created by the preschool
project can be exploited for the identification of treatment effects. In other words, the
effect of the preschool experiment on enrollment in preschool and in primary school de-
14If treatment were defined as having a child attending preschool, then σP could be interpreted
as the intention-to-treat effect of having a child attending preschool, given that compliance with the
randomized admission procedure is imperfect. However, as discussed below, regarding the particular
setting of this study, it is convenient to define ”treatment” whether or not all of a mother’s young
children are enrolled.
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scribed above translates into variation of the indicator of full enrollment for the sample
of mothers of children signed up for preschool admission. According to a comparison of
means displayed in table 4.5, as of January 2011, right after the start of the preschool
project, the difference in the likelihood of full enrollment between mothers of accepted
children and mothers of children who were not admitted is equal to 30 percentage points
for the grade 1 experiment.15 For the grade 2 experiment, the difference is equal to -19
percentage points. As mentioned above, the results presented in section 5.4 will show
that this negative effect for children signed up for second grade is not robust to the
inclusion of control variables. For the first grade experiment, however, the relationship
is robust. Thus for mothers who have a child signed up for first grade of preschool,
the effect of being accepted on full enrollment provides a first stage relationship for
instrumenting full enrollment.
Defining full enrollment as the treatment variable and using an indicator for being
accepted for preschool as an instrumental variable for full enrollment, the relationship
of interest can be captured by the following model:
yi = ρEi + βXi + i (4.2)
where yi andXi are defined as before, and Ei denotes full enrollment. The hypothesis
is that treatment reduces hours of child care, and that it potentially increases the
time mothers spend with other activities such as work. However, since yi and Ei can
be expected to be determined by common unobserved factors, OLS estimates of ρ
would be subject to endogeneity bias, so an instrumental variables strategy is preferred.
The following equation constitutes the first stage relationship for instrumenting Ei in
equation 4.2:
Ei = δPi + γXi + µi (4.3)
15The number of observations used for computing the mans in table 4.5 is smaller than 59 (the
number of mothers of children in the data who were signed up for preschool admission and who live
with their mother) because it excludes observations for which variables used for the analysis described in
section 5.4 are missing (see table 4.9 in the appendix for details), and because it uses only observations
for women observed in both waves of the survey data.
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Tab. 4.5: Having a child accepted for preschool and means of full enrollment
Participants in randomization, preschool grade 1
All mothers Youngest child>1 Youngest child<=1
2008 2011 2008 2011 2008 2011
Child accepted N=18 .06 .39 N= 9 0 .78 N=9 .11 0
Child not accepted N=22 .09 .09 N=13 .15 .15 N=9 0 0
Participants in randomization, preschool grade 2
All mothers Youngest child>1 Youngest child<=1
2008 2011 2008 2011 2008 2011
Child accepted N=16 .19 .31 N=13 .23 .38 N=3 0 0
Child not accepted N=10 .1 .5 N= 6 .17 .83 N=4 0 0
Sample: For the upper panel, calculations are based on all observations from sample F where the respective variables
are observed in both waves. For the lower panel, calculations are based on all observations from sample G where
the respective variables are observed in both waves. See table 4.9 in the appendix for details.
where all variables are defined as above and Pi, the indicator for having a child
accepted for preschool, is the instrumental variable.
In order to assess how balanced mothers of children accepted for first grade of
preschool and mothers of non-admitted children are with respect to observed char-
acteristics, columns I and J in table 5.6 in the appendix compare means of various
socio-demographic variables for these two groups of mothers. No sharp differences are
observable. However, mothers of children not accepted for preschool tend to live in
households with fewer adult cohabitants (who are, accordingly, accumulating some-
what less household income), and, on average, their adult cohabitants score lower in
tests of cognitive ability. A strategy in section 5.4 will be the stepwise inclusion and
exclusion of most of the variables mentioned in table 5.6 in the appendix in order to
check whether empirical results are sensitive to such changes in specification.
As another view on whether randomization was successful in the sense that there
are no significant differences between the groups prior to the randomization table 4.5
compares mothers of accepted children to those whose children were not accepted by
indicating averages of full enrollment in 2008, two years prior to the start of the preschool
program. Mothers whose children would later be accepted for grade 1 of preschool had
a somewhat smaller likelihood of full enrollment in 2008 than mothers of children who
would not be accepted. For the grade 2 experiment, the reverse holds true. Even though
the existence of these relatively small differences prior to the start of the preschool
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program are likely to be attributable to the small sample sizes, a strategy to account
for such heterogeneity will be to include values of the outcome variable in 2008 in Xi as
additional controls. Note that, according to table 4.5, the likelihood of full enrollment
increased between 2008 and 2011 for all groups of mothers. This is most likely due to
the fact that most of the children signed up for preschool in April 2010 had been infants
in fall 2008, which, for respective mothers, would automatically imply that Ei takes on
the value zero.
This latter point illustrates that, when analyzing full enrollment, it is important
to take into account the interaction between the likelihood of treatment affecting the
amount of time a mother needs to devote to child care and the age of children. In
particular, since school accessability is still increasing with age for young children even
after the introduction of the preschool16, and because children younger than two are
not eligible for preschool, the youngest child is, on average, the least likely to attend
school. Thus, changes in the enrollment status of the youngest child are, more likely
to directly affect full enrollment. For similar reasons, the age of the youngest child has
frequently been the explanatory variable of focus in studies investigating associations
between fertility and labor supply of mothers (e.g. Lehrer (1992)).
Accordingly, the age of the youngest child should have a strong effect in regressions
such as model 4.3, and including it in the model may increase the precision of the
coefficient estimate of the instrumental variable, thereby increasing the instrument’s
strength. More precisely, the age of the youngest child will be taken into account by
including a woman’s number of children who were younger than two years in January
2011 as a control variable for all regressions.
In addition, employing a variant of equation 4.3, the information regarding the age of
the youngest child can be exploited by differentiating the effect of admission to preschool
between the impact it has on mothers whose youngest child is at least two years old and
the impact it has for mothers whose youngest child is slightly younger. Since for the
former mothers, obtaining access to preschool is much more likely to actually result in
full enrollment, the coefficient for Pi in the first stage regression should be much larger
for this subgroup of mothers than for mothers of younger children. In other words,
the first stage relationship can be reformulated as the following difference-in-differences
16See footnote 10
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model:
Ei = σPPi + σAAi + δP (Pi × Ai) + βXi + i (4.4)
where Ai is a dummy variable indicating whether a mother belongs to the subpopu-
lation hypothesized to be more likely to be affected by the introduction of the preschool
program (in the sense that for them, the preschool program may have effectively in-
creased the likelihood of full enrollment), which is the group of mothers whose youngest
child is at least two years old. δP , the coefficient for the interaction between this in-
dicator and the dummy variable indicating admission to preschool, is the respective
difference-in-differences estimator. Xi includes additional control variables. (Pi × Ai)
serves as instrumental variable.
This latter strategy essentially groups mothers into two different cohorts according
to Ai, where cohort membership is defined according to whether a mother’s youngest
child was born in a specific year. The effect of randomized preschool admission as
in equation 4.3 is then computed within each cohort, and afterwards, the difference
between these two estimates is interpreted as the impact of having access to preschool
for a child on full enrollment.
The means of full enrollment reported in table 4.5 already suggest that mothers
whose youngest child is at least two years old in 2011 constitute a group for which the
effect of admission to preschool on full enrollment is much more pronounced. Focusing
on mothers of children signed up for the first grade of preschool, the respective difference
in means of full enrollment is equal to 0.63 whereas mothers of younger children always
have at least one child that is not enrolled, regardless of whether one of their children
was accepted for preschool or not.
The age of the youngest child may itself by, of course, an endogenous variable. For
instance, according to the simple model in Leibowitz et al. (1992), a mother’s probability
of (re-)entering the labor force rises with increasing age of her child, and that result
is driven by two assumptions. Firstly, the costs of child care are assumed to decline
with the age of the child. That is the mechanism that I want to exploit by comparing
mothers whose youngest child is at least two years old to mothers of younger children;
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since children younger than two years are not eligible for institutionalized care, child
care costs fall discontinuously when a child turns two.17 In addition, however, Leibowitz
et al. (1992) assume that the mother’s reservation wage decline with the age of the
child.18 The authors do not discuss exactly why this should be the case, but one can
come up with a few suggestions: For instance, when the child grows older, providing
care for it could generally become an easier task, decreasing the value of a woman’s
time in home production. In addition, women may worry about the appropriateness of
specific child care arrangements for children under a certain age. On the other hand,
there appears to be consensus among researchers that for children above the age of
two, out-of-home care where the child interacts with other children is generally more
appropriate than being cared for at home completely (see Leibowitz et al. (1988) and
the psychological literature cited therein).
In order to rule out that systematic differences with respect to unobservable charac-
teristics between the groups defined by Ai drive the results, observations for the same
women from the survey prior to the introduction of the preschool program can be taken
into account in order to formulate the first stage as a triple differences model:
Eit = ρ(Pi×Ai×Tt)+σPPi+γTt+δP (Pi×Tt)+σAAi+δA(Ai×Tt)+η(Pi×Ai)+βXit+it
(4.5)
where Ai and Pi are defined as above. ρ, the coefficient for the interaction between
Pi, Ai, and the period indicator Tt is the respective triple differences estimator. Xit
includes additional control variables which can now be time varying.
17For this reason, empirical labor supply models of mothers estimated in earlier studies typically
account for child age by controlling for whether a mother’s child falls into one of two age intervals,
which are usually chosen at 0-2-years and 3-5-years (Duleep and Sanders (1994)), or they simply control
for whether a mother has any preschool age children (Lehrer (1992)).
18In addition, many studies have focussed on taking into account that female labor supply and
fertility may be the results of simultaneous decisions (Angrist and Evans (1998); see Agu¨ero and
Marks (2011) for a study using data from developing countries.). However, in this study, identification
is motivated by the fact that for one cohort, the preschool project was already accessible, whereas the
other cohort was till too young. It is unlikely that women in the studied community took into account
the timing of the beginning of the preschool project when making decisions that affected their fertility
outcomes.
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As a variation of equation 4.5, individual fixed effects can be included in the model:
Eit = ρ(Pi × Pi × Tt) + γTt + δP (Pi × Tt) + δA(Ai × Tt) + βXit + τi + it (4.6)
where τi is the individual fixed effect which absorbs the variables Pi, Ai, and (Pi×Ai).
Xit can now only include time varying covariates.
A concern regarding the implementation of the empirical strategy outlined in this
section could be that it does not rely on information on all mothers of children of
preschool age in the studied community but rather on a subsample of mothers who
chose to sign up their child for admission to preschool in April 2010. It could be
argued that these mothers differ from average mothers in aspects such as labor force
attachment or in how well they are informed about the preschool project. Table 5.6 in
the appendix confronts the issue by comparing means of a range of characteristics used
throughout the analysis between participating mothers (in other words, those whose
child was part of the randomized admission procedure), and non-participants (columns
F vs. H). The general impression from inspecting these descriptive statistics (excluding
the first four rows of the table, which show means for full enrollment as well as the
dependent variables) is that the groups do not differ systematically with respect to
observable socio-demographic characteristics.
In addition, table 4.20 documents how participants differ from non-participants with
respect to various measures of opinions regarding child care arrangements, female labor
supply, the preschool project and different social groups. In general, there are only a
few statistically significant associations after controlling for other characteristics. There
are a few exceptions, though. Surprisingly, mothers with high labor force attachment
tend to be less likely to sign up a child for first grade of preschool. Moreover, mothers
who value preschool education are less likely to participate. Not surprisingly, correct
knowledge of the organizational details of the preschool project (as measured by the
knowledge of the correct school fee) has a strong correlation with signing up a child.19
However, regarding the interpretability of these results, since the respective responses
19surprisingly, the likelihood of signing up a child for second grade of preschool is negatively associ-
ated with having ever heard of the NGO, but this could be due to low sample size/few observations of
women not having heard of the NGO.
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were recorded in January 2011, they may simply reflect an outcome of the participating
in the preschool project.
4.4.1 Proximity to the preschool construction site as a source
of variation in the accessability of (pre-)school
As discussed above, preschool attendance is only partially determined by the result
of the randomized admission procedure. Instead, 11 children who participated in the
randomization and who were not accepted eventually ended up attending preschool.
Furthermore, 7 children who did not participate in the admission procedure at all were
attending preschool in January 2011 anyway.20 Particularly regarding this latter group
of children it becomes evident that the introduction of the preschool not only affected
the subpopulation of participants in the randomization but rather the community’s
population as a whole. Accordingly, there must be additional determinants of the like-
lihood of enrolling a child in preschool which could potentially serve as instruments for
full enrollment. A distinction of such a strategy from the one discussed in the previ-
ous section will be that the focus shifts from the population of mother who signed up
their children for admission to preschool to the population of all mothers in the com-
munity who have children of preschool age. Among them, again, the group of mothers
whose children attend preschool is likely to be selective. That is, had there not been
a preschool program introduced to the community, it is still very likely that mothers
whose children are attending preschool today would have differed systematically from
other mothers with respect to their enrollment behavior and their time use.
The households’ distance to the preschool construction site provides an alterna-
tive source of variation in the likelihood of preschool enrollment (which translates into
variation in full enrollment) that is independent from having participated in the ran-
domization but still motivated by the introduction of the preschool program. That
measure is likely to be associated with how strongly the introduction of the preschool
program increased accessability of preschool for households with young children.
20In addition, 12 of the children attending preschool can not not be traced in the survey data.
Overall, enrollment in preschool fell short of projections, particularly because so many 4- to 5-year-
old children were enrolled in primary school rather than preschool, in spite of commitments made by
primary school principals to abstain from this practice.
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Note that, as mentioned above, at the beginning of the school year 2010/2011,
primary schools still accepted children of preschool age. The studied community is
relatively densely populated and hosts four primary schools. Accordingly, at least one
school is in close walking distance (not more than 20-30 minutes) to almost any house-
hold in the sample. In addition, evidence regarding the impact of distance to school
on enrollment of primary school age children in poor countries has been mixed (see
Filmer (2007) for an overview), and the distances observed in the studied community
would have to be regarded relatively low compared to distances found elsewhere. Thus,
regarding primary school access, the distance to school does not constitute a significant
constraint. However, this may not hold true for the youngest among the children of
preschool age (i.e. 2- to 4-year-old children) before the introduction of the preschool.
While older children may probably walk to school on their own, the very young children
are more likely to need an accompanying older child or an adult. This implies that for
parents of 2- to 4-year-old children, schools were less accessible when they lived further
away from any school in 2008 than for other mothers.
Based on this reasoning, the relationship that may be expected to be observable
between enrollment behavior and a household’s distance to the preschool is relatively
complex. Ceteris paribus, the introduction of the preschools increased the set of en-
rollment options particularly for those households, which live closer to the preschool
than to any of the primary schools. In 2011, households were asked to indicate the
walking distance in minutes from their home to each of the four primary schools and
to preschool. Exploiting this information, the following difference-in-differences model
can be estimated for women with 2- to 4-year-old children:
Eit = σCCi + γTt + δC(Ci × Tt) + βXit + it (4.7)
where Ci is a dummy variable indicating whether a woman lives closer to the
preschool construction site than to any of the primary schools in 2011. Tt is equal
to 1 for observations from the survey after the introduction of the preschool program,
and 0 if they are from the 2008 survey. δC , the coefficient for the interaction between
these two indicators, is the respective difference-in-differences estimator. Xit includes
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additional control variables. Similar to the discussion in the preceding subsection,
equation 4.7 could be employed as a first stage regression where (Ci × Tt) serves as
instrumental variable for Eit. Alternatively, by replacing the dependent variable with a
measure of time use yit, the difference-in-difference estimate could be interpreted as the
reduced form effect of improved access to preschool on time use of mothers. However,
es can be seen from inspecting the coefficient estimates presented in table 4.18 in the
appendix, even though the difference-in-difference estimate on full enrollment is positive
and relatively robust to the inclusion of control variables it is estimated with very low
precision. In the sample of mothers of 2- to 4-year-old children δC is identified by only
11 mothers who indicated to live closer to preschool than to any of the primary schools.
Accordingly, the variation in Ci that can be observed in the data is not strong enough
in order to reliably identify the effect of improved access to preschool.
One explanation for this result could simply be that distance is not a relevant crite-
rion for enrollment decisions in the studied community. However, other aspects may be
relevant as well. First, the distance to preschool may be measured with error, because
some respondents were probably not yet very familiar with the exact location of the
preschool. Second, in light of the discussion in section 4.3, the relationship that can
be expected between distance to preschool and full enrollment is probably even more
complicated. As outlined, enrolling 2- to 4-year-old children in the particular school
of choice may have been more difficult than for 5-year-old children, because primary
schools were more reluctant to accept too young children the younger a child was. Con-
sequently, for them, the closest accessible school may not always have been the school
that is also the closest one geographically.
4.5 Results: enrollment status of young children
and time use of cohabiting women
Turning first to the results from estimating equation 4.1 for participants in the first grade
randomization (table 4.15 in the appendix), which shows the effect of being admitted to
preschool on mothers’ time use, the direction of the effect on hours of care is consistent
with the expectation that being accepted for preschool reduces child care responsibilities
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on average. The small size of the coefficient (less than one hour for six out of seven
specifications21) can be explained by low compliance with the randomization. Since, in
addition, standard errors of the coefficient estimates are large due to the small sample
size, in none of the specifications the estimate is found to be statistically significant. The
estimates of both the effects on hours of work and on the overlap between time spent
caring for children and time working are all very small and statistically insignificant;
the effect on hours of overlap between work and child care is, unexpectedly, estimated
to be positive. Although the small and insignificant effects on work may also be partly
due to low compliance with the randomization, they suggest that the true effect of a
reduction in child care responsibilities in response to the preschool program on work is
in fact very small or even absent.
Repeating the same analysis for participants in the second grade randomization
(rows 2 to 4 of table 4.16 in the appendix) yields a few surprising results. Being
accepted for preschool is estimated to have a very large and positive effect on hours of
care and hours of overlap. The results for hours of work are inconclusive. However,
both the size of coefficient estimates and the size of estimated standard errors vary
across specifications, particularly comparing specification (5) to the remaining columns.
Furthermore, as seen in the first row of the same table, using the full enrollment indicator
as dependent variable yields very small and statistically insignificant effects of being
admitted to preschool for most sets of control variables. I thus conclude that, even
though admission to the second grade of preschool was randomized, mothers of admitted
children differ systematically from other mothers with respect to characteristics that
affected both their likelihood of enrolling young children and their time use decisions.
Consequently, the second grade experiment did not result in variation in enrollment
behavior that could be exploited in order to evaluate the effect of enrollment on time
use decisions of mothers, and the remaining analysis will no longer use observations
from the second grade experiment.
Focusing on the first grade experiment, table 4.6 summarizes the results from esti-
21For all estimated equations, results from several specifications are shown in order to assess the
robustness of coefficient estimates. Results in the first column show raw effects without additional
controls. For the result in the second column, the number of children younger than two has been
added as a control variable. The remaining specifications add varying combinations of further socio-
demographic controls. Further details are given in the tables.
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mating the instrumental variables model described by equations 4.2 and 4.3. The first
stage coefficient estimates of the indicator for being accepted for preschool (first row in
table 4.6) indicate that a first stage relationship does exist, however, due to the limited
compliance with the randomization, the first stage relationship is not very strong. Con-
ditional on covariates, a mother’s likelihood of having all young children enrolled rises
by 18 to 21 percentage points if her child has been accepted for preschool, depending on
the specification. As hypothesized in section 4.4, controlling for the number of children
younger than two years increases the precision of the coefficient estimate for the first
stage effect of the instrument, although only marginally. At the same time, the size
of the coefficient estimate increases a little. Due to both these effects, the first stage
relationship is statistically significant only if at least the number of children younger
than two years are controlled for. Even then, however, the first stage relationship is
still relatively weak, as indicated by the respective F-statistics indicated in the second
row of table 4.6, which vary between 3.0 and 4.2 conditional on varying sets of control
variables. Consequently, resulting IV-estimates of the effect of full enrollment on time
use should be interpreted with care since they are, potentially, subject to a weak in-
strument problem. Regarding the validity of the instrument, I consider the first stage
coefficient estimates displayed in columns (2) through (7) of the first row in table 4.6 to
indicate robustness to the inclusion of varying sets of control variables. Given that the
sample size is small, minor fluctuations in estimated effect sizes should not contradict
the assumption that the instrumental variable is exogenous.
The IV-estimates for the effect of full enrollment on three different categories of
time use are displayed in rows 3, 4, and 5 of table 4.6. They confirm the basic result
of table 4.15 in the appendix which was based on estimating the reduced form effect of
the instrument. The effect on hours of care for young children is consistently negative,
i.e. mothers who enrolled all of their young children in response to the improved school
access induced by the preschool experiment spend systematically fewer hours caring for
children. However, the effect is not statistically significant. Conditional on covariates,
the estimated effect varies between -3.4 and -6.0 hours. For both time use categories
related to work, estimated coefficients are generally much smaller (usually less than one
hour), and they are never statistically significant.
In order to further account for heterogeneity relevant to the time use decisions inves-
118
CHAPTER 4. CHILD CARE AND TIME USE OF YOUNG MOTHERS
Tab. 4.6: Instrumental variable estimates using admission to first grade of preschool as
an instrument, women observed in 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
First stage effect of instrument 0.16 0.20∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.18∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.21∗∗
(0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
First stage F-statistic 1.62 3.18 4.18 3.94 2.96 3.80 4.24
IV-estimate: hours of care -1.56 -4.36 -4.54 -4.48 -5.10 -3.36 -6.03
(9.71) (6.36) (6.33) (5.81) (7.07) (6.38) (5.98)
IV-estimate: hours of work 0.87 0.90 0.30 0.58 -1.12 0.37 -0.43
(6.42) (5.18) (5.04) (4.75) (5.92) (5.47) (4.91)
IV-estimate: hours of overlap 0.84 3.67 0.88 0.49 0.90 1.50 0.49
(5.17) (8.88) (5.05) (4.72) (5.84) (5.50) (4.85)
Sample: Observations from Sample F (see table 4.9 in the appendix for details; N=47). Specifications: see expla-
nations for table 4.15. The ”First stage F-statistic” is based on a test of significance of the instrumental variable in
the first stage. Standard errors given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
tigated, I estimated the IV model controlling for individual 2008 values of the respective
dependent variable as well as for the number of young children in 2008. This reduces
the sample size from 47 to 40, because some of the women in the original sample are
only observed in 2011. Table 4.17 in the appendix presents results from estimating
the IV model for that subsample, but not yet controlling for previous outcomes. Evi-
dently, the women observed in both data waves are a selective sample. For them, the
first stage relationship is also very robust, and the size of the estimated impact of the
instrumental variable is larger. Accordingly, the first stage F-statistic becomes larger.
A more pronounced first stage relationship for these women could be due to the fact
that they, presumably, have been living in the community for a longer time and thus
may be more familiar with the communities institutions, providing them with generally
better school access, and amplifying the effect of the preschool program on enrollment
behavior. The second stage results regarding the impact of full enrollment on time use
are comparable with those presented in table 4.6. However, the absolute size of the
effect on child care tends to be smaller, and the effect on hours of work is still small
but consistently negative.
Adding 2008 values of the respective outcome variable as well as the number of young
children in 2008 results in coefficient estimates presented in table 4.7. In columns (3)
through (7), which add various sets of additional controls, the size of the effect of
the instrument in the first stage is even further increased, resulting in first stage F-
119
4.5. RESULTS: ENROLLMENT STATUS OF YOUNG CHILDREN
AND TIME USE OF COHABITING WOMEN
Tab. 4.7: Instrumental variable estimates using admission to preschool as an instrument,
controlling for outcomes in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
First stage 0.29∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12)
First stage F-statistic 4.89 6.36 11.38 11.81 10.50 10.20 9.86
IV-estimate: hours of care -3.32 -3.53 -3.99 -2.56 -4.65 -3.12 -4.07
(5.47) (4.81) (3.78) (3.57) (3.82) (3.88) (3.85)
First stage 0.29∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12)
First stage F-statistic 5.32 6.97 10.39 9.99 10.57 9.56 9.13
IV-estimate: hours of work -0.12 -0.07 -0.78 -0.11 -1.44 -0.75 -0.88
(3.93) (3.79) (3.04) (2.81) (3.03) (3.10) (3.08)
First stage 0.30∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12)
First stage F-statistic 5.20 6.89 12.08 12.38 11.26 10.47 10.47
IV-estimate: hours of overlap 1.11 0.66 0.91 1.48 -0.01 0.91 0.92
(4.54) (3.72) (3.35) (3.23) (3.26) (3.51) (3.46)
Sample: See explanations for results in table 4.17 (N=40). Specifications: see explanations for table 4.15. In
addition, all IV regressions control for the 2008 value of the outcome variable, i.e. the measure of time use, and
they include the number of young children in 2008 as a control variable. Standard errors given in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
statistic of around 10. The remaining estimates confirm the results discussed above.
Full enrollment leads to consistently fewer hours of child care, with the reduction usually
being estimated to be at least three hours. The effect is still not statistically significant,
though. The impact of full enrollment on time uses associated with work is usually
estimated to be less than one hour, and it is always statistically insignificant.
Table 4.8 shows results from estimating equations 4.4 and 4.5 where the idea is to
focus on subpopulations that are more likely to be affected by the preschool program.
The first two columns of the upper panel display coefficient estimates form implement-
ing a difference-in-differences model which compares the difference in the likelihood
of full enrollment between mothers of accepted children and mothers of non-admitted
children for mothers whose youngest child is at least two years old to the respective
difference for mothers whose youngest child is younger than two years. Looking at the
raw difference in means (column 1), the strategy of the model is successful in the sense
that the estimated impact of being accepted for preschool on full enrollment actually is
estimated to be larger for this subpopulation. However, the effect is not robust to the
inclusion of control variables (column 2). Taking observations from 2008 into account
by estimating the triple difference model 4.5 even further increases the estimated ef-
fect of being accepted for preschool. When adding control variables, the change in the
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likelihood of full enrollment induced by admission to preschool between 2008 and 2011
is estimated to be 86 percentage points higher for mothers whose youngest child is at
least two years old in 2011 in comparison to mothers whose youngest child is younger
than two. The lower part of table 4.8 shows coefficient estimates for models that take
a measure of time use as the dependent variable. The reduced form effect of the in-
strument is the coefficient of δP in equation 4.4 when replacing the dependent variable
with a time use measure (columns 1 and 2), or the coefficient of the ρ in equation 4.5
when replacing the dependent variable with a time use measure (columns 3 and 4). The
IV-estimates result from a model where full enrollment is instrumented by either using
model 4.4 (columns 1 and 2) or model 4.5 (columns 3 and 4) as the first stage. Results
indicate that in models where the first stage relationship is reasonably strong (columns
1, 3 and 4), full enrollment is estimated to have a negative effect on hours of child
care. The effect on hours of work is again estimated to be very small and statistically
insignificant. In contrast with results shown in tables 4.6 through 4.7, the effect on
hours of care is estimated to be marginally statistically significant. This is due to a
large (and probably unreasonable) increase in the size of the coefficient estimate which
more than counterbalances the increase in standard errors. The increase in standard
errors is due to the fact that, when narrowing down the investigation to mothers whose
youngest child is at least two years old, the subpopulation of mothers who can possibly
comply with the instrument is, inevitably, smaller.
Thus, based on the first grade experiment, which created the stronger and more
credible variation in enrollment behavior than the randomized admission to second grade
of preschool, I interpret the results as consistently showing that (in spite of the coefficient
estimate’s large standard errors) full enrollment reduces the time mothers cares for
young children by at least three to four hours. However, this is neither accompanied
with an increase in the number of hours worked, nor with an unambiguous reduction
in hours of care overlapping with other activities.
4.6 Conclusions
Based on a field experiment conducted in a Togolese community, I exploited variation
in enrollment behavior induced by randomized access to preschool in order to identify
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Tab. 4.8: Triple difference estimates (models 4.5 and 4.6) for mothers who signed up
their child for the first grade of preschool
Dependent variable: all young children enrolled
no controls controls no controls controls
Accepted · second wave · youngest>1 0.89∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.26)
Accepted · youngest>1 0.62∗∗∗ 0.36∗ -0.26 -0.38∗
(0.19) (0.20) (0.18) (0.20)
Accepted · second wave -0.11 -0.09
(0.19) (0.19)
Second wave 0.00 0.00
(0.13) (0.13)
Accepted 0.00 0.15 0.11 0.11
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)
Second wave · Youngest>1 0.00 0.00
(0.17) (0.17)
Youngest>2 0.15 0.31∗∗ 0.15 0.26∗∗
(0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13)
First stage F-statistic 10.52 3.09 11.89 11.09
Dependent variable: hours of care
no controls controls no controls controls
Reduced form effect of instrument -4.84∗ -4.45 -9.36∗∗ -8.78∗∗
(2.76) (3.46) (3.81) (3.67)
IV-estimate: effect of full enrollment -7.75∗ -12.44 -10.53∗∗ -10.18**
(4.53) (9.67) (4.68) (4.28)
Dependent variable: hours of work
no controls controls no controls controls
Reduced form effect of instrument -0.94 0.19 -2.21 -1.54
(2.40) (2.98) (3.43) (3.46)
IV-estimate: effect of full enrollment -1.51 0.53 -2.48 -1.78
(3.75) (7.04) (3.74) (3.67)
Dependent variable: hours of overlap
no controls controls no controls controls
Reduced form effect of instrument -0.86 -1.91 -4.07 -3.88
(2.24) (2.74) (3.05) (3.02)
IV-estimate: effect of full enrollment -1.38 -5.34 -4.58 -4.50
(3.45) (6.97) (3.44) (3.30)
Sample: For the first two columns, see explanations for results in table 4.17 (N=40). The third and forth column
include the same sample of women, and they add observations from 2008 for these same women. Specifications: In
columns 2 and 4, the following control variables were added: a mother’s number of children in three different age
groups (0 through 1 year, 2 through 5 years, and 6 through 12 years), the number of adults per household, age of the
mother, dummy variables for the three most common religious denominations, and the number of adult cohabitants
who work in agriculture. Standard errors given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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the impact on mothers’ labor supply. The studied community did not have access
to institutionalized child care before the start of the program. Given that demand
originally exceeded supply, access to the first two grades of preschool was determined
by a lottery. Compliance with the randomization was poor. However, in particular
institutional environment, primary schools also accept preschool age children, and, due
to a short delay in the preschool program, the randomized preschool access also affected
the likelihood of enrollment in primary school. As a result, for one of the two lotteries
carried out (the one for the first grade of primary school), the randomization induced
significant and robust variation in the likelihood of full enrollment, which is an indicator
for whether all of a mother’s young children are enrolled in either preschool or primary
school. Full enrollment is argued to be more relevant to time use decisions of mothers,
given that, if there are several young children present, enrolling one single child while
the others remain at home may not effectively reduce child care responsibilities of the
mother.
The variation induced by the first grade experiment is used to construct an in-
strumental variable for full enrollment. Results consistently show that full enrollment
reduces the time mothers cares for young children by at least three to four hours,
although, due to the small sample size, this effect is not found to be statistically sig-
nificant. The systematic reduction in hours of child care is neither mirrored by an
increase in the number of hours worked, nor are hours of care overlapping with work
significantly reduced. These results are, qualitatively, consistent with OLS estimates of
the effect of full enrollment on time use of mothers for the whole population of mothers
of young children in the community (regardless of whether they participated in the
randomization or not).
A potential explanation for the results is that they capture the effect of changes in
enrollment behavior induced by the preschool program in the short run. The program
started in October 2010, and individuals were surveyed in January 2011. This time span
may have been too short for many women to adjust their schedule regarding economic
activities. Since most of the women work on their household’s farms or in small family
enterprizes (e.g. sewer), increasing the amount of work might require to be accompanied
by additional investments (such as land or raw material) which affected families may
not have been able to make yet. In addition, it could be argued that participants
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in the randomized preschool admission procedure are selective, and that they differ
systematically from other mothers with respect to unobservable characteristics which
affect their time use decisions (as partly suggested by results from comparisons for these
two groups of answers to survey questions regarding opinions on labor supply and child
care arrangements). On the other hand, the descriptive results, which are not restricted
to participants in the randomization, and which are driven not only by the short-run
variation in enrollment induced by the experiment, lead to very similar results This
suggests that the preschool program would not necessarily lead to different effects if
evaluated after a longer time delay of if it were expanded to the expanded to cover the
full population.
Thus, the results suggest that expanding the provision of public care for preschool
age children would not lead to an increase in female labor supply. This would not allow
to conclude, of course, not to invest in public preschools. A full evaluation of the benefits
of early childhood education in a developing country like Togo would, naturally, have
to take into account the direct effects on the children’s cognitive and non-cognitive
development. It has been argued that the economic importance of evaluating early
childhood development programs in poor countries lies in the long-term consequences
such programs may have on education, labor market outcomes, health, and poverty of
affected children (Ghuman et al. (2005)). While such benefits of preschool programs in
industrial countries (e.g. Head Start) have been well documented, the evidence from
developing countries is limited to a small number of studies in educational research.
Mwaura et al. (2008) found positive effects on cognitive development of children even
within 1.5 years of time for a large East African preschool program. A study from
Botswana showed that having attended preschool is associated with better subsequent
achievement in primary school (Taiwo and Tyolo (2002)). Berlinski et al. (2009) find a
similar result when evaluating the impact of a large expansion of the public provision
of preschool in Argentina. Other studies have been concerned with whether child ar-
rangements affect the physical development of young children in developing countries
(Stansbury et al. (2000), Glewwe et al. (2001)). Usually, these studies are not exploit-
ing credibly exogenous variation in enrollment, so the issue still provides interesting
opportunities for (quasi-)experimental research. Not that, when evaluating the impact
of preschool on child development in poor countries, variation in the quality of preschool
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Tab. 4.9: Sample selection
Sample A: individuals older than five years living in households with young children
in 2011 in studied community, N=1280
Sample B: individuals in Sample A with non-missing time-use data, N=1164
Sample C: individuals in Sample B who are mothers of young children (younger than
six), N=264
Sample D: individuals in Sample C without missing values for control variables used
in analysis, N=255
Sample E: individuals in Sample D who have children of preschool age (two to five
years), N=197
Sample F: Participants in 1st
grade randomization, N=47
Sample G: Participants in 2nd
grade randomization, N=31
Sample H: Not
participating in
any
randomization,
N=120
Sample I:
Accepted for
preschool, N=22
Sample J: Not
Accepted for
preschool, N=25
Sample K:
Accepted for
preschool, N=21
Sample L: Not
Accepted for
preschool, N=10
Sample M: individuals in Sample E who have 2- to 4-year-old children, N=153
Sample N: individuals in Sample M who have non-missing data on distance to (pre-
)school, N=110
Note that one single observation belongs to both Sample F and Sample G such that adding up the number of
observations for samples F, G, and H exceeds the number of observations in sample E by one.
should be taken into account (Moore et al. (2008)). Particularly for the studied com-
munity, and for Togo as a whole, the quality of preschool is likely to be very low on
average, given that, as described in this study, many preschool age children actually
end up in the first grade of primary school, where curriculum, equipment and teacher
training are most likely not suitable for their needs.
The results regarding the impact of preschool enrollment on labor supply contradicts
findings from most earlier studies. However, previous results have been obtained using
data from richer countries than Togo. Accordingly, more research regarding the effect
of child care arrangements in developing countries is necessary. In this respect, another
lesson from this study is that researchers should evaluate programs that affect, for
a subpopulation large enough in order to be able to estimate precise effects, the full
enrollment of mothers’ young children rather than only the enrollment status of single
children.
4.7 Appendix: additional tables
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Tab. 4.10: Average time use of individuals cohibiting with young children
Mothers
of
young
children
Grand
moth-
ers and
aunts
Sisters
older
than 5
Other
female
relatives
Non-
related
female
Cohabiting
male
child
older
than 5
Cohabiting
male
adult
Morning/noon
Attending school 0.21 0.41 3.38 1.13 1.00 4.23 0.78
(1.00) (1.28) (1.86) (2.06) (1.88) (1.10) (1.75)
Doing school homework 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01
(0.00) (0.42) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.16)
Working as an apprentice 0.24 0.11 0.17 0.75 0.30 0.03 0.11
(1.05) (0.69) (0.95) (1.83) (1.34) (0.36) (0.74)
Doing household work 1.09 0.57 0.24 0.28 0.30 0.03 0.02
(1.96) (1.52) (0.94) (0.68) (1.34) (0.23) (0.23)
Working on a field 0.65 0.59 0.13 0.55 0.70 0.05 1.55
(1.47) (1.35) (0.66) (1.70) (1.55) (0.35) (2.23)
Working in a shop/work shop/etc. 1.20 1.17 0.18 1.00 2.35 0.00 1.28
(2.05) (2.13) (0.95) (2.05) (2.79) (0.00) (2.26)
Working at home 0.69 0.68 0.09 0.55 0.53 0.02 0.24
(1.65) (1.60) (0.52) (1.70) (1.62) (0.19) (1.01)
Running errands 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14
(0.50) (0.71) (0.46) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.63)
Doing nothing 0.15 0.65 0.14 0.60 0.00 0.12 0.50
(0.90) (1.91) (0.76) (1.88) (0.00) (0.70) (1.62)
Other activity 0.16 0.34 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.28
(0.84) (1.31) (0.49) (0.45) (0.00) (0.25) (1.12)
Caring for a child 4.91 2.79 0.44 0.80 3.25 0.09 0.25
(2.80) (3.08) (1.44) (2.14) (3.51) (0.56) (1.04)
Caring for a child while working 1.73 0.93 0.11 0.50 2.00 0.03 0.09
(2.13) (1.77) (0.68) (1.54) (2.69) (0.36) (0.58)
Afternoon/evening
Attending school 0.10 0.15 1.56 0.35 0.48 1.95 0.34
(0.53) (0.52) (0.95) (0.67) (1.07) (0.82) (0.83)
Doing school homework 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03
(0.06) (0.09) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.19) (0.26)
Working as an apprentice 0.14 0.04 0.08 0.60 0.15 0.01 0.07
(0.68) (0.25) (0.48) (1.57) (0.67) (0.14) (0.55)
Doing household work 1.19 0.64 0.27 0.40 0.53 0.03 0.04
(2.05) (1.55) (1.01) (0.70) (1.46) (0.17) (0.31)
Working on a field 0.29 0.33 0.03 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.78
(0.89) (0.94) (0.25) (0.67) (0.00) (0.19) (1.52)
Working in a shop/work shop/etc. 0.95 0.91 0.17 0.45 1.70 0.02 1.07
(1.84) (1.88) (0.96) (1.39) (2.12) (0.19) (2.07)
Working at home 0.58 0.62 0.11 0.53 0.57 0.02 0.19
(1.45) (1.44) (0.62) (1.52) (1.18) (0.15) (0.90)
Running errands 0.12 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19
(0.52) (0.68) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.63)
Doing nothing 0.23 0.76 0.13 0.70 0.13 0.19 0.65
(0.96) (1.95) (0.70) (2.15) (0.56) (0.91) (1.80)
Other activity 0.16 0.23 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.05 0.28
(0.82) (1.11) (0.43) (0.56) (0.00) (0.33) (1.06)
Caring for a child 5.11 2.89 0.54 0.98 3.93 0.17 0.28
(2.66) (3.15) (1.55) (2.16) (3.31) (0.83) (1.06)
Caring for a child while working 1.36 0.78 0.08 0.05 1.73 0.01 0.06
(1.88) (1.62) (0.48) (0.22) (2.09) (0.14) (0.39)
Observations 264 116 189 20 20 196 349
Sample: see description for table 4.1 (standard deviations in parentheses).
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Tab. 4.11: Average time use of subpupulations of mothers cohabiting with young chil-
dren
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Par-
tici-
pants
Non-
partici-
pants
Ad-
mitted
(1st
grade)
Not
ad-
mitted
(1st
grade)
Young-
est
child
younger
than
2
Young-
est
child
at
least
2
All
young
chil-
dren
enrolled
Not
all
young
chil-
dren
enrolled
One
young
child
More
than
one
young
child
Morning/noon
Attending school 0.11 0.23 0.23 0.00 0.14 0.18 0.26 0.14 0.22 0.10
(0.73) (1.02) (1.07) (0.00) (0.83) (0.90) (1.12) (0.81) (1.01) (0.72)
Doing homework 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0 00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Working: apprentice 0.05 0.29 0.11 0.00 0.22 0.28 0 00 0.32 0.19 0.33
(0.36) (1.14) (0.53) (0.00) (1.05) (1.07) (0 00) (1.17) (0.89) (1.21)
Household work 0.94 1.13 0.80 1.06 1.31 0.89 0.91 1.07 0.91 1.18
(1.89) (1.99) (1.88) (1.93) (2.11) (1.79) (1.88) (1.93) (1.84) (2.00)
Working on a field 0.61 0.70 0.52 0.68 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.67 0.61
(1.33) (1.55) (1.35) (1.35) (1.43) (1.50) (1.60) (1.44) (1.56) (1.37)
Working in a shop 1.62 0.89 1.86 1.40 0.86 1.33 1.62 1.05 1.36 0.95
(2.13) (1.85) (2.25) (2.05) (1.76) (2.18) (2.43) (1.93) (2.18) (1.89)
Working at home 0.71 0.83 0.59 0.82 0.85 0.81 1.17 0.73 0.92 0.72
(1.52) (1.72) (1.49) (1.57) (1.77) (1.75) (2.34) (1.57) (1.90) (1.60)
Running errands 0.00 0.14 0.00 0 00 0.02 0.17 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.10
(0.00) (0.50) (0.00) (0 00) (0.18) (0.71) (0.51) (0.60) (0.47) (0.68)
Doing nothing 0.06 0.08 0.14 0 00 0.06 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.15
(0.44) (0.47) (0.64) (0 00) (0.40) (0.76) (0.56) (0.67) (0.43) (0.82)
Other activity 0.23 0.08 0.41 0.08 0.17 0.10 0.18 0.11 0.13 0.13
(0.96) (0.61) (1.33) (0.40) (0.83) (0.71) (0.85) (0.73) (0.80) (0.71)
Caring for a child 4.82 4.93 4.73 4.90 5.98 4.07 1.88 5.47 4.09 5.46
(2.87) (2.68) (3.13) (2.67) (1.84) (3.04) (2.59) (2.40) (3.06) (2.36)
Caring + working 1.76 1.71 1.82 1.70 2.17 1.44 0.82 1.92 1.52 1.90
(1.92) (2.13) (2.08) (1.80) (2.18) (1.99) (1.73) (2.11) (2.06) (2.11)
Afternoon/evening
Attending school 0.04 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.05
(0.29) (0.47) (0.43) (0.00) (0.33) (0.43) (0.45) (0.39) (0.47) (0.30)
Doing homework 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Working: apprentice 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.15 0.13 0.00 0.17 0.07 0.20
(0.31) (0.61) (0.44) (0.00) (0.69) (0.52) (0.00) (0.65) (0.37) (0.75)
Household work 1.02 1.20 1.05 1.00 1.37 1.00 1.35 1.08 0.97 1.31
(2.00) (2.02) (2.13) (1.93) (2.07) (1.92) (2.29) (1.90) (1.90) (2.06)
Working on a field 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.30 0.16 0.35 0.28 0.28 0.39 0.17
(0.71) (0.87) (0.77) (0.68) (0.57) (0.97) (1.01) (0.81) (1.06) (0.53)
Working in a shop 0.85 0.80 0.68 1.00 0.59 1.06 1.14 0.83 1.08 0.69
(1.47) (1.77) (1.13) (1.73) (1.41) (1.98) (1.95) (1.77) (1.97) (1.60)
Working at home 0.81 0.70 0.80 0.82 0.68 0.75 1.17 0.61 0.84 0.60
(1.73) (1.54) (1.97) (1.53) (1.46) (1.71) (2.29) (1.39) (1.81) (1.39)
Running errands 0.18 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.05 0.20 0.24 0.12 0.22 0.07
(0.71) (0.50) (0.85) (0.58) (0.24) (0.68) (0.86) (0.47) (0.70) (0.37)
Doing nothing 0.06 0.20 0.14 0.00 0.18 0.20 0.09 0.22 0.09 0.30
(0.44) (0.77) (0.64) (0.00) (0.83) (0.83) (0.56) (0.88) (0.45) (1.09)
Other activity 0.16 0.08 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.14
(0.69) (0.58) (0.85) (0.53) (0.71) (0.58) (0.40) (0.68) (0.64) (0.62)
Caring for a child 4.93 5.30 4.89 4.96 5.92 4.65 2.92 5.65 4.70 5.54
(2.91) (2.46) (3.04) (2.85) (1.95) (2.84) (2.78) (2.29) (2.84) (2.31)
Caring + working 1.35 1.45 1.30 1.40 1.35 1.45 1.18 1.47 1.54 1.27
(1.68) (2.05) (1.72) (1.68) (1.74) (2.04) (1.93) (1.93) (2.09) (1.75)
Observations 47 120 22 25 71 126 39 158 101 96
Samples: Results in column 1 were computed based on sample F, those in column 2 based on sample H, those
in column 3 basee on sample I, and those in column 4 based on sample J. For each of the remaining pairs of
columns (5/6, 7/8, and 9/10), calculations are based on sample E, where the sample is split into two subsamples
(one subsample corresponding to one column) based on the respective characteristic indicated in the column head.
For more details, see table 4.9 in the appendix (standard deviations in parentheses).
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Tab. 4.12: Average time use of subpupulations mothers cohibiting with young children:
different occupations
Agriculture
Alimentary
commerce
Other
small
commerce
Sewery
No
occupation
Morning/noon
Attending school 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.42
(0.00) (0.38) (0.00) (0.00) (1.40)
Doing school homework 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Working as an apprentice 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.26 1.08
(0.75) (0.00) (0.00) (1.15) (1.98)
Doing household work 1.04 0.97 1.07 0.42 1.89
(1.78) (1.95) (1.95) (1.43) (2.41)
Working on a field 1.82 0.08 0.24 0.00 0.51
(2.05) (0.53) (0.79) (0.00) (1.38)
Working in a shop/work shop/etc. 0.10 1.86 1.71 1.92 0.14
(0.50) (2.35) (2.14) (2.19) (0.83)
Working at home 0.51 1.26 0.81 1.21 0.57
(1.33) (2.12) (1.76) (2.26) (1.59)
Running errands 0.10 0.20 0.05 0.32 0.03
(0.41) (0.66) (0.28) (1.38) (0.17)
Doing nothing 0.20 0.06 0.16 0.18 0 00
(1.07) (0.38) (0.61) (0.80) (0 00)
Other activity 0.23 0.20 0.10 0.11 0 00
(1.12) (0.95) (0.56) (0.46) (0 00)
Caring for a child 5.20 4.94 4.88 3.66 4.28
(2.54) (2.86) (2.89) (3.09) (2.81)
Caring for a child while working 1.61 2.06 1.62 1.53 1.01
(1.85) (2.14) (2.11) (1.86) (1.95)
Afternoon/evening
Attending school 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.21
(0.00) (0.00) (0.19) (0.00) (0.71)
Doing school homework 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Working as an apprentice 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.57
(0.48) (0.00) (0.00) (0.46) (1.12)
Doing household work 1.26 1.30 1.29 0.55 1.54
(1.73) (2.26) (2.18) (1.30) (2.41)
Working on a field 0.81 0.14 0.03 0.00 0.18
(1.36) (0.64) (0.19) (0.00) (0.50)
Working in a shop/work shop/etc. 0.06 1.16 1.29 1.18 0.28
(0.30) (1.84) (2.12) (1.33) (1.26)
Working at home 0.50 1.22 0.93 0.97 0.28
(1.20) (2.19) (1.82) (1.98) (0.91)
Running errands 0.16 0.25 0.07 0.18 0.04
(0.54) (0.87) (0.26) (0.69) (0.18)
Doing nothing 0.21 0.09 0.14 0.34 0.31
(1.07) (0.43) (0.58) (1.03) (1.09)
Other activity 0.26 0.09 0.05 0.18 0.00
(1.05) (0.60) (0.28) (0.61) (0.00)
Caring for a child 5.06 5.52 5.05 4.32 4.78
(2.65) (2.44) (2.62) (3.10) (2.66)
Caring for a child while working 0.95 1.83 1.47 1.29 0.76
(1.41) (2.09) ( 2) (1.75) (1.50)
Observations 48 44 29 19 36
Sample: Calculations are based on sample E (see table 4.9 in the appendix for details). The means desplayed
in each column refer to a subsample defined by the occupation indicated in the column head. 18 observations
from sample E are not taken into account because they are grouped into occupational categories of 5
observations and less (standard deviations in parentheses).
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Tab. 4.13: Means and standard deviation of variables used throughout the analysis for
different subsamples
Sample
E F I J F’ H
All children younger than six enrolled 0.20 0.23 0.32 0.16 0.22 0.14
Hours of care 9.87 9.74 9.61 9.86 10.05 10.23
(5.28) (5.64) (6.13) (5.28) (5.44) (4.98)
Hours of work 5.13 5.40 5.48 5.34 5.52 4.75
(3.92) (3.53) (3.56) (3.57) (3.64) (3.71)
Hours of overlap between care and work 5.38 5.03 5.34 4.76 5.27 5.60
(4.21) (4.08) (4.23) (4.01) (4.10) (4.23)
Number of 0- to 1-year-old children 0.33 0.40 0.45 0.36 0.39 0.33
(0.47) (0.50) (0.51) (0.49) (0.49) (0.47)
Number of 2- to 5-year-old children 1.17 1.15 1.09 1.20 1.15 1.14
(0.45) (0.55) (0.29) (0.71) (0.57) (0.37)
Age 30.33 30.47 29.68 31.16 31.15 30.1
(7.34) (6.96) (5.63) (7.99) (7.11) (7.18)
Is wife of household head 0.75 0.79 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.72
Number of children ever gave birth to 3.81 4.04 3.95 4.12 4.22 3.84
(2.16) (2.36) (2.34) (2.42) (2.42) (2.20)
Ever went to school 0.82 0.81 0.86 0.76 0.78 0.84
Protestant 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.20 0.12
Muslim 0.21 0.28 0.23 0.32 0.30 0.19
Number of adults in household 3.65 3.21 3.68 2.80 3.17 3.94
(2.52) (1.83) (2.03) (1.55) (1.80) (2.87)
Number of adult cohabitants working on farm 0.65 0.66 0.82 0.52 0.61 0.66
(0.74) (0.73) (0.80) (0.65) (0.70) (0.78)
Number of adult coh. working in sales shop 0.24 0.19 0.27 0.12 0.20 0.27
(0.55) (0.54) (0.70) (0.33) (0.56) (0.55)
Number of adult coh. without occupation 0.26 0.19 0.27 0.12 0.20 0.32
(0.66) (0.45) (0.55) (0.33) (0.46) (0.76)
Total of adult cohabitants’ salaries (Thousand) 12.22 10.36 9.02 11.53 11.26 13.88
(23.73) (18.91) (13.65) (22.79) (20.40) (27.09)
Total value of adult cohabitants’ farm output (Th.) 344.41 337.00 404.55 277.56 330.02 344.72
(819.10) (648.55) (645.82) (658.31) (654.38) (805.90)
Number of rooms of dwelling 3.21 3.36 3.95 2.84 3.34 3.26
(2.48) (2.64) (3.36) (1.70) (2.76) (2.59)
Dwelling is owned by a household member 0.51 0.43 0.45 0.40 0.44 0.53
Av. cogn. test score of children (3-5) in household -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15)
Average cognitive test score of adults in household 6.11 6.33 6.96 5.70 6.40 6.14
(2.33) (2.35) (2.24) (2.34) (2.37) (2.35)
Number of observations 197 47 22 25 40 120
Sample: the samples used to compute the means vary by column, and column heads indicate the respective sample
used. For definitions of these samples see table 4.9. Sample F’ includes all observations from sample F for which
dependent variables from 2008 are not missing (i.e. the sample used for the estimations for which table 4.7 displays
the results). For the two rows of means for cognitive test scores, sample sizes are smaller, because there are some
missing values for test scores, particularly for young children. The respective sample sizes for child test score are
(in the order of the table’s columns): 121, 24, 13, 11, 22, and 76. For adult test scores, sample sizes are: 162, 40,
20, 20, 33, and 98 (standard deviations in parentheses).
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Tab. 4.14: Opinions regarding ability to work/child development conditional on different
child care arrangements. Relative frequencies of responses to survey questions.
Age of child when
mother can start
working if child is
cared for by mother
Age of child when
mother can start
working if child is
cared for someone else
Age of child when no
longer harmful if it is
cared for by someone
else
Response:
Child must be...
1 year old 23.91 14.67 20.11
2 years old 17.93 10.87 20.65
3 years old 14.67 33.70 23.37
4 years old 14.13 19.57 13.04
5 years old 17.39 14.13 14.67
6 years old 6.52 3.80 3.80
at least 7 years old 5.43 3.26 4.35
Sample: Calculations are based on all observations in sample E (see table 4.9 in the appendix for details)
for which responses to all three survey questions considered here are non-missing (N=184).
Tab. 4.15: Impact of having a child accepted for first grade of preschool on time use of
mothers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Hours of care -0.25 -0.86 -0.91 -0.91 -0.92 -0.62 -1.25
(1.67) (1.39) (1.52) (1.48) (1.57) (1.39) (1.52)
Hours of work 0.14 0.18 0.06 0.12 -0.20 0.07 -0.09
(1.04) (1.06) (1.15) (1.15) (1.23) (1.17) (1.18)
Hours of overlap 0.58 0.17 0.18 0.10 0.16 0.28 0.10
(1.20) (1.03) (1.12) (1.12) (1.21) (1.14) (1.16)
Sample: Observations from Sample F (see table 4.9 in the appendix for details; N=47). Specifications: Model 1
gives the raw effect without additional controls. Model 2 adds the number of children younger than two. Models
3 through 7 all add at least the following control variables: a mother’s number of children in three different age
groups (0 through 1 year, 2 through 5 years, and 6 through 12 years), the number of adults per household, age of the
mother, dummy variables for the three most common religious denominations, and the number of adult cohabitants
who work in agriculture. In addition, models 4 through 7 include further groups of control variables in a non-nested
manner (i.e. the additional controls from model 4 are not included in either of models 5 through 7, etc.). Model
4 adds an indicator for whether the mother is the household head’s wife, the total number of children she has ever
given birth to, and whether she ever went to school. Model 5 adds the number of adult cohabitants who own shops,
the number of adult cohabitants who work as drivers, and the number of cohabiting adults who have no occupation.
Model 6 adds the number of rooms per household and a dummy variable indicating whether the household’s dwelling
is owned by a household member. Model 7 adds the total of salaries of cohabiting adults and the total of agricultural
output produced by cohabiting adults Standard errors given in parentheses..
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Tab. 4.16: Impact of having a child accepted for second grade of preschool on time use
of mothers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full enrollment -0.21 -0.29∗ -0.02 -0.02 0.16 -0.08 -0.03
(0.19) (0.17) (0.21) (0.21) (0.28) (0.20) (0.22)
Hours of care 4.22∗∗ 5.05∗∗ 4.38∗ 4.22∗ 1.89 4.92∗ 4.25
(2.13) (2.04) (2.56) (2.39) (3.46) (2.60) (2.78)
Hours of work -0.08 -0.27 -1.48 -1.20 2.95 -1.98 -1.30
(1.96) (2.02) (2.73) (2.87) (3.41) (2.83) (2.94)
Hours of overlap 3.25∗∗ 3.50∗∗ 4.80∗∗ 4.56∗∗ 3.80 5.14∗∗ 4.77∗∗
(1.58) (1.61) (2.05) (1.87) (2.77) (2.10) (2.19)
Sample: Observations from Sample G (see table 4.9 in the appendix for details; N=31). Specifications: see
explanations for table 4.15. Standard errors given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Tab. 4.17: Instrumental variable estimates using admission to first grade of preschool
as an instrument, women observed in both 2008 and 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
First stage effect of instrument 0.30∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
First stage F-statistic 5.48 7.16 8.57 8.11 6.20 7.78 7.80
IV-estimate: hours of care -3.59 -3.95 -3.86 -2.00 -3.19 -2.50 -3.94
(5.17) (4.53) (4.61) (4.24) (5.13) (4.68) (4.51)
IV-estimate: hours of work -0.13 -0.08 -1.79 -1.30 -2.65 -1.79 -1.87
(3.84) (3.71) (3.88) (3.63) (4.43) (4.15) (3.91)
IV-estimate: hours of overlap 0.44 0.80 0.52 1.43 0.51 0.84 0.25
(3.69) (4.44) (3.73) (3.58) (4.21) (4.00) (3.75)
Sample: Observations from Sample F (see table 4.9 in the appendix for details) for women who appear in both the
2008 and the 2011 household data and for whom data is not missing (N=40; the same sample has been used for
the computation of means displayed in the upper panel of table 4.5). Specifications: see explanations for table 4.15.
Standard errors given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Tab. 4.18: Households for which the preschool is the closest institution for young chil-
dren vs. other housholds: difference in differences
Dependent variable: all young children enrolled
No controls Controls
Preschool is closest · second wave 0.21 0.15
(0.18) (0.17)
Preschool is closest -0.09 0.06
(0.13) (0.12)
Second wave -0.04 0.09
(0.06) (0.07)
Sample: all observations on women in sample N (see table 4.9 in the appendix for details) who are also observed
in 2008, and for whom all other variables used for the analysis for both years are not missing. The final sample
includes 81 women, i.e. 162 observations. Standard errors given in parentheses.
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Tab. 4.19: Reasons indicated for not sending young children to preschool
Don’t know 5
Preferred to send child to primary school 12
Preferred to have child at home 0
Preschool too far away 17
Quality of preschool is uncertain 1
Preschool is too expensive 0
Child is still too young 9
Neighboring child was not admitted 1
Child was not admitted 5
Other reason 18
Number of children 65
Sample: households with children who were admitted to preschool but who were not enrolled
in preschool. Multiple responses were allowed
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Tab. 4.20: Opinions and the likelihood of signing up a child for preschool
1st grade,
3-year-olds
2nd grade,
4-year-olds
N (1) (2) N (1) (2)
Child care arrangements, mother’s work, and child development
Age of child when mother can start working if child is cared
for by mother
39 -0.11∗∗ -0.08 33 0.07 0.09
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Age of child when mother can start working if ch. is cared
for someone else
39 -0.11∗∗ -0.07 32 0.02 0.04
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Age of child when no longer harmful if it is cared for by
someone else
39 -0.04 -0.03 33 -0.05 -0.03
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Young children are harmed when cared for by someone else
39 -0.05 0.01 33 0.06 -0.01
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10)
Could easily find care for young child
39 0.01 0.02 33 -0.02 -0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09)
Whether women/mothers should work
Want to spend as much time with young child as possible
39 0.06 0.00 33 0.08 0.03
(0.08) (0.11) (0.07) (0.09)
Women should not work outside household
39 0.08 0.05 33 0.01 0.05
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11)
Mothers of young children should not work outside household
39 0.08 0.04 33 0.04 0.06
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09)
Importance of education
Our children must attend school
39 -0.29 -0.39 33 0.11 -0.15
(0.27) (0.32) (0.37) (0.50)
Sometimes family needs are more important than education
for children
39 -0.01 0.04 33 0.11∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
Children should attend preschool
39 -0.27∗ -0.34∗ 33 0.14 0.22
(0.16) (0.18) (0.15) (0.22)
Labor force attachment
Need to fulfill my needs by means of work
39 -0.33∗ -0.35∗ 33 0.30∗ 0.31
(0.17) (0.20) (0.18) (0.23)
Like working
39 -0.16 -0.14 33 -0.07 -0.10
(0.16) (0.21) (0.23) (0.30)
Would want to work more if I had the chance
39 -0.34∗∗ -0.38∗∗ 33 -0.07 -0.66
(0.16) (0.18) (0.31) (0.62)
Knowledge of NGO/preschool project
Have heard of NGO
40 0.19 0.22 33 -0.48∗∗ -0.68∗
(0.18) (0.25) (0.23) (0.35)
Number of NGO’s projects known
40 0.06 0.12 33 -0.08 -0.10
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08)
Gave correct preschool fee
37 0.57∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 30 0.33∗ 0.35
(0.14) (0.16) (0.17) (0.22)
Trust
Can generally confide in people
39 -0.02 0.03 32 0.14 0.31
(0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.28)
People take advantage of me
39 0.02 -0.02 32 -0.01 0.26∗∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11)
Children can marry anyone
39 0.02 0.05 32 -0.10 0.14
(0.17) (0.23) (0.18) (0.24)
Children should not marry Christian
39 -0.21 0.02 32 -0.05 -0.40
(0.23) (0.38) (0.30) (0.49)
Children should not marry someone of different relig.
denomination
39 0.10 0.01 32 -0.05 -0.18
(0.25) (0.30) (0.30) (0.48)
Children should not marry Muslim
39 -0.02 -0.15 32 0.07 -0.10
(0.23) (0.26) (0.21) (0.29)
Sample: two subgroups out of sample M (see table 4.9) which are not mutually exclusive - women with at least one 3-year-old child for the left half
of the table, and women with at least one 4-year-old child for the right half. Since woman would often have a missing value for one response and
non-missing values for all others, I chose not to construct one sample consistently used for all computations. Instead, the sample used for each row
depends on the sample of women for whom one particular opinion measure is not missing; resulting sample sizes are indicated. Columns labeled with
(1) display coefficient estimates from regressing an indicator for whether a woman signed up a child for admission to preschool on the respective opinion
measure and a constant. For the results in columns labeled with (2), the following control variables have been added: a mother’s number of children
in three different age groups (0-1 year, 2-5 years, and 6-12 years), a dummy variable for whether she is muslim, the numbers of adult cohabitants who
work in agriculture, own shops, and have no occupation, the number of rooms per household, a dummy variable indicating whether the household’s
dwelling is owned by a household member, an indicator for whether the mother is the household head’s wife, whether she ever went to school, the total
of salaries of cohabiting adults and the total of agricultural output produced by cohabiting adults. Standard errors given in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Tab. 4.21: Correlation between opinions and time use of mothers of 2 to 5-year-olds:
are opinions relevant to outcomes?
Hours of
care
Working
hours
N (1) (2) (1) (2)
Child care arrangements, mother’s work, and child development
Age of child when mother can start working if child is cared for
by mother
191 -0.47∗∗ -0.49∗∗ -0.28∗ -0.29∗
(0.21) (0.21) (0.15) (0.16)
Age of child when mother can start working if ch. is cared for
someone else
190 -0.04 0.01 0.20 0.12
(0.26) (0.26) (0.19) (0.20)
Age of child when no longer harmful if it is cared for by someone
else
185 0.13 0.23 -0.12 -0.18
(0.23) (0.24) (0.18) (0.19)
Young children are harmed when cared for by someone else
191 0.05 0.17 0.06 0.03
(0.31) (0.32) (0.23) (0.25)
Could easily find care for young child
191 -0.01 0.02 -0.32 -0.30
(0.27) (0.28) (0.20) (0.22)
Whether women/mothers should work
Want to spend as much time with young child as possible
191 -0.66∗∗ -0.61∗ 0.33 0.34
(0.32) (0.33) (0.24) (0.25)
Women should not work outside household
191 0.03 0.16 0.23 0.24
(0.29) (0.30) (0.22) (0.23)
Mothers of young children should not work outside household
191 -0.29 -0.31 -0.15 -0.15
(0.30) (0.30) (0.22) (0.23)
Importance of education
Our children must attend school
190 0.61 0.72 -0.50 -0.71
(1.30) (1.30) (0.96) (1.00)
Sometimes family needs are more important than education for
children
191 -0.58∗ -0.61∗ -0.01 -0.01
(0.32) (0.32) (0.24) (0.25)
Children should attend preschool
191 1.05∗ 1.07∗ -0.66 -0.65
(0.57) (0.57) (0.42) (0.44)
Labor force attachment
Need to fulfill my needs by means of work
191 -0.95 -1.16∗ -0.63 -0.68
(0.61) (0.61) (0.45) (0.47)
Like working
191 -0.61 -0.51 -0.13 -0.21
(0.72) (0.73) (0.53) (0.56)
Would want to work more if I had the chance
191 -0.76 -0.97 -0.60 -0.54
(0.56) (0.62) (0.42) (0.48)
Knowledge of NGO/preschool project
Have heard of NGO
191 -1.95∗∗ -1.79∗∗ 1.69∗∗∗ 1.82∗∗∗
(0.83) (0.90) (0.61) (0.69)
Number of NGO’s projects known
191 -0.27 -0.14 0.53∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗
(0.28) (0.30) (0.21) (0.23)
Gave correct preschool fee
175 -1.85∗∗ -1.71∗∗ -0.04 -0.26
(0.83) (0.85) (0.62) (0.66)
Trust
Can generally confide in people
186 2.29∗∗∗ 2.28∗∗∗ -0.04 -0.08
(0.83) (0.84) (0.63) (0.66)
People take advantage of me
182 0.48 0.33 -0.14 -0.12
(0.29) (0.31) (0.22) (0.24)
Children can marry anyone
184 -0.50 -0.49 -0.16 -0.21
(0.80) (0.85) (0.59) (0.65)
Children should not marry Christian
184 1.04 0.40 -0.21 -0.35
(1.23) (1.53) (0.91) (1.17)
Children should not marry someone of different relig.
denomination
184 1.11 0.86 0.13 0.20
(1.28) (1.34) (0.95) (1.03)
Children should not marry Muslim
184 -0.81 -0.67 0.63 0.84
(0.95) (0.99) (0.70) (0.76)
Sample: observations include women in sample E (see table 4.9 in the appendix for details). For further explanations
regarding sample choice and specifications, see the explenations given in table 4.20. Standard errors given in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Tab. 4.22: Correlation between opinions and likelihood of full enrollment for mothers
of 2 to 5-year-olds
N (1) (2)
Child care arrangements, mother’s work, and child development
Age of child when mother can start working if child is cared for
by mother
191 -0.02 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Age of child when mother can start working if ch. is cared for
someone else
190 0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.02)
Age of child when no longer harmful if it is cared for by someone
else
185 -0.02 -0.04∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Young children are harmed when cared for by someone else
191 0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Could easily find care for young child
191 0.00 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Whether women/mothers should work
Want to spend as much time with young child as possible
191 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Women should not work outside household
191 0.04∗ 0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
Mothers of young children should not work outside household
191 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Importance of education
Our children must attend school
190 -0.07 -0.07
(0.10) (0.09)
Sometimes family needs are more important than education for
children
191 0.06∗∗ 0.05∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Children should attend preschool
191 -0.04 -0.04
(0.04) (0.04)
Labor force attachment
Need to fulfill my needs by means of work
191 -0.04 -0.03
(0.05) (0.04)
Like working
191 0.00 -0.02
(0.05) (0.05)
Would want to work more if I had the chance
191 -0.05 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
Knowledge of NGO/preschool project
Have heard of NGO
191 0.11∗ 0.08
(0.06) (0.07)
Number of NGO’s projects known
191 0.06∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Gave correct preschool fee
175 0.27∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06)
Trust
Can generally confide in people
186 -0.02 -0.01
(0.07) (0.06)
People take advantage of me
182 0.01 0.03
(0.02) (0.02)
Children can marry anyone
184 0.07 0.07
(0.06) (0.06)
Children should not marry Christian
184 -0.18∗ -0.09
(0.09) (0.11)
Children should not marry someone of different relig.
denomination
184 -0.05 0.03
(0.10) (0.10)
Children should not marry Muslim
184 0.06 0.01
(0.07) (0.07)
Sample: observations include women in sample E (see table 4.9 in the appendix for details). For further explanations
regarding sample choice and specifications, see the explenations given in table 4.20. Standard errors given in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Chapter 5
Grade retention and peer effects1
5.1 Introduction
This paper investigates how grade repetition2 causes spillovers, or peer effects, in edu-
cational production. Economists have long been interested in peer effects in the context
of education, because of their potentially important implications for policy; regarding,
for instance, the potential efficiency gains from reallocating students by reorganizing
classroom composition. The bulk of evidence on peer effects in education has been ob-
tained by studying data from industrialized countries. The present study, instead, uses
administrative student data from four primary schools in one Togolese community. It
focuses on grade retention status as the relevant peer characteristic, which has, with the
exception of Lavy et al. (2008), not yet been studied in the context of peer effects. Iden-
tification relies on variation in the share of repeating classmates within schools while
using a value added approach, i.e. controlling for earlier test scores. I argue that, given
the primarily merit-based retention policy in the studied schools, the estimated models
appropriately account for selection into classes. The identifying variation in the share
of repeaters per class comes from, essentially, comparing different cohorts of students
within schools. Togolese primary schools provide a good setting for investigating the
issue, because class repetitions are very common, and, in addition, the Togolese school
system can be considered as a typical example of education systems in Francophone
1Part of this research was supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) within the project
’Ein Paneldatensatz zur Analyse von Humankapitalinvestitionen im fru¨hen Alter in la¨ndlichen Regionen
von Entwicklungsla¨ndern’, and by the Leibniz Universita¨t Hannover (”Forschungsfond”).
2The terms grade repetition and retention are used interchangeably throughout this chapter.
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sub-Saharan Africa, which are all strongly and homogenously influenced by the French
colonial administration (Fro¨lich and Michaelowa (2005)).
In many countries (such as the US, see Jacob and Lefgren (2004) and Eide and
Showalter (2001)), requiring students to repeat a grade if they fail to meet specific
achievement standards, is a widespread policy. Grade repetition has been seen as
a means to help low achieving students improve their learning by giving them more
time to acquire the skills associated with their current grade. In addition, extremely
high repetition rates in many developing countries have long been recognized as poten-
tially indicating a waste of resources, since letting a student repeat a grade requires
roughly the same resources as enrolling an additional child for one year (Gomes-Neto
and Hanushek (1994), Mahjoub (2008), Manacorda (2008), Glick and Sahn (2010)).
Regarding the prevalence of grade repetition, the studied community is not an excep-
tion. The average share of repeaters per class in the data used for the analysis equals
22.7 percent, a figure that is very similar to those found for other developing countries,
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.
Regarding the evaluation of the impact grade retention policies, studies have focused
on assessing whether repeating a class enhances learning for affected students, yielding
mixed results. Gomes-Neto and Hanushek (1994) found that having repeated a grade
is associated with enhanced learning for Brazilian primary school students. However,
Jacob and Lefgren (2004) summarize results from correlational studies to indicate that
repeaters are negatively affected through decreased self-esteem, lower achievement and
higher dropout rates. These studies may not take into account that repeaters are a
selective sample who tend to be low achieving students before repetition.
For a few quasi-experimental studies, which do attempt to account for the fact that
repeaters tend to be low-achievers, the direction of the effect of grade repetition on
achievement of affected students depends on whether these studies use data from rich
or from poor countries. As regards industrialized countries, Jacob and Lefgren (2004)
evaluate grade repetitions in Chicago Public Schools by exploiting the fact that the
retention decision is an (almost) discontinuous function of prior test scores in order to
implement a regression discontinuity design. Mahjoub (2008) employs an instrumental
variable strategy. He uses quarter of birth as an instrument, arguing that relatively
old students are promoted more often. For French high school students, he finds a
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positive effect of repetition. Likewise, Eide and Showalter (2001) argue that students
who are relatively young compared to their classmates repeat more often, and their
instrumental variable is given by a child’s school entry age relative to the statutorily
determined kindergarten entry date which varies across US states. They find negative
but statistically insignificant effects of grade repetition on the likelihood of dropping
out of high school, and positive but statistically insignificant effects on later earnings.
For developing countries, comparable studies tend to find opposing results. Man-
acorda (2008) exploits a discontinuity in retention probability induced by a minimum
attendance requirement in Uruguayan junior high schools to implement a regression
discontinuity design. He finds a negative effect of grade retention on educational at-
tainment, i.e. students complete fewer grades if they have repeated a grade. Glick
and Sahn (2010) obtained a similar result for students in Senegal. Exploiting variation
across schools in test score thresholds for promotion they find that repeating second
grade reduces the likelihood of completing primary school.
Thus, while there exists some (albeit inconclusive) evidence regarding the impact
of grade repetition on repeaters, Jacob and Lefgren (2004) explicitly point out that
a full evaluation of the costs and benefits of grade retention would require to take
into account spillover effects, which is the focus of this study. Regarding the direction
of peer effects caused by grade retention, it may depend on whether grade repetition
actually enhances learning of repeaters or not - more knowledgable peers may positively
affect classmates, and less knowledgable may negatively affect classmates. Thus, the
fact that studies from developing countries mentioned above tend not to find beneficial
effects of grade repetition on repeating individuals leads to suspect negative peer effects
as well. Moreover, even if learning effects for affected students were not negative, it
has been argued that grade repetition may have psychological effects such as lower self
esteem (Gomes-Neto and Hanushek (1994)) which could worsen classroom behavior and
thereby negatively affect educational achievement of classmates.
In order to avoid simultaneity bias arising from including contemporaneous outcomes
in the empirical model, studies of peer effects usually focus on peer group characteris-
tics that have been determined before the formation of peer groups as the explanatory
variable of interest. The respective coefficient is then interpreted as a reduced form peer
effect associated with the group characteristic, which is a mixture of both a direct effect
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of the characteristic on peers, and an indirect effect working through changes in behavior
during the current period of observation caused by the respective characteristic.3 Ac-
cordingly, studies of peer effects focus on a great variety of group characteristics which
all have in common that, chronologically, they have been determined before the forma-
tion of peer groups. Lavy and Schlosser (2011) investigate the impact of peer group
gender composition; Hoxby (2000) also looks at gender composition, and at racial com-
position of student cohorts. Sacerdote (2001) and Carrell et al. (2009) use SAT scores
as a measure for background characteristics of peers in college.4 The present study
also follows this reduced form approach by focusing on the retention status of peers, a
variable that is determined during the previous school year.
Even if a study of peer effects does not attempt to measure peer effects of con-
temporaneous group behavior, the identification of peer effects is still complicated due
to usually non-random peer group formation. The strongest concerns regarding endo-
geneity due to selection into peer groups concern school choice.5 Accordingly, a large
part of the literature chooses to control for school fixed effects, arguing that, given the
respective institutional background, variation in the peer measure within schools can
be considered exogenous6. Lavy and Schlosser (2011), for instance, compare cohorts
within schools. Ammermueller and Pischke (2009) rely an variation in class composi-
3See Lyle (2007) for one of the few recent attempts to separate between contemporaneous (or ”en-
dogenous”) peer effects and ”exogenous” peer effects (i.e. the spillovers caused by preexisting behavior
and attributes of peers net of contemporaneous changes in behavior) within a randomized research
design.
4Other examples include Ding and Lehrer (2007) who use exam results prior to assignment to
schools as the relevant peer characteristic. Ammermueller and Pischke (2009) use the number of books
in student’s household as a proxy for peer quality. Neidell and Waldfogel (2010) look at the spillovers
during Kindergarten resulting from additional peers having attended preschool prior to Kindergarten.
Angrist and Lang (2004) evaluate peer effects by exploiting variation in the racial composition of classes
induced by Boston’s Metco Program.
5This is what would be called correlated effects in Manski’s terms (Manski (1993) as cited in most
of the studies discussed in this section).
6Other papers have addressed the issue of selection into peer groups by exploiting scenarios in which
individuals are randomly assigned to their peer groups. Carrell et al. (2009) consider random assign-
ment of US Air Force Academy students to squadrons. Sacerdote (2001) exploits random assignment
of Freshmen at Dartmouth college to roommates and dorms. These studies tend to find positive effects
of high peer quality. Effect sizes in Carrell et al. (2009) are larger than in Sacerdote (2001), which the
authors attribute to the fact that their peer variable is measured at the level of a larger group than in
other studies (which focus on roommates, for instance). Studying randomly formed groups within the
US Military Academy, Lyle (2007) finds significant peer effects on subsequent decisions such as choice
of academic major, but not for academic performance. A few studies rely on a large set of control
variables that are argued to sufficiently capture student, teacher, and school characteristics in order to
adequately take into account the process of selection into schools and classes (Ding and Lehrer (2007),
Fro¨lich and Michaelowa (2005))
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tion within European primary schools, comparing classrooms of the same grade for the
same cohort of students; in their study, the introduction of school fixed effects reduces
the size of estimated peer effects. Other studies that rely on including school fixed
effects for identification of peer effects include Hoxby (2000), Neidell and Waldfogel
(2010), and Lavy et al. (2008). In my study, variation in class level variables within
schools can only result from variation across cohorts, either by comparing students in
the same grade between different cohorts, or by comparing different cohorts (grades)
observed in the same calendar year.
The estimates presented in this chapter consistently show that test scores are sig-
nificantly negatively affected by increases in the share of repeaters. A one standard
deviation increase in the share of repeaters per class is estimated to reduce individ-
ual test scores by about 13 percent of a standard deviation. Estimates are robust to
changes in model specification associated with different sources of variation in the share
of repeaters. The effect is heterogenous across subjects taught, and it is particularly
pronounced for mental arithmetic and math word problems. I also show that the esti-
mates can be interpreted as showing the impact of actual changes in class composition
rather than changes in class size.
The study proceeds as follows: Section 5.2 discusses institutional background, po-
tential determinants of the likelihood of grade retention, and arguments regarding the
direction of a potential peer effect associated with grade repetition. Section 5.3 de-
scribes the empirical strategy and the models estimated as well as the dataset used for
the analysis. Section 5.4 presents results, and robustness checks and analysis regarding
heterogenous effects across subjects are discussed in section 5.5. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Background
The direction of peer effects caused by grade repetition can be expected to depend on
how repeaters respond to the fact that they are retained, as well as on predetermined
characteristics of repeaters, who are, presumably, low achievers Lavy et al. (2008).
Potential mechanisms may include both cognitive and behavioral aspects. As far as
learning is actually enhanced through grade repetition for affected students, spillover
effects may also be positive. More knowledgable peers are assumed to be beneficial for a
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student’s learning because his motivation increases, he has to compete with betters stu-
dents, or because his peers share knowledge with him.7 However, in turn, if the causal
effect of repetition on repeating students actually is negative, resulting externalities
may also consist of lower achievement of other students in the same class. Manacorda
(2008) claims that repeaters may do worse in school because they are faced with lower
expectations, they have lower expectations themselves, or because they need to adjust
to a new class. In addition to learning effects, repetition might also have negative con-
sequences for classroom behavior of repeaters. For instance, it has been argued that
grade repetition may lower self-esteem of repeating students (e.g. Gomes-Neto and
Hanushek (1994), Manacorda (2008)). If, as Lazear (2001) argues, worse behaving stu-
dents require teachers to shift teaching time to disrupting students, such deteriorating
behavior of repeaters would impose negative effects on learning of classmates.
Recent research focusing on the importance of non-cognitive skills also supports
the notion that classroom behavior may constitute a mechanism through which grade
repetitions impose negative peer effects. Aizer (2008) for instance, investigating the
example of ADD, finds that programs which alter student behavior can reduce negative
peer effects. Segal (2008) has found that institutional settings such as school rules may,
to some extent, affect classroom behavior such as tardiness, inattentiveness, disruptive-
ness, homework completion, and absenteism (although he concludes that such behavior
is not as malleable has might be desired). Accordingly, classes with many repeaters
may constitute an environment where teachers find it harder to impose school rules,
resulting in worse non-cognitive skills of students which, in turn, may lower achieve-
ment. The psychological literature has also been concerned with peer effects operating
through classroom behavior. For example, studying language achievement of preschool
children, Mashburn et al. (2009) stress that the quality of social interactions within the
classroom are important determinants of students’ success. They find that language
achievement improves if teachers succeed in managing social interactions. In an envi-
ronment with many repeaters, teachers may have a harder time in managing fruitful
interactions between students within the classroom.
7A more general positive impact of grade repetition policies can be that merit based retention
decision rules can provide an incentive for students to study harder in order not to have to repeat a
grade (Manacorda (2008)). Testing this hypothesis is not a focus of this study.
141
5.2. BACKGROUND
According to these considerations, the sign of a potential peer effect of grade rep-
etitions is a priori unclear. However, given that studies mentioned in the introduction
have found that in developing countries, repeaters tend to do worse in school in re-
sponse to repetition, and in light of the arguments made regarding negative behavioral
consequences of grade repetition, any peer effect observed for students in the studied
Togolese community would be expected to be negative. The objective of this study is
to test this expectation empirically.
When estimating peer effects of grade retention, the reasons leading to grade reten-
tions (and thereby causing variation in the share of repeaters per class) need to be well
understood, and I now discuss them for the remainder of this section.
I study peer effects of grade repetition using data on students from all primary
schools in a community in the Southwest of Togo. Data from the same community
has been used to evaluate the preschool program in chapter 4, and a description of
the community is given in chapter 3. In the studied community, children can choose
between four different primary schools (commuting to another community to attend a
school there is not an option). Among students attending these schools, repeating a
class is extremely common. In the data8, out of the 1460 first through sixth graders
for whom exam scores are available, 22.7 percent are currently repeating a class. This
figure is comparable to those that have been found in other developing countries, and
in particular, it is very close to repetition rates in other sub-Saharan African countries.
Manacorda (2008) reports that, according to UNESCO data, the average repetition
rate in sub-saharan African primary schools is 20 percent. The sample means given by
Fro¨lich and Michaelowa (2005), who use data for fifth graders from several Francophone
Sub-Saharan African countries, imply that grades one through four exhibit an average
repetition rate of 17.5 percent. In Latin America, repetition rates have been found to be
even higher. Gomes-Neto and Hanushek (1994) cite studies which estimate repetition
rates of 30 to 55 percent for the first grade in Brazilian primary schools during the
1980s; based on data from northeast Brazil from the 1980s which the authors use for
their own analysis they calculate repetition rates of 65, 45, 37, and 32 percent for first,
second, third, and forth grade, respectively. According to the data Manacorda (2008)
uses for his own analysis, the repetition rate equals 30 percent in Uruguayan junior
8The data are further described at the end of section 5.3
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high schools. In the sample of Senegalese students used by Glick and Sahn (2010), 76
percent of students report having repeated at least one grade during primary school.
Given that, as discussed above, grade repetition is unlikely to be beneficial for
affected students in the studied community, it may be somewhat surprising that schools
adhere to this policy. One explanation for the high incidence of grade repetitions in
the Togolese community may be that primary schools often accept children who are
actually too young to attend primary school.9 This leads to an unusual heterogenity
among first graders with respect to their age. According to the survey data introduced
in chapter 3, in 2011, out of all first graders in the community who had just started
attending school in fall 2010, 4 percent were two years old, 11 percent were three years
old, 16 percent four years old, 36 percent five years old, 18 percent six years old, and
15 percent were seven years old or older. A likely consequence of this phenomenon is
that in first grade classes children are very heterogenous with respect to their school
readiness. Given the sparse resources at hand, teachers may deem themselves incapable
of preparing the least ready children for promotion to the next grade. Consequently,
schools might prefer to simply wait until these children grow old enough, before they
start promoting them. However, according to table 5.6 in the appendix, the first grade
classes in the sample are not the ones exhibiting the highest share of repeaters, which
demonstrates that there must also be other reasons for the high incidence of grade
repetition than heterogeneity in school readiness among first graders.
While the average share of repeaters in the sample is very significant it also varies
strongly between classes. As figure 5.1 in the appendix shows, observed values for that
fraction range from 0 to 46 percent. Most of this variation in the share of repeaters
per class is within the four schools. The total variance is 129.4, and the within schools
and between schools components are 110.7 and 18.7, respectively.10 Given that the four
9This phenomenon has been discussed in more detail in chapter 4
10This calculation is based on the following formula, also used by Ammermueller and Pischke (2009):
1/C
S∑
s=1
CS∑
c=1
(xCS − x¯)2 = 1/C
S∑
s=1
CS∑
c=1
(xCS − x¯S)2 + 1/C
S∑
s=1
CS(x¯S − x¯)2 (5.1)
where the left hand side is equal to the total variance in the share of repeaters per class (xCS), and
the right hand side shows the within and between schools components. C is equal to the number of
classes in the sample, CS is the number of classes in school S. x¯S is the average share of repeaters per
class in school S, and x¯ equals the average share of repeaters per class in the sample.
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schools are located in the same community it appears plausible that their retention
policies do not differ much.
Even though the variation in the share or repeaters per class between schools is
relatively small, regressions will control for school choice by including school dummy
variables. Since school choice might be influenced by factors that are also correlated
with a school’s average grade retention probability, not accounting for it may bias
results.
The central assumption of the empirical analysis will be that, conditional on school
choice, first trimester scores, and individual retention status, the average retention
status of class mates can be seen as a predetermined variable from the point of view
of the individual student. In order to assess the plausibility of that assumption, it
is necessary to discuss all potential determinants of the share of repeaters per class.
Within schools, the class a child is taught in when it is first enrolled is not subject
to the student’s or parents’ choice, because each school only comprises one class per
grade.11 The retention status of classmates depends on the exam results of students who
attended the same grade during the previous calendar year and on how the retention
decision rule is enforced.
Formally, a student needs to reach a target regarding his total score during the last
trimester of a school year in order to be admitted to the following grade. Accordingly,
conditional on the number of non-repeating classmates, the share of repeaters in the
current class depends on the achievement of students who attended the same grade
during the previous calendar year. Thus, the share of repeaters increases if last year’s
students obtained low scores because they learned less. In an education production
framework, the current share of repeaters would thus be seen as determined by last
year’s education production inputs, i.e. student level factors and teacher quality.12
Strong ties between the likelihood of grade repetition and exam results in the previ-
ous school year are consistent with the explanations given by other studies for the high
11The situation would be more complex if students switched schools frequently. The following discus-
sion would then have to elaborate on how to take into account individual determinants of the likelihood
of choosing a particular school at the beginning of each school year. However, out of the 1331 individual
observations used for the estimations presented in section 5.4, only 4 correspond to students who are
observed to have attended a different school during the previous school year. Accordingly, the problem
of students switching between schools is neglected for this study.
12In addition, the share of repeaters might also be high if grading standards during the previous year
have been particularly high. This issue is further discussed in section 5.3.
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incidence of grade repetition in many countries. Gomes-Neto and Hanushek (1994) refer
to potential causes of low achievement which may result in a higher probability of rep-
etition if retention decisions are primarily merit-based. For instance, low achievement
may be caused by poverty and bad health. Causes on the school level would include
low teacher quality and low quality and quantity of other resources such as textbooks.
In their study for Brazil, they find limited scope for overruling merit-based retention
decisions. For instance, family background is found to be unimportant, implying that
parents do not significantly influence the retention decision. Manacorda (2008) sum-
marizes studies from industrialized countries as indicating that family socio-economic
status, educational inputs, and early childhood interventions affect the likelihood of
grade repetition, and he refers to two studies from developing countries indicating that
cash transfers increase the likelihood of grade promotion. Glick and Sahn (2010) show
that for Senegalese primary school students test scores at the end of second grade are
the most important determinant of the likelihood of repeating that grade. Among the
household background variables only a measure for household wealth had a significant
effect when controlling for test scores. Other important determinants were classroom
supplies as well as whether the teacher was female (particularly relevant for girls).
Given that the studied schools also have a merit based retention policy, the share of
repeaters per classroom can be expected to be determined to a large extent by factors
in the educational production for the same grade in the same school during the previous
school year. However, those past inputs are not the only determinants of the share of
repeaters per class in the current year if the retention rule described above is not strictly
enforced.
Table 5.1 documents how the individual likelihood of repeating a grade varies with a
student’s third trimester exam results. The exam results are standardized such that they
indicate how many percent of the grade specific target points a student has reached13.
Thus, a score of 100 or more would indicate that a student is formally entitled to con-
tinue with the subsequent grade. The figures indicate that there is a strong negative
relationship between a student’s third trimester exam results and his likelihood of re-
13The relevant thresholds have been obtained by interviewing the principals of the four schools.
They vary by grade, and they are identical for all four schools. They are equal to 30 for first grade, 35
for second grade, 50 for third and fourth grade, and 70 points for fifth and sixth grade.
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peating a class. The vast majority of repeaters have missed the grade specific target.
The likelihood of compliance rises for very low exam results. Note that the observation
of the likelihood of retention being strongly related to prior individual achievement is
consistent with the notion that repeaters constitute a sample of students who actu-
ally do need more time to master the grade’s skill level than other students. Thus,
it is possible that grade repetition may actually enhance learning of affected students
(Gomes-Neto and Hanushek (1994)). However, according to table 5.1 there is no sharp
drop in the likelihood of repeating at the threshold. Apparently, many students do not
comply with the retention rule.14
The deviations from the formal retention rule as documented in table 5.1 imply that
teachers or other school staff frequently overrule the test results. A likely explanation
is that other student characteristics can make up for low test scores. For instance,
even a low scoring student might be considered mature enough to be promoted to the
next grade. Accordingly, variation across classes in aspects of personality and cognitive
development that are not sufficiently captured by exam results will also translate into
variation in the share of repeaters per class.
Moreover, the share of repeaters per class might be affected by variation in the
likelihood of disregarding the formal retention rule. A class has many repeaters if
the enforcement of the retention rule for the same grade in the previous year was
particularly strict. Within schools, enforcement intensities might vary due to changes
in teacher assignment to classes. In addition, schools/teachers might adapt enforcement
intensities to ”shocks” like variations in cohort size, etc..
Table 5.8 in the appendix examines the determinants of the share of repeaters by
estimating linear regression models at the class level. Both the number of failures in
the same grade last year and the previous class size are associated with the share of
repeaters today (with the exception of model 5.4 for previous class size), and they
explain a significant portion of the variation in the share of repeaters (as can be seen
by comparing the R2 of the restricted model, which includes neither the number of
failures, nor previous class size, with an unrestricted model’s R2, which includes either
14Accordingly, the institutional background of the studied schools is not suitable for applying a
regression discontinuity design similar to the study by Jacob and Lefgren (2004) in order to determine
the causal effect of grade retention on repeating individuals.
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Tab. 5.1: Share of students who repeat or drop out, grouped by third trimester exam
results
Third
trimester Repeats Drops out N
results
[0, 20[ 0.62 0.29 21
[20, 30[ 0.53 0.36 36
[30, 40[ 0.75 0.19 52
[40, 50[ 0.61 0.26 80
[50, 60[ 0.54 0.33 114
[60, 70[ 0.43 0.26 157
[70, 80[ 0.21 0.31 137
[80, 90[ 0.27 0.23 142
[90, 100[ 0.12 0.25 143
[100, 110[ 0.04 0.24 197
[110, 120[ 0.05 0.22 190
[120, 130[ 0.02 0.24 155
[130, 140[ 0.05 0.27 130
[140, 150[ 0.01 0.21 91
[150, 160[ 0.03 0.15 62
[160, 170[ 0.02 0.23 48
[170, 180[ 0.06 0.29 35
>=180 0.06 0.59 34
Total 0.20 0.26 1824
Sample: all students for whom the subsequent grade and the same grade are observed in the following school year.
Note that this ”forward looking” sample differs from the one used to calculate the total share of repeaters at the
beginning of section 5.2 and for the estimations in the following sections which is ”backward looking” in the sense
that it requires the same grade to be observed during the previous school year. This precludes using observations
from the earliest school year within a grade-school combination for which classes are observed for several school
years in a row. The reverse is true for the ”forward looking” sample, however, the last school year for which classes
are observed generally is the school year 2010/2011, but that year is also excluded from the ”backward looking”
sample, because it only includes observations for the first trimester - which explains the difference in sample sizes.
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the number of failures or previous class size). Note how the number of failures translates
almost one to one into repeaters when looking at variation within groups of classes from
several years within the same grade within the same school (model 5.4). These results
show that for the student level estimates discussed in section 5.4 a very large part of
the identifying variation in the share or repeaters stems from variation in the number
of students who failed the same grade one year earlier. Particularly when focusing
on different cohorts of students within the same grade and school, achievement of the
preceding class of the same grade will be the most important determinant of variation
in the share of repeaters for a current class.
Referring to table 5.1 again, also note that dropout rates are very high15, but they
are apparently unaffected by third trimester exam results. In other words, students
do not appear to drop out of school in response to missing the grade point target.
This is an important result, because it suggests that factors driving dropout decisions
are different from those determining retention probability. If this were not the case,
empirically modeling the process of individual selection into classes would potentially
become more complicated.
5.3 Empirical strategy and data
Given the institutional background described in the previous section, I estimate regres-
sion models of individual student achievement (as measured by third trimester total
scores) which control for first trimester scores as well as the number of non-repeating
students per class and dummy variables indicating the primary school attended. Thus,
I am investigating the association between the change in individual achievement within
one school year and the share of repeaters among classmates, where the variation in the
share of repeaters only comes from within-school variation in the number of repeaters
(rather than within-school variation in the number of non-repeaters). Similar to ear-
lier studies (Neidell and Waldfogel (2010), Ammermueller and Pischke (2009), Lavy
and Schlosser (2011), Lavy et al. (2008)), I argue that the estimates from such a value
added model of achievement, conditional on school effects, identify the reduced form
15Based on the data at hand, I define dropped out students as those for whom observations cannot
be linked to an observation in the subsequent school year.
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peer effect of the share of repeaters per classroom. My main model is defined by the
following equation:
yitcs,trimester=3 = α + β1SR−i,tcs + β2NNRtcs + β3yitcs,trimester=1 + β4Ritcs
+β5S
B
tcs + β6S
C
tcs + β7S
D
tcs + γ
′Xtcs + itcs
(5.2)
where yitcs,trimester=3 indicates the third trimester exam results of student i in year
t in class c, and in school s. SR−i,tcs denotes the share of a student’s classmates
who are repeaters while controlling for the number of non-repeaters (NNRtcs ). S
k
tcs is a
dummy variable indicating whether an observation is from school k, and Ritcs denotes
the individual’s current retention status. Xtcs includes additional class level controls
which are either grade dummy variables, school year dummies, or both. Exam results
from the first trimester, yitcs,trimester=1, are also added as a control variable. Since
first trimester exam results are measured relatively shortly after peer group formation,
they can be assumed to reflect peer influences to a very limited extent. Neidell and
Waldfogel (2010) employ a similar strategy. When investigating Kindergarten students
they estimate the impact of peer characteristics on test scores in spring while controlling
for test scores from the preceding fall in the same school year. When relying on such a
value added specification, the intention is to use previous test scores as control for all
previous inputs to educational production. It requires the assumption that the effects
of all inputs in the production process relevant to the the first trimester score have
developed (i.e. decayed) until the third trimester at the same rate β3 (Hanushek et al.
(2003), Ding and Lehrer (2007)). In other words, model 5.2 assumes that the change in
test scores during the current school year is unrelated to, for instance, teacher behavior
in the previous school year as well as to all other inputs in an individual student’s
educational production during the previous year, which implies a specific form of the
education production function.
In model 5.2, identification of β1 relies on variation within the four schools. As noted
in the introduction, including school fixed effects has been a standard approach in the
literature in order to take into account selective school choice. The reasoning underlying
the concern that school choice introduces endogeneity is that school choice is correlated
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with background characteristics such as the type of neighborhood (Ammermueller and
Pischke (2009)). However, in this study, all four observed schools are located in the
same community, and differences in background of students between the schools can
be assumed to be smaller than in other studies which sample students from different
schools across a country. Still, school fixed effects are included in order to account for
any heterogeneity across schools that may be present.
The identification strategy must avoid that unobserved selection effects, i.e. factors
which affect the likelihood of ending up in a class with a high or low share of repeaters,
are still included in the error term of equation 5.2.16 However, since schools in the
community only include one class per grade, many of the practical concerns regarding
selective group formation within schools as mentioned in other studies (e.g. grouping
of students within the same grade into separate classes according to their abilities)
are not relevant to the scenario investigated here. Instead, it is known exactly how
the individual likelihood of ending up in a particular class is determined: it depends
on a child’s entry cohort, it’s probability of dropping out of school before reaching a
particular grade, and on the number of grades it has repeated.
As seen above, the likelihood of dropping out appears to be driven by other factors
than those determining the share of repeaters in a class, so I do not consider it as a
threat to the identification strategy.
Regarding individual grade repetitions, it is evident that factors determining the
likelihood that a child currently repeats a grade are also correlated with it’s current
classes’ share of repeaters. Since the regressions control for the number of non-repeating
students per class, this potential source of bias only concerns repeaters. As far as the
retention decision is merit based and the assumptions underlying value added specifi-
cations are met, taking into account first trimester exam results should already control
for the determinants of individual retention status. However, as discussed in the previ-
ous section, factors other than previous test scores also seem to affect the likelihood of
grade repetition. Thus, all regressions include a dummy for whether a student currently
repeats a grade as additional explanatory variable.
16Apart from selective peer group formation, the share of repeaters per class could, technically,
be correlated with the error term due to common shocks during the current school year. However,
contemporaneous shocks are unlikely to be associated with predetermined peer characteristics (Lyle
(2007)).
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Accordingly, I argue that estimates of β1 rely on exogenous variation in the share
of repeaters which reflects variation in the likelihood of retention within schools from
cohort to cohort, grade to grade, and year to year. As discussed in section 5.2, the
variation in the share or repeaters reflects, to a large extent, variation in achievement
across classes within the same grade in the previous year, and other sources of variation
include student characteristics not reflected in test scores as well as the strictness with
which the merit-based retention rule is enforced. All estimates shown in section 5.4 will
report standard errors clustered at the class level.
In order to assess the robustness of the results obtained by estimating model 5.2,
I also estimate additional specifications that add dummy variables for smaller units
than schools. Determining how the peer effect coefficient changes in response to such
alternations in model specification allows to observe whether the size or even the sign
of the peer effect depends the particular source of variation that is exploited for its
estimation. In the related literature, this point is often made to motivate comparisons
between estimates resulting from models with and without school fixed effects (Neidell
and Waldfogel (2010)). Model 5.3 is specified as
yitcs,trimester=3 = α + β1SR−i,tcs + β2NNRtcs + β3yitcs,trimester=1 + β4Ritcs
+
∑T
t=2
∑S
s=1 βt,s (T
t
tcs × Sstcs) + γ′Xtcs + itcs
(5.3)
where the T ttcs denote school year dummies (counting from 2, which is the second
school year in the sample i.e. 2005/2006 to T, the last year in the sample, which is
2009/2010). Model 5.3 exploits variation within each school-year combination. Thus,
looking at students who attended one school in a particular year, different grades are
compared.
However, in models 5.2 and 5.3, endogeneity could arise if controlling for first
trimester scores does not adequately account for educational inputs and teacher be-
havior during the previous school year. Such problems are particularly likely to arise
for classes in the same school and grade, and even more so for classes taught by the
same teacher. For instance, rather than being randomly assigned to classes each year,
teachers in the studied community tend to be responsible for the same grade for several
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years in a row. If one grade in a school is taught by a particularly bad teacher for two
years in a row, then the share of repeaters in the second year might be high and average
student achievement might be low simply due to low teacher quality.
In order to verify whether coefficient estimates change when I focus on variation
in the share of repeaters within groups of observations that are likely to be exposed
to some common educational production inputs and similar teacher behavior, I also
estimate the following two specification:
yitcs,trimester=3 = α + β1SR−i,tcs + β2NNRtcs + β3yitcs,trimester=1 + β4Ritcs
+
∑C
c=1
∑S
s=1 βc,s (G
t
tcs × Sstcs) + γ′Xtcs + itcs
(5.4)
where Gttcs are grade dummies. Model 5.4 exploits variation within each school-grade
combination. Thus, looking at all students who ever attended one grade in a particular
school, the specification compares the different years (i.e. cohorts of students), which
makes the strategy similar to the one applied by Hoxby (2000) who compares adjacent
student cohorts within the same grade within the same school; also see Hanushek et al.
(2003) for a similar strategy. Information on which teacher was assigned to which class
is also available in the data, so replacing Gttcs by teacher dummies would provide an
additional useful model. However, since during the period of observation teachers do not
switch schools or grades, this also amounts to a comparison between classes of the same
grade but between different years. Since, in addition, a single teacher is responsible for
teaching all subjects in one class, and, as table 5.7 in the appendix documents, only
very few changes in teacher assignment between different years are observed, estimates
controlling for teacher dummies would be based on very much the same variation as
those obtained from model 5.4. Unsurprisingly, estimation results from both of these
specifications turned out to be very similar (results controlling for teacher dummies are
not shown).
A concern regarding the interpretation of the results based on models 5.2 through
5.4 may be that the effect on scores does not reflect a change in achievement but
rather changes in grading standards. For instance, in response to the presence of many
repeaters, a teacher may lower grading standards in order to avoid that too many
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students would have to repeat yet again. As a result, test scores would measure actual
achievement with error. If this were true, this would result in an upward bias in the
estimate of the effect on actual achievement, such that the estimate of β1 could be
interpreted as giving upper bounds of the achievement effect. Moreover, controlling
for first trimester scores should reduce the potential bias caused by any adjustments in
grading standards as long as these affect only the level of a students scores throughout
a school year, not the change in scores.
Furthermore, a teacher might take into account a student’s status as either a re-
peater or a non-repeater when judging his performance. For example, he may give a
better score to a non-repeater than to a repeater even though their true performance is
identical, because he may value the repeaters’ achievement lower, as they had to take
the class twice in order to arrive at a given skill level. Consequently, grading stan-
dards for non-repeaters may be lowered, or standards for repeaters may be increased,
or both. The direction of a potential bias in the estimated effect on actual achievement
induced by such behavior is ambiguous, because it is not clear whether the average grad-
ing standard in a class would increase or decrease in response to additional repeaters.
Again, controlling for first trimester scores should reduce the potential bias due to such
adjustments in grading standards if they do not affect the change in individual test
scores.
The data used for this study were collected parallel to the deployment of the second
wave of the household survey described in chapter 3 which was conducted in the same
community in January 2011. The principals of all four primary schools allowed access
to all administrative student data they could find in their archives. These consisted
of hand written notebooks which teachers used to keep track of exam results for all
students. The resulting list included each attending student by name and, for each
trimester, the students’ exam results for each subject as well as the total score. These
tables were first scanned, and then transformed into spreadsheets which were assembled
to form a single dataset suitable for econometric analysis.
Notebooks that could be recovered ranged from the school year 2003/2004 until the
first trimester of the school year 2010/2011. Unfortunately, data from this time period
are not complete. Presumably, due to frequent changes in personnel, many notebooks
were simply misplaced. Even more mundane reasons for data loss included termite
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infestation. Table 5.7 in the appendix illustrates for which combinations of school,
school year, and grade data is available for the final sample. The original data include
2856 observations with non-missing third trimester exam results (one observation per
student) in 90 classes. In order to compute the share of repeaters and the individual
retention status, an observation can only be included in the sample if class exam results
are also available for the same grade in the same school in the previous school year.
This restriction reduces the number of observations to 1585 in 54 classes. In order to
estimate value added specifications, the first trimester score needs to be available for a
given school year and a given student as well, which further reduces the sample size to
1460 observations in 52 classes.17 Finally, the estimation of model 5.4 require variation
within grades of the same school. Thus, all classes are dropped which constitute the
single class observed for one grade in given school. This restriction leads to a final
sample of 1331 observations in 48 classes. Note that the way in which estimated models
are specified, the data are treated is if they were repeated cross sections. In reality, since
some of the cohorts a covered by more than one of the cross sections (as defined by
a school year), it is theoretically possible to take into account observations from more
than a single school year for an individual. However, given that data for many classes
are missing, the resulting individual panel data would be very unbalanced, and it would
contain many students who appear in the data only for one school year. Accordingly,
panel data methods would hardly improve upon the value added models presented
above.
A advantage of the data used for the analysis is that for each class in the data usually
the complete class is observed. As a result, I do not have to deal with measurement error
in the peer characteristics variable which can result if peer averages are calculated using
a subsample of students (Ammermueller and Pischke (2009)). However, the children
appearing in the data are still a non-random sample of the population of equally aged
children in the studied community. A concern regarding the interpretation of estimates
based on these data may be that children attending school are different from other
children with respect to learning and their reaction to various types of peers. However,
in the studied community, enrollment rates in primary school are very high. Out of the
17The loss of student data notebooks as described above included cases were third trimester and first
trimester results were documented in different notebooks, and only the former were recovered.
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551 children who are between six and twelve years old (the regular primary school age
group) and who are observed in the household survey described in chapter 3 in 2011,
93 percent were reported to be currently attending school. Furthermore, if a main
policy interest is to learn more about the determinants of school quality, then children
currently attending school can themselves be a population of interest.
A major challenge during the process of data preparation was to link individual
observations between consecutive school years in order to determine whether a student
proceeded regularly, repeated a grade or dropped out of school. This had to be accom-
plished based on the students’ names as indicated in the schools’ notebooks. However,
the exact spelling of the same name may differ depending on the teacher who writes
it down, and even for the same teacher noting the same name at several occasions. In
addition, the first name indicated by students may differ from one occasion to another,
as most children in Togo have at least two first names which are used interchangeably.
In order to solve the problem an algorithm similar to the one that linked observations
between the two waves of the household survey as described in section 3.3 was used.
The main difference between the two approaches was that the algorithm used for the
student data had to take into account that in the student data, the same individual
would usually appear more than twice. After this step of data preparation, a student
was defined to be a repeater in the current school year if his or her name appears in
both the current school year’s class list as well as in the same grade and the same school
one year earlier.
Table 5.6 in the appendix summarizes descriptive statistics based on the sample
used for the analysis discussed in the following sections.
5.4 Results
This section shows the results of estimating models 5.2 through 5.4 using all available
student data from the studied Togolese community fulfilling the sample requirements
described in the previous section. Table 5.2 presents the main results, displaying co-
efficient estimates for the share of repeaters per class and for individual first trimester
test scores with varying models and specifications. At first sight, estimates of the peer
effect are consistently negative, and they are statistically significant for most estimated
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models.
The rows in table 5.2 correspond to different models estimated, namely a baseline
model without fixed effects, and models 5.2 through 5.4 discussed in section 5.3. The
columns correspond to variations in these models which differ with respect to which
additional control variables are included as indicated at the bottom of the table. These
additional controls include first trimester scores (which was a standard control variable
in the equations presented in section 5.3, so for models 5.2 through 5.4 columns 5
through 8 are consistent with the presentation in section 5.3), school year dummies,
grade dummies, or any combination of these. This setup allows to give a first impression
of the robustness of the results.
The effect of first trimester scores on third trimester scores is estimated very pre-
cisely. The effect is about 0.6, and it is extremely robust to changes in specification (this
includes additional variants of the model which will be discussed in section 5.5). Com-
paring the columns 1 through 4 with columns 5 through 8 in table 5.2 shows that using
a value added specification (i.e. including fist trimester results as a control variable)
significantly affects the estimated peer effect only if grade effects are not controlled for.
Furthermore, when focussing on the results from the value added models in columns 5
through 8, the size of the estimated peer effect varies within a relatively small range
from -.33 to -.56. When exploiting only variation in the share of repeaters within the
same grade and same school (model 5.4), coefficient estimates are slightly larger, but
overall, there is no clear pattern linking the size of the estimate with the particular
source of variation in the share of repeaters exploited for its computation. It is partic-
ularly interesting to note that, comparing the baseline model with model 5.2, including
school dummies only has a very small impact on the peer effect estimate. Thus, as sus-
pected in section 5.3, non-random selection into different schools is less relevant to this
study than in earlier literature. Furthermore, the general robustness of the peer effect
estimate as seen from table 5.2 increases confidence in that the identification strategy
successfully accounts for all other aspects of peer group formation.
Table 5.3 shows results from estimating a subset of the models without including
individual retention status as a control variable. This change in specification hardly
affects coefficient estimates at all, even when not controlling for first trimester exam
results. This suggests that common determinants of retention status and the share
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of repeaters per class do not affect current achievement. The estimated coefficient for
retention status when it is included in the model as in table 5.2 is not interpreted here.18
Regarding the size of the peer effect, the middle of the interval between the lowest
and the highest coefficient estimate from value added models presented in table 5.2 is
equal to 0.45. In other words, an increase in the share of repeaters by one percentage
point reduces standardized test scores by about .45 points.
In terms of standard deviations a one standard deviation increase in the share of
repeaters per class reduces test scores by 13 percent of a standard deviation. This
figure is slightly above the range between .05 and .10 which Ammermueller and Pischke
(2009), summarizing previous studies on peer effects, indicate to be the range within
which the largest part of estimates fall. However, larger effects have been found as
well. The mean effect according to the analysis in Ammermueller and Pischke (2009)
is .17. Hanushek et al. (2003) find an effect of .35. Larger effects have also been found
in Hoxby (2000) and McEwan (2003). Naturally, the size of estimates can be expected
to depend on the peer characteristic that has been considered and on the particular
context of each study.
5.5 Robustness and potential mechanisms
Table 5.4 shows estimates of the effect of the share of repeaters where the dependent
variable has been replaced by scores for any of the five subjects that are consistently
graded for all schools and grades in the sample: dictation, mental arithmetic, (written)
math, math word problems, and drawing. Although all coefficients are estimated with
rather low precision, a clear pattern can be observed. The effect of classroom composi-
tion on student achievement is not homogenous across subjects, and the subjects most
clearly negatively affected are mental arithmetic and math word problems.
The result that peer effects are more relevant to math achievement than to outcomes
in other subjects is consistent with similar findings in various contexts. For Israeli pri-
mary schools, Lavy and Schlosser (2011) find that gender composition in the classroom
only affects math, science and technology test scores, but not language test results.
18See Manacorda (2008) and Jacob and Lefgren (2004) for studies which carefully identify the causal
effect of retention status on individual achievement of repeaters.
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Tab. 5.2: Coefficient estimates for the share of repeating classmates
Specifaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline model
Share of repeaters -.97∗∗∗ -1.11∗∗∗ -.38 -.47∗ -.41∗ -.47∗∗ -.33 -.41∗
.31 .29 .25 .25 .22 .22 .22 .21
First trimester score .59∗∗∗ .6∗∗∗ .6∗∗∗ .61∗∗∗
.03 .03 .03 .03
Model 5.2
Share of repeaters -.93∗∗∗ -1.04∗∗∗ -.29 -.32 -.46∗ -.5∗∗ -.37 -.4∗
.3 .3 .24 .24 .24 .24 .23 .21
First trimester score .58∗∗∗ .59∗∗∗ .61∗∗∗ .62∗∗∗
.04 .03 .03 .03
Model 5.3
Share of repeaters -1.07∗∗∗ -.29 -.48∗ -.49∗
.29 .26 .25 .26
First trimester score .59∗∗∗ .63∗∗∗
.03 .03
Model 5.4
Share of repeaters -.38 -.44∗ -.51∗∗ -.56∗∗∗
.24 .24 .2 .19
First trimester score .62∗∗∗ .63∗∗∗
.03 .03
Additional controls:
First trimester score X X X X
Year dummies X X X X
Grade dummies X X X X
All regressions control for number of non-repeating classmates as well as individual retention status. Sample:
Observations for all students from classes for which results for the same grade in the same school in the previous
school year are available and for which at least one more class in the same school and same grade also fulfills the
same requirement; individual observations are dropped for all students form whom first or third trimester total
exam results are missing (N=1331). Standard errors of coefficient estimates are given in italic; asterisks indicate
statistical significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent significance level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at
the class level.
158
CHAPTER 5. GRADE RETENTION AND PEER EFFECTS
Tab. 5.3: Coefficient estimates for the share of repeating classmates - not controlling
for individual retention status
Specifaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline model
Share of repeaters -.96∗∗∗ -1.1∗∗∗ -.37 -.47∗ -.41∗ -.47∗∗ -.33 -.41∗∗
.31 .29 .25 .25 .22 .22 .22 .2
First trimester score .59∗∗∗ .6∗∗∗ .61∗∗∗ .61∗∗∗
.03 .03 .03 .03
Model 5.2
Share of repeaters -.93∗∗∗ -1.04∗∗∗ -.3 -.34 -.46∗ -.51∗∗ -.37 -.4∗
.3 .3 .25 .25 .24 .24 .23 .21
First trimester score .58∗∗∗ .59∗∗∗ .61∗∗∗ .62∗∗∗
.04 .03 .03 .03
Model 5.4
Share of repeaters -.39 -.47∗ -.51∗∗ -.56∗∗∗
.25 .25 .2 .19
First trimester score .62∗∗∗ .63∗∗∗
.03 .03
Additional controls:
First trimester score X X X X
Year dummies X X X X
Grade dummies X X X X
All regressions control for number of non-repeating classmates. Sample: Observations for all students from classes
for which results for the same grade in the same school in the previous school year are available and for which at
least one more class in the same school and same grade also fulfills the same requirement; individual observations
are dropped for all students form whom first or third trimester total exam results are missing (N=1331). Standard
errors of coefficient estimates are given in italic; asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent
significance level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the class level.
Tab. 5.4: Effect of share of repeaters on raw scores in different subjects
Dependent variable:
Dictation Mental arithmetic Math Word problems Drawing
Model 1 -.003 -.022 -.001 -.04 .013
.022 .026 .027 .028 .013
Model 3 -.029 -.039 -.018 -.038∗ .017
.022 .028 .026 .02 .014
Number of observations 1328 1329 1328 1327 1328
All regressions control for number of non-repeating classmates, school dummies, year dummies, grade dummies as
well as individual retention status. Sample: Observations for all students from classes for which results for the same
grade in the same school in the previous school year are available and for which at least one more class in the same
school and same grade also fulfills the same requirement; individual observations are dropped for all students form
whom first or third trimester results for the respective subject are missing. Note that in cases of missing subject
scores, the total trimester score can still be available, because it was recorded by teachers in an extra column.
Standard errors of coefficient estimates are given in italic; asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1-, 5-, and
10-percent significance level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the class level.
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According to the results in Hoxby (2000), positive peer effects for Texan primary school
students associated with a higher share of classmates being female are larger for math
than for reading. For students of the US Air Force Academy, Carrell et al. (2009) find
that peer quality matters only for math and science achievement as opposed to physical
education and foreign languages.
Given the high relevance that has been attributed to math and science education in
previous studies, the finding that classroom composition matters particularly for math
scores is quite interesting. On an aggregate level, mathematical skills have been found
to be associated with economic growth (Hanushek and Woessmann (2008)). For both
developing and industrialized countries, it has been shown that the private returns to
learning math can be very high (Hanushek and Woessmann (2008), Joensen and Nielsen
(2009)).
Another aspect regarding the potential channel of the estimated peer effect is whether
the results allow to distinguish between the impact of a change in classroom compo-
sition and a change in class size. Since all regressions presented so far control for the
number of non-repeating students, an increase in the share of repeating classmates ac-
tually means two things: the retention status of the average classmate changes, but the
class also increases in size. In an attempt isolate the classroom composition effect, I
estimated alternative models that control for total class size rather than the number of
non-repeating class mates.
A potential drawback of this approach is that variation in the share of repeaters
can now be due to both a change in the number of repeaters and a change in the
number of non-repeaters. Accordingly, identification assumptions for these models are
stronger than for the models discussed above, since they would include assumptions
not only about inputs to educational production for the same grade last year but also
for the preceding grade last year. However, as table 5.9 in the appendix shows, the
estimates for the effect of the share of repeaters are very similar whether class size is
controlled for or the number of non-repeating class mates. Consequently, I interpret the
results presented in tables 5.2 and 5.4 as indicating the effect of a change in classroom
composition.
Another approach to examining potential mechanisms that contribute to the class-
room composition effect is to add specific control variables which further narrow down
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the type of variation in the share of repeaters identifying the estimated coefficient. Two
such variables on the class level which are both available in the data and are interme-
diate variables in the determination of the share of repeaters are class size and number
of failing students in the previous class (of the same grade).
The number of failing students in the previous year should reflect both the ”output”
of the previous class’ educational production as well as their teacher’s grading standard.
Thus, when controlling for the number of failures from the previous class, the variation
in the share of repeaters that is ”left over” should reflect deviations from the retention
rule.
The size of the previous class should reflect variations in cohort size, but also ed-
ucational achievement of even earlier classes (because last year’s class size is in part
determined by last year’s number of repeaters). When controlling for the previous
class’ size, the remaining variation in the share of repeaters should reflect variation in
average achievement in last year’s class, variations in last year’s grading standards as
well as deviations from the retention rule.
Table 5.5 presents results for the respective estimations of the effect on individual
test scores. In comparison with table 5.2, coefficient estimates of the effect of the share
of repeaters tend to be somewhat larger in absolute size. However, neither adding the
number of failures nor previous class size significantly affects the main results, even
though the process causing the identifying variation in the share of repeaters is quite
different. Thus, classroom composition changes due to an increased number of repeaters
negatively affect student achievement irrespective of the reason for the increased share
of repeaters.
5.6 Conclusion
In order to investigate the peer effects of grade retention, this study used administrative
student data from four primary schools in a Togolese community. Identification relied
on variation in the share of repeating classmates within schools. I argued that, given
the primarily merit-based retention policy in the studied schools, the estimated value
added models of student achievement appropriately account for selection into classes
when controlling for school choice and individual retention status. The identifying
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Tab. 5.5: Coefficient estimates for the share of repeating classmates: controlling for
previous classes’ size and number of failures
Controlling for Controlling for
number of failures previous class size
(5) (6) (7) (8) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Model 5.2
Share of repeaters -.61∗∗ -.64∗∗∗ -.5∗∗ -.54∗∗∗ -.46∗ -.51∗∗ -.38∗ -.43∗∗
.25 .23 .21 .2 .24 .23 .23 .21
First trimester score .6∗∗∗ .62∗∗∗ .61∗∗∗ .62∗∗∗ .57∗∗∗ .59∗∗∗ .6∗∗∗ .61∗∗∗
.03 .03 .03 .03 .04 .03 .03 .03
Model 5.4
Share of repeaters -.6∗∗∗ -.66∗∗∗ -.51∗∗ -.56∗∗∗
.22 .23 .2 .2
First trimester score .62∗∗∗ .62∗∗∗ .62∗∗∗ .63∗∗∗
.03 .03 .03 .03
Additional controls:
First trimester score X X X X X X X X
Year dummies X X X X
Grade dummies X X X X
All regressions control for number of non-repeating classmates as well as individual retention status. Sample:
Observations for all students from classes for which results for the same grade in the same school in the previous
school year are available and for which at least one more class in the same school and same grade also fulfills the
same requirement; individual observations are dropped for all students form whom first or third trimester total
exam results are missing (N=1331). Standard errors of coefficient estimates are given in italic; asterisks indicate
statistical significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent significance level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at
the class level.
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variation in the share of repeaters per class came from, essentially, comparing different
cohorts of students within schools.
The estimates consistently show that test scores are significantly negatively affected
by increases in the share of repeaters. A one standard deviation increase in the share of
repeaters per class is estimated to reduce individual test scores by about 13 percent of
a standard deviation. Estimates are robust to changes in model specification associated
with different sources of variation in the share of repeaters. The effect is heterogenous
across subjects taught, and it is particularly pronounced for mental arithmetic and
math word problems. I also showed that the estimates can be interpreted as showing
the impact of actual changes in class composition rather than changes in class size.
A drawback of the data used for the analysis is that they do not include additional
individual control variables. In order to further verify the robustness of the estimated
peer effect it would be preferable to be able to control for additional determinants
of educational achievement. Since the household data described chapter in 3 were
collected in the same community, the majority of children from the student data can be
expected to be included in the household data as well. Since the household data also
include information on the children’s names and current enrollment status, including
the grade and school they attend (for both waves, i.e. in fall 2008 and early 2011), it
is, technically, possible to match observations from both datasets. However, given the
frequent misspelling of names and the ambiguous use of first names described in section
5.3, this is a task that is either very programming- or time-intensive (if done by hand),
and it is left for future research.
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5.7 Appendix: additional tables and figures
Fig. 5.1: Share of students per class who are repeaters
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Tab. 5.6: Means and standard deviations of variables used for the analysis
All Grade
Grades 1 2 3 4 5 6
Student level characteristics
Total scores, 3rd trimester Mean 95.47 114.8 102.94 82.59 81 79.73 123.98
S.D. 34.46 38.88 28.85 29.5 32.36 20.18 18.38
Total scores, 1st trimester Mean 96.28 128.65 104.49 72.77 88.3 79.5 112.64
S.D. 37.8 33.01 31.31 31.3 34.57 19.46 15.66
Retention status Mean .22 .2 .2 .24 .28 .23 .12
N 1331 301 322 431 143 100 34
Dictation, 3rd trimester Mean 3.43 5.8 2.39 3.12 3.17 1.46 2.96
S.D. 3.08 2.31 2.41 3.27 2.86 2.73 1.97
N 1331 301 322 431 143 100 34
Mental arithmetic, 3rd trimester Mean 5.07 6.24 4.66 4.24 5.38 5.46 6.65
S.D. 3.09 2.95 3.21 3.09 2.6 2.66 1.95
N 1331 301 322 431 143 100 34
Math, 3rd trimester Mean 5.57 6.05 4.01 5.11 4.32 9.53 15.4
S.D. 3.72 3.07 2.62 2.68 3.36 4.61 4.31
N 1330 301 321 431 143 100 34
Math word problems, 3rd trimester Mean 6.32 9.04 7.91 4.04 4.42 5.17 7.6
S.D. 4.07 2.36 3.41 4.2 3.19 3.68 2.5
N 1328 301 319 431 143 100 34
Drawing, 3rd trimester Mean 6.05 5.69 5.77 6.25 6.5 6.27 6.87
S.D. 1.05 1.15 .9 .97 .94 1.06 .71
N 1329 301 321 431 143 99 34
Class level characteristics
Number of repeaters Mean 6.4 5.82 5.82 8.77 7.4 4 2
S.D. 3.65 3.71 3.54 3.7 2.7 1.41 0
Class size Mean 31.94 36.27 31.09 36.62 32.6 19.33 18.5
S.D. 14.51 15.63 16.38 12.98 14.4 2.73 7.78
Previous class size Mean 31.65 35.64 29.82 36.31 34.2 20 18
S.D. 14.77 16.95 14.32 14.19 16.63 2.83 7.07
Previous number of failures Mean 15.33 8.82 9.55 24 20.6 13.83 18
S.D. 9.47 5.25 4.82 10.86 7.57 2.64 7.07
N 48 11 11 13 5 6 2
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Tab. 5.7: Assignment of teachers to class es in the sample
Year
School Grade 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 1 A A A
1 2 B B B B B
1 3 C C
1 4 D E
2 1 F F
2 3 G H H H
3 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. I I J
3 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. K K I
3 3 n.a. L L L
3 4 M M M
3 5 n.a. n.a. n.a. N M O
3 6 O O
4 2 P
4 3 Q Q Q
Sample: All classes for which exam results for the same grade in the same school in the previous school year are
available and for which at least one more class in the same school and same grade also fulfills the same requirement
(N=48). The different letters represent different teachers. ”n.a.” indicates that observations from this class are
included in the data, but the teacher identity could not be recovered.
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Tab. 5.8: Effect of previous class’ number of failures and previous class size on current
share of repeaters at the class level (N=48)
Number of failures Previous class size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Model
Number of failures .47∗∗∗ .48∗∗∗ .63∗∗∗ .63∗∗∗
.13 .13 .17 .17
Previous class size .28∗∗ .27∗ .23∗ .21
.13 .14 .13 .14
Restricted R2 .29 .35 .43 .5
Unrestricted R2 .44 .51 .57 .64 .35 .41 .47 .53
Within schools
Number of failures .48∗∗∗ .63∗∗∗ .72∗∗∗ .74∗∗∗
.16 .17 .21 .24
Previous class size -.11 .21 -.1 .01
.23 .14 .24 .26
Restricted R2 .41 .35 .5 .56
Unrestricted R2 .51 .64 .62 .66 .41 .53 .5 .56
Within year by school
Number of failures .43∗∗ .66∗∗
.19 .28
Previous class size -.07 -.04
.31 .33
Restricted R2 .56 .65
Unrestricted R2 .63 .72 .56 .65
Within grade by school
Number of failures .84∗∗∗ .88∗∗∗
.25 .28
Previous class size -.18 -.07
.28 .3
Restricted R2 .54 .6
Unrestricted R2 .65 .7 .55 .6
Additional controls:
Year dummies X X X X
Grade dummies X X X X
Sample: All classes for which exam results for the same grade in the same school in the previous school year are
available and for which at least one more class in the same school and same grade also fulfills the same requirement
(N=48).
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Tab. 5.9: Coefficient estimates for the share of repeating classmates: controlling for
class size (rather than the number of non-repeaters)
Specifaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Model 5.2
Share of repeaters -.88∗∗∗ -.98∗∗∗ -.31 -.3 -.47∗∗ -.46∗∗ -.35∗ -.34∗∗
.25 .26 .2 .19 .2 .21 .2 .17
First trimester score .58∗∗∗ .6∗∗∗ .61∗∗∗ .62∗∗∗
.04 .04 .03 .03
Model 5.4
Share of repeaters -.38∗ -.41∗ -.49∗∗∗ -.52∗∗∗
.21 .21 .18 .18
First trimester score .63∗∗∗ .63∗∗∗
.03 .03
Additional controls:
First trimester score X X X X
Year dummies X X X X
Grade dummies X X X X
Sample: All regressions control for class size as well as individual retention status. Sample: Observations for all
students from classes for which results for the same grade in the same school in the previous school year are available
and for which at least one more class in the same school and same grade also fulfills the same requirement; individual
observations are dropped for all students form whom first or third trimester total exam results are missing (N=1331).
Standard errors of coefficient estimates are given in italic; asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1-, 5-, and
10-percent significance level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the class level.
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6.1 Questionnaire for a household survey conducted
in a Togolese community - First wave (2008)
6.1. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR A HOUSEHOLD SURVEY CONDUCTED IN A
TOGOLESE COMMUNITY - FIRST WAVE (2008)
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CHAPTER 6. GENERAL APPENDIX
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6.1. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR A HOUSEHOLD SURVEY CONDUCTED IN A
TOGOLESE COMMUNITY - FIRST WAVE (2008)
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6.2. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR A HOUSEHOLD SURVEY CONDUCTED IN A
TOGOLESE COMMUNITY - SECOND WAVE (2011)
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6.2. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR A HOUSEHOLD SURVEY CONDUCTED IN A
TOGOLESE COMMUNITY - SECOND WAVE (2011)
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CHAPTER 6. GENERAL APPENDIX
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